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Abstract
Take any belief of yours – even one about which you feel supremely confident. The Sceptic will
ask: why do you think it is true? You might take yourself to have a very good reason to believe what
you do. But the sceptic will also want to know why you think that this second thing is true as well.
You might offer yet a third reason for believing that, but the sceptic won't stop. He will want, again,
to know why you believe that third thing. How will you choose to answer the sceptic's constant
questioning? You might just keep going on, offering yet more and more reasons every time the
sceptic questions you. Or you might argue in a circle, so that you defend your original belief by an
argument which eventually appeals again to that very belief. Or you might argue that your original
belief can eventually be defended by appeal to a set of assumptions for which you do not have any
further reasons. But are any of those options really acceptable, or should you give up your original
belief? If the latter, then since the sceptic could question any of your beliefs in this way, does that
mean that you should give up all of your beliefs? Are you open to blame and criticism just for
believing anything at all?
The Pyrrhonian sceptic tries to convince us that the answers to these questions are “yes”. In this
work, I explicate the sceptical strategy in detail and consider philosophical attempts to evade its dire
conclusion. My development of Scepticism draws on the ideas of Sextus and three of his scholars,
Barnes, Bailey and Machuca, as well as BonJour and Oakley.
A number of philosophers have criticized Scepticism on the grounds that it  presupposes a non-
ordinary definition of “knowledge”. The sceptic tries to show that our common-sense belief that we
know all sorts of things about the world is really a giant error, but the only way he manages to do it,
according to these philosophers, is by starting with a definition of “knowledge” vastly removed
from our usual one. This strategy is the dominant way of criticizing Scepticism in contemporary
epistemology.  It  is  deployed  by John  Greco,  Alvin  Goldman,  Mark  Kaplan  and  many others.
Against these philosophers, I urge that the sceptic's using the word “know” in a non-ordinary way
does not harm the substance of his arguments at all. 
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A number of philosophers have argued that the sceptic's standards for right or justified belief should
be rejected. I argue that the standard which the Pyrrhonian lays down is not at all ridiculous. All he
asks of us is that we have some reason, no matter how weak, for believing that P rather than -P – a
reason which might convince someone who did not already believe that P. And so the sceptic lays
down a standard which it may be very difficult to give up. What's more, I argue, by discussing the
views of Michael Williams and Michael Huemer, that it is far from clear that there is anything in the
neighbourhood that is particularly plausible as an ethics of belief. 
These two broad anti-sceptical gambits are the currently dominant ones. In showing them to be
unsatisfactory, I show that the sceptic still has us firmly in his net. 
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Introduction 
1. The Basic Idea
Take any belief of yours – even one about which you feel supremely confident. The Sceptic will
ask: why do you think it is true? You might take yourself to have a very good reason to believe what
you do. But the sceptic will also want to know why you think that this second thing is true as well.
You might offer yet a third reason for believing that, but the sceptic won't stop. He will want, again,
to know why you believe that third thing. How will you choose to answer the sceptic's constant
questioning? You might just keep going on, offering yet more and more reasons every time the
sceptic questions you. Or you might argue in a circle, so that you defend your original belief by an
argument which eventually appeals again to that very belief. Or you might argue that your original
belief can eventually be defended by appeal to a set of assumptions for which you do not have any
further reasons. But are any of those options really acceptable, or should you give up your original
belief? If the latter, then since the sceptic could question any of your beliefs in this way, does that
mean that you should give up all of your beliefs? Are you open to blame and criticism just for
believing anything at all?
Sextus Empiricus presents that line of thought – the Modes of Agrippa – as a dialectical strategy for
convincing others that they have,  ultimately,  no reason to believe anything at  all,  and that they
should suspend judgement about any issue whatsoever. He tries to convince us that we are wrong to
hold our beliefs. In this work, I defend that strategy against various responses to it.  I therefore
defend the initially absurd view that there is, ultimately, no reason to believe anything at all and
that, as a result,  we should not believe anything. I defend it in the usual philosophical way: by
defending it against objections and arguing against opposing ideas. My purpose in defending it is
not to show that Scepticism is true, or that Sextus' strategy should be utterly convincing to all of us.
My purpose is just to show that certain responses to Sextus' strategy are unsatisfactory, with the
hope that this increases our understanding of Scepticism. To the extent that the reader agrees that
those responses are unsatisfactory, to that extent I succeed. 
The first response I will discuss has to do with the word, “knowledge”. Scepticism is quite often
associated with the phrase “nobody knows anything”, and the arguments for Scepticism are often
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reconstructed – by dogmatists  – as  having that  as their  conclusion.  This way of understanding
Scepticism leads to the often made complaint that the sceptic uses the word “know” in a non-
ordinary way.  His standards for knowledge,  the critic  will  say,  are  far more stringent  than our
ordinary ones. This way of criticizing Scepticism is incredibly popular in present epistemological
writings. A large amount of effort has been spent on providing 'analyses' of (allegedly) ordinary
epistemic concepts like “knowledge”. Most philosophers who have developed these theories have
been keen to present them as opposed to Scepticism, and it is quite often championed as a virtue of
a theory that it undermines, criticizes or at least avoids Scepticism. For various reasons which I will
explain, I do not think that it is a significant criticism of Scepticism to say that sceptics use the word
“know” in a non-ordinary way. 
The second and third responses both have to do with the ethics of belief. The sceptic, in using his
dialectical strategy, hopes to convince the dogmatist that he ought to give up his beliefs. In doing
that, he presupposes that you should believe only what there is some reason to believe. For a long
time, I took that view to be obvious, but recent philosophy has shown that it isn't that obvious. It is
probably fair to say that it is now a minority view and that various less stringent standards for belief
are currently much more popular. The second and third responses to Scepticism that I will discuss
both involve adopting some such more liberal ethic of belief. 
According to versions of Conservatism, you are entitled to hold a belief (at least to some degree),
by the mere fact that you believe it or that it seems to you to be true. For reasons which I will
explain, I deny that any version of Conservatism is a plausible ethic of belief, and so I deny that this
wasyof avoiding the sceptic's trap is a satisfying one. 
According to Contextualism, you may be entitled to hold a belief for no reason at all, so long as you
are  in  the  right  context.  Thus,  so long as  you are  in  the  right  context,  the sceptic's  dialectical
strategy is, allegedly, of no force. For reasons which I will explain, I deny that Contextualism is a
plausible response to Scepticism as well. 
My defence of Scepticism is obviously limited. There are all sorts of other ways that anti-sceptical
philosophers (call them dogmatists, like Sextus Empiricus does) have responded to Scepticism, and
I don't have something to say about all of them here. For example, there are dogmatists who accept
the Agrippan standards for right belief but say flatly that the sceptic is just wrong that there is no
reason to believe anything – though by now the number of philosophers sticking their heads up to
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defend  this  is  countable  on  one  hand.  There  are  also  dogmatists  who  hold  that  Scepticism is
completely meaningless or incoherent – though again,  their  aren't  too many people prepared to
defend the view in print these days. There are also those dogmatists who hold that Scepticism is un-
liveable or  psychologically impossible  and so must  be rejected  on those grounds.  I  don't  have
anything to say about those issues here. That is not because I don't take the issues to be important.
On the contrary, I take them to be the most important, and I am even inclined to think that there is
some truth in at  least  the first and third options,  but that is not how the majority of dogmatist
philosophers see things. As they see it, the issues I discuss here are the important ones, and so those
are the ones I opt to discuss. I content myself with showing that those responses to Scepticism are
unsatisfactory. Whether any other response is better, I suspend judgement.
This introduction has a number of other sections. The next section distinguishes some different
forms of Scepticism. Section 3 is a general overview of the entire work. Section 4 is about the
epistemic “ought”; section 5 clears up some smaller issues, and section 6 gives thanks to those who
have helped me.
2. Various forms of Scepticism
I follow tradition in understanding by a sceptical argument one which argues that we do not know,
ought not to believe or have no reason at all to believe something which most people take fore-
granted.  At  the  present  time  philosophical  writings  are  filled  with  a  large  number  of  different
sceptical arguments. 
Cartesian sceptical arguments deny some positive epistemic status to beliefs about the physical
world. So the Cartesian sceptic will typically say that I do not know, ought not to believe or have no
reason at all to believe that there is a physical world – a world which is not a part of my mind in the
way that pain and other mental states are part of my mind. Sceptical arguments for this conclusion
usually make appeal to sceptical scenarios. For example, the hypothesis that while it looks to me at
the moment just like I am sitting in my bedroom, I am in fact asleep having the dream that I am
sitting in my bed room; or again the hypothesis that while it looks to me at the moment just like I
am sitting in my bedroom, I am in fact having a hallucination produced by an evil demon bent on
tricking me into getting things wrong. 
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Cartesian sceptical arguments work on the idea that in some sense I cannot tell whether or not a
sceptical scenario obtains. There are two Cartesian sceptical arguments that are widely discussed:
the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument. The Closure argument is as follows. I
can know that I am sitting in my bedroom only if I can know that I am not in a sceptical scenario.
But I cannot know that I am not in a sceptical scenario, and therefore cannot know that I am in my
bedroom. Yet, plausibly, if I know anything at all about the physical world then I know right at this
moment that I am sitting in my bedroom, and so it turns out that I cannot know anything about the
physical world. That argument is due to Nozick:
You think you are seeing these words, but could you not be hallucinating or dreaming or
having your brain stimulated to give you the experience of seeing these marks on paper
although no such thing is before you? More extremely, could you not be floating in a tank
whil  super-psychologists  stimulate  your  brain  electrochemically  to  produce  the  whole
sequence of experiences you have had in your lifetime thus fat? If one of these other things
was happening, your experience would be exactly the same as it now is. So how can you
know none of them is happening? Yet if you do not know these possibilities don't hold, how
can you know you are reading this book now? If you do not know you haven't always been
floating in the tank at the mercy of the psychologists, how can you know anything – what
your name is, who your parents were, where you come from? (Nozick, 1981, 167). 
Another variation on the same idea is as follows.  The only way we know that there is a physical
world is by experience. That we see the physical world is how we know that it is there. But all of
the evidence yielded by sense perception is compatible with the truth of a sceptical hypothesis. The
existence of the physical world is indistinguishable from the truth of, for example, the hypothesis
that the physical world does not exist and I am being deceived by an evil demon. So I cannot know
that the physical world exists on the basis of sense perception alone. But it is plausible that there is
no other way at all that I could know that the physical world exists. It follows that I cannot know
that the physical world exists at all. This way of spelling out the Cartesian argument is due to Vogel:
 Suppose you see a tree. You take your sensory experience at that time to be caused by a tree.
But  if  you  have  just  as  much reason to  think  that  something else  is  the  cause  of  your
experience, your belief that there is a tree in front of you is arrived at arbitrarily and doesn’t
amount to knowledge. Skeptical arguments, as I understand them, are meant to establish that
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every one of our perceptual beliefs faces competition from an equally good alternative. It
would follow that we are never in a position to know anything about the world around us
(Vogel, 2004, 427). 
In addition to Scepticism about the physical world there are myriad others. There is, for example,
Scepticism which grants the existence of the physical world whilst it is being perceived, but doubts
whether it exists when unperceived. I have myself tried to reconstruct an argument for this kind of
Scepticism out of the philosophical writings of W.T Stace (1934; Burns, 2018). The argument is
this. I can only know about the sensible world by perceiving it or by inferring it from what I do
perceive. I cannot know, for example, how many pieces of paper are in my drawer without looking
(or at the very least without somebody else looking and telling me) or inferring the answer from
what I already know about the contents of my room. Yet I cannot perceive that something exists
unperceived, because that is a contradiction, and there is no serious inference from anything I do
know to the conclusion that anything exists unperceived. Therefore I cannot know whether anything
at all exists when unperceived. If I place a piece of paper in the drawer and close it, I cannot know
whether the paper continues to exist after I have closed the drawer (Burns, 2018; Stace, 1934). 
All of these same arguments can be reconstructed in basically the same way for conclusions about
our reasons for the beliefs in question – that there is no reason to believe in the physical world or no
reason to believe that anything exists unperceived. It is also possible, if we introduce a normative
principle  about  when  belief  is  and  is  not  appropriate,  to  construe  them as  arguments  for  the
conclusion that we ought not believe these things. 
There are of course many other kinds of Scepticism as well: Scepticism about other minds; about
the past; about the future; a priori Scepticism; Moral Scepticism and so on.
My focus in this work is none of the above versions of Scepticism or the associated arguments. My
focus is Pyhrronian Scepticism. Pyrrhonian Scepticism is, according to Paul Moser (2000),  “the
most powerful skeptical challenge” and according to Laurence BonJour (2008), it is “the central
question  in  epistemology”.  There  are  a  number  of  Pyrrhonian  themes  but  the  main  one  is  a
development of the five modes presented in Sextus Empiricus' (2000) Outlines1. It goes by the name
“the Modes of Agrippa” and may be characterized in the way that I suggested at the start. It tries to
1 It is worth noting that Sextus also offered a number of other arguments. For more on this, see Reed (2007) and 
Barnes (2007). 
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convince us that we are wrong, blameworthy or open to reproach just for believing anything at all.  
3. An Overview
The work is divided into eleven chapters, excluding this introduction, a concluding section and an
appendix.  Chapter  1  explains  what  Pyrrhonian  Scepticism is  in  detail,  and  lays  out  Agrippa's
Trilemma. Chapter 2 discusses the charge that Scepticism presupposes a non-ordinary definition of
“knowledge”. I take a careful look at what exactly the charge of using a non-ordinary definition of
“knowledge” really amounts to, drawing on its articulation by Greco and Kaplan. I argue that it
doesn't amount to anything. There is no significant criticism that can be made of the charge, even if
we grant that there is such a thing as the ordinary meaning of “knowledge”.
Chapter 3 explicates Phenomenal Conservatism – the view that you ought to believe, at least to
some extent and absent defeaters, what seems to you to be true. Huemer, like Williams, also sees the
sceptic as trying to lure us into suspension of judgement through an unnatural and unattractive
standard for reasonable belief. If we replace the sceptic's standards with Phenomenal Conservatism,
the sceptic's argument unravels. Chapter 4 argues that there are no such things as 'seemings' – the
mental state which does all the heavy lifting in the theory. Chapter 5 discusses Michael Huemer's
Self-defeat  argument  for  Phenomenal  Conservatism.  He  claims  that  the  denial  of  Phenomenal
Conservatism is in a sense self-defeating. I deny that it is, and show the argument to be fallacious.
Chapter 6 discusses a different way of using Phenomenal Conservatism to criticize Scepticism, and
I argue that this too fails. Chapter 7 sweeps Phenomenal Conservatism aside to consider its cousin,
Doxastic Conservatism. I argue that Doxastic Conservatism is implausibly permissive.  
Chapter  8  is  about  Michael  Williams'  Contextualist  reply  to  Scepticism.  Williams  rejects  the
sceptic's standards for right belief and develops an alternative. Chapter 9 criticizes Williams' claim
that his Contextualism is in line with “our epistemic practices”. I argue in Chapter 10 that Williams
avoids the sceptic's lure to suspension only at the high cost of embracing a kind of Relativism about
reasonable  belief,  and  that  even  having  done  so  his  theory  is  compatible  with  the  heart  of
Scepticism. 
The sceptic's dialectical strategy presupposes that the dogmatist  will  accept a certain policy for
forming and evaluating beliefs, or, if you like, an ethics of belief. That policy is what I call Extreme
Evidentialism. Most philosophers will take it to be a seriously implausible view, but I defend it from
objections and highlight what makes it attractive in the final chapter. 
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4. Epistemic Oughts and “Justification”
Plenty of people often enough wonder what they ought to believe. Should I believe that there is a
God? Or should I believe that the material world is all there is? When the matter is of immanent
importance, the question only presses itself harder. Should I believe that my friends' wife is being
unfaithful, or should I trust her? Should I believe that my ship is seaworthy, or should I check it
over once more before I let the passengers on board? Sometimes it makes sense to say to another
person, “you should not have believed that! That was too hasty!”, “you shouldn't have jumped to
conclusions” or “you shouldn't just assume these things”. All of this is to say that plenty of us
presuppose at least implicitly that there are rights and wrongs in belief; that we have obligations and
duty's with respect to belief, and that people can be properly blamed and criticized for having the
wrong beliefs. I assume here that this is correct2. 
Some philosophers say that a belief  is  “justified” when it  is  blameless or does not  violate  our
epistemic obligations (Ginet, 1985). I am tempted by this usage.  The language of “justification”
however, is not only used in this way. Other philosophers use it to mean very different things, and it
is  sometimes very difficult  to tell  how a given author means to be using the word at  all.  This
semantic issue has created a severe amount of confusion in epistemology.
First, the basic question raised by Agrippa's Trilemma is: what reason do I have to believe anything
at all? A reason is an indication that a belief is true. As we have said, the reasons in question are
supposed to answer the sceptic's  question,  “why believe that?”.  It  is  absolutely crucial  that the
reasons in question are ones that I have, in the sense that those reasons are more or less readily
available to me on reflection so that I might actually appeal to them to answer the sceptic's “why”
question.  It  is  common  for  philosophers  who  call  themselves  “Internalists”  to  use  the  word
“justification” to refer to the possession of reasons of this kind, saying that to have a reason to
believe something is to have some justification for believing it (BonJour, 2003).  I will not use the
language of justification for that purpose. I will just speak directly of “reasons”. 
2 See Ryan (2003) for a defence.
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There is also a fundamental divide between “Internalist” and “Externalist” epistemologists. Ginet
(1985) helpfully distinguishes three ways of understanding Externalism.
4.An Externalist account of the ordinary meaning of “justification”.
5.An Externalist account of the ordinary meaning of “knowledge”. 
6.An Externalist account of the 'fourth condition' of  the ordinary meaning of “knowledge”. 
Externalists who offer (4) deny that the internalist conception of justification is what is ordinarily
meant by “justification”. Externalists will say that to have a justification for a belief means to have a
belief  which  stands  in  some  causal  or  modal  relation  to  the  world.  The  most  straightforward
example is a crude version of Goldman's (1995) definition, on which a belief is justified if and only
if it is produced by a reliable process. The priests' belief that God exists may be justified if it is
produced by the reliable  functioning of the holy spirit  within him, even if  he has no reason –
internally available to him – to believe either that God exists or that the holy spirit is functioning
reliably within him. And the same will apply to more mundane beliefs and processes, such as my
belief that I have hands and the sensory processes which produce it.
Externalists who offer (5) will deny that the internalist conception of justification is necessary for
“knowledge” in the ordinary sense. Almost all philosophers agree that “knowledge” means at least
“true belief”. A debate between internalists and externalists arises over what else must be added to
complete  the  definition.  Externalists,  in  denying  that  internalist  justification  is  necessary  for
knowledge will typically insert some other condition, of which there are now various. Externalists
typically define “knowledge” in terms of a complex causal or modal relation between the subject's
beliefs and the world – a relation which may entirely escape the subject's grasp. The paradigm
example of these is, again, Goldman's idea of a reliable process.
Externalists who offer (6) may concede that the internalist conception of justification – that of an
accessible reason for the belief – is necessary for knowledge in addition to true belief but insist that
some fourth condition is  needed. The fourth condition may,  again,  be spelt  out by reference to
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reliable processes or something similar of which the subject may be entirely unaware. These, then,
are  three  debates  which  arise  between  philosophers  who  call  themselves  “Externalists”  and
“Internalists”. 
To avoid all of these wrangles I will try to avoid use of the word “justified” entirely. One of our
topics here is whether we are wrong to believe as we do – whether we should hold our beliefs or
instead give them up. I will use explicitly deontological language in this connection. I will speak of
a  belief  being  right,  acceptable,  blameless  or  properly  beyond  criticism  (Huemer,  2001,  10;
Nottleman, 2013). 
The question is then one of when belief is acceptable and when it isn't. I will say that a general rule
for when we should accept beliefs or when we should reject  them is  a “policy” of belief.  For
instance, the rule, “if someone you respect disagrees with you about whether or not P, you should
reduce your confidence that P”, is a policy for belief. So too is “you should believe what your
evidence supports, and nothing else”. The question of what our epistemic duties are is then the
question of which policies are correct.
Many other authors use the language of “justification”, and I will try to explain what they mean by
using it where necessary. If I have used the word “Justified” somewhere in this work, I mean to use
it in the deontological sense; and I do not mean to assert that this is the “ordinary meaning” of the
phrase, nor do I take any view on that issue here3. I can only hope that the astute reader can follow
my path through the linguistic maze. 
In my terminology, the sceptic is trying to convince us, first that there is ultimately no reason to
believe anything at all, and second, that we should not believe anything at all. 
5. Other Issues
3 Although, I am sympathetic to Swinburne's (2001) view about the ordinary concept of justification, and I defend a 
similar view about “knowledge” in chapter 3. 
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What follows is my attempt to anticipate some questions and criticisms the reader may have about
my project as I have so far described it and to answer them ahead of time. 
(a) “You do not discuss the most powerful criticisms of Scepticism here. Why do you not
discuss Philosopher X's response to Scepticism?”
In my discussion of Scepticism, I have opted to deal only with criticisms which seem to me to
dominate the epistemological field at present. I will not, therefore, have anything to say about, to
take  examples,  Kant,  Heidegger  or  Hilary Putnam's  views  on Scepticism.  The  justification  for
making this restriction is that Scepticism is regarded by most philosophers as an epistemological
topic, and so, one might think, if anyone has a cogent criticism of Scepticism (or a solution to the
problem of Scepticism), it will be philosophers who specialize in epistemology at the cutting edge
of the field.  A great number of those specialists  have developed criticisms of the kind which I
discuss here. It might be that it is wrong to assume that epistemologists will have the most insight
into Scepticism, and that Kant, Heidegger, Putnam and the rest of Philosophy have more insight on
the matter than the epistemologists but it remains true that the latter are the sensible place to start. 
(b) “So your thesis is wholly negative? You are just going to criticize other people's theories
the whole time? You should really try to construct your own theory as well if you want your
thesis to be really valuable. It is very easy to tear down other people's work, and not so easy
to make something yourself.”
Given that very few philosophers are sceptics of any sort the probability that the reader is not at all
sympathetic to Scepticism is high. Most philosophers have almost always seen Scepticism as a bad
thing; as an enemy, threat, opponent, paradox, or absurdity. This way of speaking can create an
unacceptable bias against Scepticism. I have discussed my research with many philosophers who
hold this attitude and explained to them that my aim is to defend Scepticism against the criticisms
of (some) contemporary epistemologists. On hearing this,  they have quite often said something
critical, like (b). I anticipate that there will be readers who have this same criticism in mind. But the
criticism is ill-founded. What I will do in this work is defend Scepticism from criticism. There is no
reason to think of this project as “wholly negative” or as not offering anything constructive. It is no
less constructive than is defending Naturalism, Utilitarianism, Platonism or any other philosophical
position. Of course, it doesn't offer anything constructive to philosophers who oppose Scepticism,
but the only reason to infer from this that the project is “wholly negative” is the assumption that
Scepticism is the super villain, to be defeated at all costs by philosophical theory, and this is nothing
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more than an unjustifiable bias against Scepticism. 
(c) “There is already a vast literature on Scepticism. What can you possibly hope to say of
any originality?”
Although there are some influential books about Cartesian Scepticism and its responses – Barry
Stroud's (2008) being the most obvious – I can find no equivalent for Pyrrhonian Scepticism. There
is Fogelin's (1994) but it is over twenty years old and although it is insightful, it is showing its age
insofar as it does not discuss any of the more recent reactions to Pyrrhonian Scepticism which I
include here. So, my first hope is that I can provide a single treatise written in a single voice which
discusses some of the major reactions to Pyrrhonian Scepticism which have developed in recent
years, as opposed to the scattered writings which presently exist. 
In  my discussions  of  contemporary epistemological  theories,  I  also hope to have constructed a
number of novel arguments and criticisms, and to have developed arguments which have been made
by others into something stronger. Even if I fail to be convincing in my negative assessment of
epistemological theorizing, perhaps I will nevertheless have done enough in these other ways to
provoke discussion. 
(c) Who Cares about your research? Or why should they?
I discuss directly a number of authors who have criticized Scepticism. Chiefly John Greco, Mark
Kaplan, Michael Williams and Michael Huemer. Those philosophers should be interested in what I
have to say here because if I am right then their criticisms of Scepticism fail. 
But  my  work  has  a  wider  audience  than  that.  The  most  prominent  and  popular  responses  to
Scepticism in the literature today are of the three kinds that I discuss here. If I am right in my
negative assessments of those responses, then contemporary epistemologists have wasted a large
amount of their resources pursuing an anti-sceptical strategy which fails.
(d) Why don't you discuss Reliabilism or Epistemological Externalism?
I do discuss it! In chapter 2 I discuss the charge that the sceptic uses the word “know” in a non-
ordinary sense. That is what prominent Externalist philosophers, like Alvin Goldman, John Greco
and David Armstrong, have said about Scepticism. They have analysed the ordinary meaning of
“know” in Externalist terms, and then said that the sceptic does not use the word in the ordinary
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way. 
So I discuss Externalism as a semantic theory. I don't discuss it as a proposed epistemic duty. Why
not? I have just never found Externalism, understood that way, even a little bit plausible, for this
reason: it is quite sensible to answer the question “how should I maintain my beliefs?” by saying
“use reliable methods”, but that alone is not the Externalist answer to the question. The answer is
“use reliable methods, even if you aren't aware that they are reliable”. The Externalist will urge that
we should criticize a person for holding a belief by taking into consideration things of which they
weren't aware, nor perhaps even could be aware of with some reflection, but how on earth can I be
sensibly blamed for doing something even when I was not aware that I was doing it? I cannot be
blamed for using an unreliable method for forming my belief if I was not aware that the method was
unreliable, and that is just what a typical Externalist theory  will imply. That point is due to Ginet
(1990). Most Externalists reply by denying outright that beliefs are subject to obligations at all,
because, they say, beliefs are not under voluntary control. That response, however, is not a defence
of an Externalist answer to questions about what we ought to believe – it is a repudiation of the
questions  entirely,  usually  followed  up  the  entirely  different  issue  of  providing  an  Externalist
analysis of the English words “justified” and “knows”.
As I said, that argument against Externalism is a thirty year old one, due to Ginet, and nothing else I
would have to  say about  Externalism is  any more original4.  What  I  would do in  a  chapter  on
Externalism is nothing more than trot out the objections to it  which most philosophers already
know:  BonJour's  clairvoyance  counter-examples,  the  generality  problem,  the  new  evil  demon
problem, bootstrapping and epistemic circularity,  etc,  before returning to make the fundamental
point made by Ginet. For this reason, I opt just not to discuss Externalism, except as a semantic
theory, and to let readers discover the literature about it at their leisure. 
Chapter 1: Agrippa's Trilemma Explicated
1. The Beginning
The sceptic, as I shall understand him here, is a person who practices total suspension of judgement
about everything. He is, also, someone who tries to convince other people to join him. He tries to
4 The distinction between saying that my beliefs are subject to evaluations of praise and blame in accordance with an 
ethics of belief, and saying that the ordinary word “justified” means “praiseworthy” or “blameworthy” seems like a 
very obvious distinction, but I didn't even think of that myself! See Nottleman (2013). 
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convince the dogmatist that he has no reason for his belief and, the sceptic hopes that the dogmatist
will thereupon give up his belief. 
To pull off the rhetorical feat, the sceptic has a certain strategy. In this chapter, I say what that
strategy is.  Sections  2  is  about  Sextus  Empiricus  and the  Modes  of  Agrippa.  Section  3  is  on
Oakley's use of the modes. Section 4 is on Fogelin's use of them. Section 5 summarizes the modes
as resting on the thought that it is unacceptable to hold a belief on the basis of assumption, circular
argument or infinite regress. Section 6 explains what is wrong with assumption. Section 7 explains
what is wrong with circularity. Section 8 explains what is wrong with infinite regress. are devoted to
that purpose. Section 9 summarizes puts it all together, and Section 10 discusses the charge that
Scepticism is self-refuting. 
2. Sextus and The Modes of Agrippa
An argument is a set of sentences in which one sentence is claimed to follow logically from the rest.
When contemporary philosophers think about  versions of Scepticism they typically think about
what arguments there are for them. The sceptic is said to put forward various sentences which we
are supposed to find plausible, and then to claim that his sceptical views follow logically from them.
That is not how Sextus Empiricus presents Pyrrhonian Scepticism, and it is not how he presents the
five Modes of Agrippa either. 
Sextus presents the modes most clearly in this passage:
The later Skeptics hand down Five Modes leading to suspension, namely these: the first
based on discrepancy, the second on the regress ad infinitum, the third on relativity,  the
fourth on hypothesis, the fifth on circular reasoning. That based on discrepancy leads us to
find that with regard to the object presented there has arisen both amongst ordinary people
and amongst the philosophers an interminable conflict because of which we are unable either
to choose a thing or reject it, and so fall back on suspension. The Mode based upon regress
ad  infinitum is  that  whereby we assert  that  the  thing  adduced as  a  proof  of  the  matter
proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on ad infinitum, so that the
consequence is suspension [of assent], as we possess no starting-point for our argument. The
Mode based upon relativity . . . is that whereby the object has such or such an appearance in
relation to the subject judging and to the concomitant percepts, but as to its real nature we
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suspend judgment. We have the Mode based upon hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being
forced to  recede  ad  infinitum,  take  as  their  starting-point  something  which  they do not
establish but claim to assume as granted simply and without demonstration. The Mode of
circular reasoning is the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter
of  inquiry  requires  confirmation  derived  from the  matter;  in  this  case,  being  unable  to
assume either in order to establish the other,  we suspend judgement about both. (Sextus
Empiricus, 2000 164-69).
The five modes are presented as dialectical strategies “leading” to suspension. The sceptic and the
dogmatist  are engaged in a discussion about some issue. The dogmatist  judges that his view is
correct. The sceptic tries to convince the dogmatist to suspend judgement using these strategies. In
the mode of discrepancy, the sceptic points out that there are lots of people who disagree with the
dogmatist. In the mode of  relativity, the sceptic points out that the dogmatists' judgements are only
how things appear to him and that there is a plain difference between how things seem to you and
how things really are. In the mode of regress, the sceptic demands an argument for the dogmatists'
claim, and an argument for the premises of the first argument, and an argument for the premises of
the second argument, and so on ad infinitum. In the mode of circularity, the dogmatist is accused of
arguing in a circle, and in the mode of hypothesis he is accused of making an assumption there is no
reason to believe. 
Sextus sometimes uses each of the modes alone against dogmatist views, but he more often uses
several  of  them together  (Barnes,  1990,  113).  There are  various  ways  of  deploying the  modes
systematically, some of which Sextus seems to have used and some of which are just ways in which
they could be used. Barnes (1990) surveys the way in which Sextus could use each mode alone to
try and lead dogmatists to suspension, and also the ways in which the modes could be used in
tandem. For my purposes, I focus on a particular systematization of the modes – what Barnes calls
“the System of Three Modes”. 
Suppose that the dogmatist judges something to be true, say, P. The sceptic will ask “why believe
that P?”. Either (1) the dogmatist merely judges it to be true for no reason, or (2) he supports his
judgement  with  some reason,  R1.  If  (1),  then  the  sceptic  accuses  the  dogmatist  of  making an
assumption for no reason (the mode of hypothesis). If (2), then either (3) R1 is a claim we have seen
before or else (4) it is a new claim. If (3) then the sceptic accuses the dogmatist of arguing in a
circle (the mode of circular reasoning). If (4) then either (5) the dogmatist merely judges R1 for no
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reason or (6) he supports his judgement with some reason, R2. If (5) then the mode of hypothesis
applies again. And so on, until the sceptic accuses the dogmatist of an infinite regress (Barnes,
1990, 119). 
The three modes work together to  “weave the web that will trap those who endeavor to justify any
belief using different strategies” (Machuca, 2015, 25). In arguing this way, the sceptic hopes to
convince  the  dogmatist  to  suspend  judgement  about  P.  The  dogmatist  will  only  be  lead  to
suspension, however, if he thinks that his defences of P are insufficient. For instance, when the
sceptic accuses the dogmatist of making an arbitrary assumption, the dogmatist will only suspend if
he takes arbitrary assumption to be unacceptable. So too with the other modes. The dogmatist will
only suspend judgement when accused of arguing in a circle or a regress if he takes those ways of
defending  his  belief  to  be  unacceptable.  Sextus  thus  presupposes  that  the  dogmatist  will  have
certain standards for right belief in the forgoing strategy. He assumes that the dogmatist will find
hypothesis, circularity and regress all unacceptable5. 
3. Oakley's Three Modes
As I have noted, Sextus' use of the modes is very different from what is usually called a sceptical
argument  in  contemporary philosophy.  Sextus'  strategies  for  inducing suspension are dialectical
moves, designed to persuade the dogmatist to suspend. They are not much like sceptical arguments
in the sense of sentences from which sceptical conclusions follow logically. 
There are ways, however, to present the modes as a sceptical argument. I.T Oakley begins his 1976
paper with “I shall argue that no beliefs are justified... even to the most minimal degree” (Oakley,
1976, 221). He goes on to argue in this way:
Someone claiming A to be justified in p must accept that p is either: (1) itself basic, or else
dependent on one or more basic beliefs' or (2) a member of a series of an infinite number of
different beliefs,  justifedness in each of which is dependent upon the justifiedness in its
successorts in the series; or (3) p is a member of a series of a finite number of different
beliefs justifiedness in at least one member of which depends at least partially upon itself. In
traditional terms, we must choose between a sort of foundationalism, an infinite regress, or a
5 Note that Sextus need not himself accept those standards. It is sufficient that the dogmatist accepts them. 
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coherence  account  of  justfieidness.  The  chain  of  beliefs  upon  which  p  depends  for  its
justifiedness either stops, is infinite, or loops back on itself. In what follows I shall argue
against each of the three possibilities concluding that the chain does not in fact start. P is not
justified. (Oakley, 1976, 221). 
Oakley goes on in the paper to argue against the three options he canvasses, eventually concluding
that “no beliefs are justified”. 
There is obviously a clear parallel between the way Sextus deploys his dialectical strategies and
Oakley's argument. The modes of hypothesis, circularity and regress all make their appearance, and
are  all  found to  be objectionable.  On the assumption that  there are  no other  ways  in  which a
dogmatist might defend his judgement that P, Oakley draws his sceptical conclusion. 
We should pause for a moment to examine that conclusion, however. One might be inclined to think
that Oakley's conclusion parallels the one Sextus tries to get his dogmatist opponents to draw. On
that  interpretation  of  Oakley,  he  would  be  arguing that  we ought  to  suspend judgement  about
everything  –  that  our  beliefs  fall  short  of  standards  which  we  should  hold  them  to.  That
interpretation of Oakley is certainly supported by the way he speaks at the beginning of the paper,
saying that as he is using the word “justified”, it is equivalent to “reasonable” or “rational” (Oakley,
1976, 221). 
Yet, in another paper, interpreting him this way makes his view quite puzzling: 
The sceptic can easily accept the sensibleness of holding beliefs relative to local or short
range  aims;  it  may  be  sensible  to  hold  a  belief  relative  to  the  immediate  goal  of  the
elaboration of a pre-existing belief system. The very same belief may be unjustified, in the
sceptic's view, relative to the aim of holding a belief which is not merely derivable from
other unquestioned beliefs but from other justified beliefs, or from a set of beliefs which
may be regarded as in some way better than  any possible alternative set (Oakley, 1988,
278).
Oakley goes on:
[the sceptic]  uses purely those contextualist  senses of 'justified',  where justifiedness is  a
matter of reasonableness given the essentially local epistemic aim of having a belief that fits
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in with the currently accepted system (Oakley, 1988, 279).
If we take Oakley to be saying that our beliefs fall short of the proper ethics of belief, it is hard to
understand what  could  be meant  by saying that  our  beliefs  are  justified relative  to  the aim of
extending our belief system and yet unjustified relative to the aim of having a belief or set of beliefs
that is better than any other. Either a belief meets the standards of acceptable belief or it doesn't. If
my belief that there are aliens does not meet the proper standards, then it does not meet them period,
even if my aim is to extend my belief system. 
Perhaps what Oakley means is this. My belief may be acceptable relative to the aim of extending
my belief system in the sense that, given that my belief system is itself acceptable and this new
belief follows from it, it too is acceptable. Oakley's sceptic will not deny a conditional claim of this
sort. What the sceptic will deny, however, is that any belief (and so any belief system) is acceptable
in  the  first  place.  This  puts  Oakley's  conclusion  back  in  tune  with  the  one  Sextus  wants  his
dogmatist opponents to draw, and Oakley draws it.
4. Fogelin's Modes
Robert Fogelin has defended what he calls “Neo-Pyrrhonian Scepticism”. He says that the Agrippan
modes presuppose W.K Clifford's Evidentialist principle that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and
for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (Clifford, 1877). Once that principle is
accepted, he says:
The task of the remaining three modes-those based on regress ad infinitum, circularity, and
(arbitrary) hypothesis-is to show that it is impossible to complete this reason-giving process
in a  satisfactory way.  If  the Pyrrhonists  are  right,  no argument,  once  started,  can  avoid
falling into one of the traps of circularity, infinite regress, or arbitrary assumption (Fogelin,
1994, 116) . 
He  then  argues  at  some length  that  no  contemporary “theory  of  justification  has  come close”
(Fogelin,  1994, 119) to solving the problem and avoiding the sceptical result  that  we ought to
suspend judgement about everything. 
In another paper, he sums the Pyrrhonian strategy up succinctly:
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The central concern of the Pyrrhonists was the claimed capacity of their dogmatic opponents
to present adequate reasons in behalf of their dogmas as, following their own standards, they
pretended to do. The central maneuver of Pyrrhonists was to challenge the dogmatists to
produce such reasons (Fogelin, 2004, 170). 
And again:
Both  the  foundationalists  and the  coherentists  undertook the  task  of  showing that  some
suitably large and important region of our knowledge claims is capable of validation. They
both  thought  that  these  knowledge  claims  could  be  defended  by  presenting  reasons
establishing their legitimacy. If that is what theory of knowledge is supposed to do, then, as
it seems to me, the five Agrippan modes involving discrepancy, infinite regress, relativity,
hypothesis (or arbitrary assumption), and circularity show that this cannot be done (Fogelin,
2004, 162).
5. Outlines of Pyrrhonian Scepticism 
The dogmatist claims that P. The sceptic asks him why he believes that P. Any answer that the
dogmatist gives to the sceptic looks to involve one of three possibilities:
Assumption: An argument from arbitrary assumptions.
 Circularity: A circular argument.
Regress: An infinitely long argument.
The dogmatist is supposed to find all of these unacceptable, and is, for that reason, supposed to
suspend judgement. Why might he find them unacceptable?
6. What is Wrong with Assumption?
Reasoning from an assumption involves producing as reasons for accepting P some other belief Q
for which no further reason can be given. The most obvious thing to say about why such reasoning
is unsatisfactory is that reasoning from assumption amounts simply to giving up on answering a
given request for reasons, for it involves, by definition, accepting a proposition for no reason. 
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Any belief can be supported by an argument from an arbitrary assumption. An advocate of Norse
mythology could support his belief that the earth is made of the corpse of the giant Ymir by arguing
from an arbitrary assumption.  Odin  and his  brothers  killed Ymir  and made the  earth from his
corpse. Therefore the earth is made from Ymir's corpse. Here is a valid argument for the earth's
being made from Ymir's corpse6, but the argument starts from a premise which the advocate of
Norse mythology cannot give us any reason to believe. There is simply no reason to believe that
Odin and his brothers fought and killed Ymir in the first place. Thus, anything at all may be proven
from arbitrary assumptions.
What's worse, any proposition P and its negation may be proven from arbitrary assumptions. Take
any  proposition,  P supported  by  an  argument  from  arbitrary  assumptions.  Now  consider  this
argument: God says that -P and God does not lie. Therefore -P. There is no reason to believe the
premises of this argument anymore than the argument for P and vice-versa. Both arguments are of
equal force in this sense. They cancel each other out, leaving us with no reason at all to favour P or
-P.  As Barnes puts it:
If it is acceptable for a Dogmatist to hypothesize that P then it must be equally acceptable for
a sceptic to hypothesize -P. But if -P is no less acceptable than P, we cannot accept P just
because the Dogmatist chooses it (Barnes, 2007, 100)7. 
If, in trying to answer the question, “why believe that P?”, you give such an argument, you do not
really answer the question at all, because your  answer is of such a kind that could just as well be
given for -P. 
7.  What is Wrong with Circular Reasoning?
Circular reasoning is reasoning for a conclusion, P, in which P features as a premise. Many writers
on this issue are unacceptably brief. Klein writes of circular reasoning that its' unacceptability is
“an obvious  presupposition  of  good reasoning”  (Klein,  1999,  298),  but  he  never  says  what  is
actually wrong. BonJour complains that:
6 These fascinating myths are retold by Gaiman (2017). 
7 Barnes attributes the argument to Sextus Empiricus. See also Oakley (1976).
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A justificational structure whose branches all terminate in this way again seems to provide
no reason for thinking that any of the component non-conditional beliefs are true (BonJour,
2003, 12).
Again, BonJour asserts that circular reasoning cannot provide a reason for thinking that beliefs in
the circle are true, but does not say why not. Williams offers a brief argument:
Reasoning in a circle is  a paradigmatically poor sort  of reasoning: how can a statement
support itself? Supposing that it could embodies a kind of pragmatic inconsistency, treating
the same statement as needing support... and as already in order (Williams, 2001,62). 
If we spell out the “pragmatic inconsistency” involved, however, I think you will see that Williams
has not really offered any explanation of what is wrong with circular reasoning. The idea here is
that in arguing in a circle from P to Q to R and back to P I treat P as already acceptable (in the
beginning) and yet also in need of argument (in the conclusion), and this is inconsistent on my part.
If P is already acceptable then there is no need for an argument for it, and if P is not acceptable then
an argument which uses P as a premise cannot legitimately be invoked. 
Yet, why is it the case that if P is not acceptable then an argument using P as a premise cannot be
legitimately invoked? Williams has not answered this question, and it is, to my mind, the very same
question as “what is wrong with circular reasoning?”
Barnes explains well what is wrong with circular reasoning in the present context. 
Take any circle or web of beliefs, W. Let it be as complex as you like. Now construct a
different web, W*, in the following fashion. Replace the constituent beliefs, all or some of
them, by different and incompatible beliefs. (Replace 'Honey is sweet' and 'Naples is in Italy'
by, say, 'Honey is sour' and 'Naples is in Greece'.) Rope up the new beliefs in the same sort
of way as you roped up the old – the ropings follow the same rules and exhibit the same
complexity as before.
Now compare W and W*. In W we shall find a belief, P, which does not appear in W*.
Instead,  W*  will  contain  some  belief  P*,  which  is  incompatible  with  P.  Now  P was
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supposedly justified by its position in W – we were allegedly justified in believing that P by
the  fact  that  P was  tied  to  or  supported  by  numerous  other  propositions  which  were
themselves tied and supported in turn. But W* has just the same structure, in all relevant
respects, as W. Hence if P was justified by its position in W, P* will  be justified by its
position in W*. But we know that P and P* are incompatible with one another. Hence we
cannot be justified in holding both of them. Hence we are justified in holding neither of them
(Barnes, 2007, 87-88). 
The point  of offering the circular  reasoning is  to  find some reason to prefer  a  belief,  P,  to  its
negation, -P. Yet it is always possible to produce circular reasoning both for P and -P. Take any
circular argument for any proposition, P, which you might be inclined to accept. I can always argue,
for example, that -P is true because Thor said so, and I know that everything Thor says is true
because Thor has said -P, and -P is true. If circular reasoning is supposed to give me some reason to
believe P over -P, it is to say the least unclear how it can do so when formally identical circular
reasoning may be produced on both sides.  Again, the question “why believe P?” goes unanswered
if we offer the sceptic a circular argument, since a formally identical argument may be produced for
believing differently. 
8. What is Wrong with Infinite Regress?
An infinite regress of reasons is a chain of reasoning for a conclusion, P, where Q is the reason for
P, R the reason for Q, S the reason for R, and so on ad infinitum. It is common to lodge an objection
to infinite regresses of reasons called “the Finite Minds Objection”. Williams presents the objection:
The [proposed] regress of justification of S’s belief that p would certainly require that he
holds an infinite number of beliefs. This is psychologically, if not logically, impossible. If a
man can believe an infinite number of things, then there seems to be no reason why he
cannot know an infinite number of things. Both possibilities contradict the common intuition
that the human mind is finite. Only God could entertain an infinite number of beliefs. But
surely God is not the only justified believer (Williams, 1981,85)
The reason why Williams seems to think that it is impossible to have an infinite number of beliefs is
this. Every belief is either conscious or unconscious. It is psychologically impossible for anyone to
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have an infinite number of conscious beliefs because having a conscious belief requires considering
a proposition, and no mortal has enough time to consider an infinite number of propositions. It is
also impossible for anyone to have an infinite number of unconscious beliefs because, according to
Williams,  it  would  require  having  a  belief  the  content  of  which  was  too  complex  for  me  to
understand, let alone believe. He gives the following example. Williams unconsciously believes that
he is within 100 miles from Boston. He also believes that he is within 200 miles from Boston  and
that he is within 300 miles from Boston...  ad infinitum (Williams, 1981, 85-86). He points out,
however, that I could not really believe the entire infinite series of propositions in this set, because
to believe a proposition I must at least understand it, and eventually a proposition in this set will be
The proposition “I am within n miles from Boston”, where n is a number so large that I cannot
understand what number it is. 
In response, Klein (1999, 307) points out that although it is true that we cannot have an infinite
number of consciously formed beliefs,  we can have an infinite number of unconscious beliefs.
Concerning Williams'  example,  Klein rightly notes  that  the fact  that  a  particular  set  of infinite
propositions contains a proposition too complex for me to believe, it does not follow that any set of
infinite propositions will be the same. Suppose, for example, that there were an infinite number of
round objects. I could believe, of each object, that it is round and so have an infinite number of
unconscious  beliefs  (Klein,  1999,  307)8.  It  is,  therefore,  false  that  we  cannot  have  an  infinite
number of beliefs. 
We may grant that it is psychologically possible for me to have an infinite number of beliefs, but
there still seems to be a problem. It is not only necessary that I have an infinite number of beliefs
but that I have an infinite number of  reasons. That is, I must have an infinite number of beliefs
capable of standing in premise-conclusion relations to one another, and that I have any such chain
of beliefs as that to support even one belief of mine seems doubtful. What does the infinite chain of
reasons look like, for example, for my belief that I am in my apartment?  I do not know. That is to
say, if the sceptic presses me endlessly for why I believe that P and then for why I believe my
reasons for P, and for why I believe those reasons... etc, I am doubtful that I really could continually
answer his questions at every stage.
8 Klein's exact position is that, in the case where there are an infinite number of round objects, we have a disposition 
to form the disposition to think of each object that it is round. He prefers talk of dispositions to think various things 
rather than talk of “unconscious beliefs”. I stick with “unconscious beliefs” in the text because that is Williams' 
language. 
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Klein seems to be open-minded as to whether an infinite number of reasons is available for anything
that we believe.  He seems to think that,  whenever we are pressed to give reasons for what we
believe, it might yet turn out that we can think  of them, ad infinitum (Klein, 1999, 216). This
optimism is surely unwarranted. Take any belief that philosophers have traditionally thought to be
difficult to find reasons for – belief that there is a physical world. We might be able to find a good
reason to believe that there is a physical world – perhaps by arguing that the existence of such a
world is the best explanation of our sensory experiences. But the sceptic will want to know why we
believe  that  we  have  certain  sensory  experiences  and  why  we  believe  that  criteria  of  best
explanation are truth-conductive. Maybe – just maybe – we can find reasons for those things, but
the sceptic will only rear his head again, and, speaking for myself, my own ingenuity is starting to
wear thin. I am not sure I could continue the reasoning back even one more round, never mind an
infinite number of rounds, even supposing my reasoning to that point is cogent – which many
philosophers would likely deny. 
Furthermore, it should be of no surprise to be told that no philosopher has ever seriously attempted
providing an infinite chain of arguments for any proposition at  all,  never-mind for propositions
which are typically the victims of sceptical criticism. There are no papers,  for example,  which
purport to be capable of even so much as schematically gesturing as to how an infinite chain of
arguments might be produced for the belief that there is a physical world, or that other human
bodies have minds, or that the world has existed for more than five minutes. The idea of an infinite
chain  of  arguments  sufficient  to  meet  the  sceptic's  questioning  is  only  an  empty  theoretical
possibility. This, all by itself, shows that the dogmatist has no hope of answering the question, “why
believe that P?”, by an infinitely long argument. He just can't think of any such argument. 
Suppose, however,  that I really am able to think of a argument for P, and an argument for the
premises of the first argument, and an argument for that, ad infinitum. Would the infinite chain of
arguments genuinely give me a reason for believing P as opposed to -P? I do not think that it would,
given that it is easy to create infinite sequences of inferences for anything at all. Suppose that I do
have an infinite string of arguments for P. It is all too easy to create a formally identical infinite
string of arguments for -P (Barnes,  2007, 53-54). I might say that I believe that -P because Thor
said so, and Odin assures me that Thor is truthful, and Loki assures me that Odin is truthful, and... n
assures me that n-1 is truthful ad infinitum. Since infinite strings of argument may be produced on
both sides of any issue, it is difficult to see how such strings are supposed to provide a reason to
favour one particular side. 
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Here, then, is the problem with an infinite chain of reasons; one can be produced for any side of any
issue, meaning that such a chain never yields a decisive consideration in favour of either side of a
debate. The sceptic's question, “why believe P?”, has not been answered. 
9. Running Out of Reasons
The dogmatist claims that P. The sceptic asks him why he believes that P. The dogmatist has either
an argument from assumption, a circular argument or an infinitely long argument. In any such case,
the sceptic urges the dogmatist to think that his belief is unacceptable. The belief is supposed to be
unacceptable because for any pair of propositions P and -P, one can produce an argument from
arbitrary assumption, a circular argument and an infinitely long argument on both sides; at which
point, the sceptic's question returns: why believe one side and not the other? The dogmatist is thus
unable to  provide what Paul  Moser  (2000,  209)  calls  “non-question begging warrant  for  [his]
beliefs”9. If  the  sceptic  continues  to  ask  “why?”  for  long  enough,  no  belief  will  survive.  The
dogmatist will always run out of answers1011.
It  is  important not to read too much into the fact that  the sceptic and the dogmatist  are being
imagined here as two different people engaged in a debate. It might be tempting to think that the
dogmatists' failure to answer the sceptic's “why” questions is “merely” a dialectical point with no
further  import,  but  this  is  too quick in  two places.  First,  the sceptic  is  trying to  convince you
9As Fumerton puts it:
The [sceptic]…wants to know why we can legitimately conclude that a certain way of forming a belief is
legitimate, and the [sceptic's] philosophical curiosity isn’t going to be satisfied by being told at any stage of the
game that it just is. (Fumerton 2006, 184)
10 The argument might nevertheless be useful for some purposes. An argument which depends on an arbitrary 
assumption might be quite effective dialectically if the assumptions are such that the audience accepts them. 
Plantinga describes natural theology in this way, as the attempt to  “show that some of the central beliefs of theism 
follow deductively or inductively from propositions that are... accepted by nearly every sane man”. (Plantinga, 1967,
4). 
11From a common-sense standpoint, this result seems absurd. It seems quite obvious that we have excellent reasons for
holding various empirical beliefs. I believe at this moment that I am sitting on my bed, and it seems so obvious as to be
hardly worth stating that I have very good reason for believing this to be so, at least at this very moment. Yet, the
attempt to state exactly what my reasons are is fraught with difficulties well-known to philosophers. The difficulties are
so great as to have convinced some philosophers that there is no account available of why we believe anything at all
about the world. According to Barry Stroud, “... the philosophical problem of the justification of our beliefs in general
cannot be solved” (Stroud, 2004, 176).
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precisely that it does have further import; that it shows that you ought not to hold the beliefs, and so
to plant one's feet and stubbornly insist without further ado that it has no such import is just to
ignore the sceptic's gambit all together. What one needs to do is develop some principled account of
why it  has  no  such import.  More  importantly,  imagining the  sceptic  and the  dogmatist  as  two
different people is just a useful way of framing the issue. The dogmatist could run through all of the
“why?” questions about his own beliefs, just by rehearsing the issue in his mind. It would be, surely,
quite alarming to ask yourself “why believe that I have hands?”, and to find yourself completely
drawing a blank; with no answer whatsoever to the question, and so, ultimately, no reason to believe
it. 
The dogmatist, then, is supposed to find his belief unacceptable once he finds himself in this absurd
position. 
10. Is Scepticism Self-Refuting?
The sceptic's gambit involves two ideas:
(S) I have, ultimately, no reason to believe anything at all.
(S*) We ought to suspend judgement about everything. 
The sceptic's dialectical strategy is designed to convince me first of (S) and then consequently of
(S*), but, some dogmatists have supposed that (S), (S*) or both are self-refuting, and concluded on
that basis that Scepticism itself is self-refuting.
In order to determine whether or not Scepticism really is self-refuting, the notion of self-refutation
must be made more precise. In the most obvious sense, a proposition, p, is self-refuting if and only
if it implies something which contradicts it (Gallios, 1993). Say that a thesis which is self-refuting
in this sense is  self-contradictory. I cannot find any argument for the conclusion that (S) is self-
contradictory.
In another sense, a thesis is self-refuting if and only if believing it entails that it is false. This sort of
self-refutation is found in Descartes' Cogito. It is self refuting for me to believe that I do not exist.
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There is nothing impossible about my not existing, but my believing that I do not exist entails that I
do. Following Gallios (1993), let's say that a thesis which could be true but could not be truly
believed is self-falsifying. Scepticism would be self-falsifying only if my believing it entailed that
there were at least some complete reasons to believe at least one proposition. There does not seem
to be any argument on this front either. Clearly my believing that there is no complete reason to
believe anything at all is compatible with it being true, or at least, there is no obvious argument to
the contrary. 
In a third sense, a thesis is self-refuting only if, given that it is true, there is no reason to believe that
it is. Let's say that a thesis like this is self-defeating. Scepticism certainly is self-defeating. If it is
true that there is no complete reason to believe anything at all, it follows that there is no complete
reason to  believe Scepticism itself.  But  what  is  problematic  about  self-defeat?  A self-defeating
thesis could still be true, so why does it matter that Scepticism is self-defeating? It matters because
the person who asserts a self-defeating thesis cannot coherently take themselves to have complete
reason to believe it. They in effect must assert “p, but there is no complete reason to think that p”.
The sceptic, in order to maintain coherence, must deny that he has any complete reason to believe
his Scepticism. 
There is still no serious problem in the vicinity for the sceptic. So long as he does not claim to have
complete reasons for his Scepticism, he seems to be on solid ground. True, the things the sceptic
says might, at this point, sound a bit unusual. It is unusual to say “P but there is no reason to believe
that P”, but it is hardly an objection to his position that it sounds odd, and even if it were, that is a
far weaker objection than the initially very threatening charge of “self-refutation”.
I conclude that (S) is not self-refuting.
(S*) is more problematic. If the sceptic believes that (S*), then he believes that he ought not to
believe anything. A kind of self-refutation immediately threatens. If (S*) is true, no one – including
the sceptic – should believe that it is. 
The  sceptic's  escape  from  this  trap  involves  distinguishing  between  the  mere  psychological
inclination to believe something and the voluntary act of judging that it is more credible than its
negation.  I  might,  as a  matter of psychological  fact,  be inclined to believe that  there is  a God
because of the way I was raised. Nevertheless, although that proposition is attractive for me, I might
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choose not to actively judge that there is a God in the sense that, if someone were to ask me “Is
there a God?”, I would neither say “yes” or “no”. I would not regard the proposition “God exists” as
any more credible than its opposite. 
Most often philosophers are associated with certain theses just because they accept them. So Theists
are associated with the idea that there is a God because they judge it to be true; and Naturalists are
associated with Naturalism for the same reason. But the sceptic is not associated with sceptical
theses because he actively judges them to be true. In fact, on the strongest interpretation of his
position, he does not judge that the sceptical thesis is true. The sceptic does not judge anything to be
true at all. The defining characteristic of the sceptic is his distinctive outlook – that of universal
suspension of judgement12. 
The sceptic is, nevertheless like everyone else. He is naturally inclined to believe various things as a
result of his upbringing and cultural background. The sceptic passively “goes along” with those
inclinations, never judging them to be true or false (Machuca, 2009, 116-118)13. 
This  account  of  the  sceptic's  mental  life  paints  him  as  distancing  himself  from  his  own
psychological conviction. One way to think about that distancing is like this. Suppose that I say to
you “there are ghosts in my back garden!”. You come to the garden to investigate and I swear to you
that I saw them last night, even though you do not see them at the moment. Suppose that as a result
you do not  believe me.  Despite   you not  judging that  there are  ghosts  in  the garden,  you can
appreciate that I am quite convinced that there are. The sceptic takes that very stance towards his
own beliefs. He finds himself with all sorts of inclinations to believe things – perhaps even very
strong ones. He passively goes along with them as far as he needs to for practical purposes14. But he
never consciously judges them to be true or more credible than alternatives. The latter is just the
sort of thing which (S*) says that we ought not to do. 
The view that we ought to suspend judgement about everything is, therefore, not one which the
12 Bailey (2007, 142) interprets Sextus as having been lead, psychologically, to total suspension of judgement by 
Agrippa's Trilemma. The trilemma causes Sextus to suspend about everything, including the premises and 
conclusion of the trilemma itself. Sextus then uses the trilemma to try and lure others into suspension of judgement 
as well, even though he no longer finds the argument persuasive. I do not have much to say about the sceptic's own 
suspension of judgement here. For the full account, see Bailey (2007).  
13 The distinction is Sextus' (2000). 
14 It should be noted here that the sceptic need not go along with all of his inclinations. He needs only to yield to those 
that allow him to live a happy and fruitful life. How exactly the sceptic should make the distinction is unclear to me. 
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sceptic judges to be the truth, but merely one of his psychological inclinations15. No self-refutation
is in the offing. 
Chapter 2: The Ordinary Language Critique of
Scepticism
1. Linguistic Criticisms of Scepticism
Everyday we judge ourselves and others as knowing things. I take it that I know that it is Thursday.
I say that my friend knows what time it is. You judge that I know some things about Philosophy. We
take ourselves to know established scientific theories to be true. All of this is common-place. 
Sceptics deny all of this, or so we are told by some contemporary epistemologists. In epistemology,
the standard sceptical argument has the following form. “You can know that P only if you meet
condition C. But condition C cannot be met. So you cannot know that P”. In offering his argument,
the sceptic tries to convince us that even though we say that we know things all of the time, we are
always saying something false.
Many philosophers concur with this understanding of Scepticism. Here are some samples:
A l l  k n o w l e d g e ,  s a y s  t h e  s k e p t i c ,  m u s t  b e  g r o u n d e d  i n  g o o d
r e a s o n s .  B u t  n o t  a n y  r e a s o n  i s  a  g o o d  r e a s o n - - o n e  m u s t
h a v e  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  o n e ’ s  r e a s o n s  a r e  t r u e .
B u t  t h i s ,  i n  t u r n ,  e n s u r e s  t ha t  an y  a t t e mp t  t o  g round
know l edge  in  good  r ea s ons  mus t  b e  i n a d e q u a t e .  F o r  e i t h e r  ( a )
o n e ’ s  r e a s o n s  w i l l  g o  o n  i n  a n  i n fi n i t e  r e g r e s s ,  ( b )  t h e y
w i l l  c o m e  b a c k  i n  a  c i r c l e ,  o r  ( c ) the y  w i l l  end  a rb i t r a r i l y.
Bu t  none  o f  t he s e  ou t co mes  i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y - n o n e  p r o v i d e s
15 If that is how the sceptic sees his Scepticism, why does he bother offering an argument for it at all? The answer is
given by Sextus:
The Skeptic, because he is philanthropist, wishes to cure by argument, as far as he can, the conceit and the
rashness of the Dogmatists (Sextus, 2000). 
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k n o w l e d g e  w i t h  g r o u n d i n g  i n  good  r e a s o n s .  A n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e
s k e p t i c  c o n c l u d e s ,  k n o w l e d g e  i s  impossible (Greco, 2006, 9).
The  only  way a  skeptical  philosopher  can  hope  to  move  her  audience,  after  all,  is  by
appealing to things that seem unremarkable and ordinary to say about the nature and extent
of our knowledge, and showing how from these things it follows that we have much less
knowledge than we are wont to say we have (Kaplan, 2018). 
 “we want a response to [the sceptical]  paradox that  preserves our belief  that  we know
things” (Cohen, 2000, 100). 
 For  skeptical  arguments...  threaten  to  show,  not  only  that  we  fail  to  meet  very  high
requirements  for knowledge of  interest  only to  misguided philosophers seeking absolute
certainty,  but  that  we don't  meet  even the  truth  conditions  of  ordinary,  out-on-the-street
knowledge attributions. They thus threaten to establish the startling result that we never, or
almost never, truthfully ascribe knowledge to ourselves or to other mere mortals (DeRose,
1995, 4). 
The  philosopher  who  understands  Scepticism  this  way  has  a  pretty  simple  and
devastating critique to offer. Here again are some samples:
k n o w l e d g e  i s  t r u e  b e l i e f  r e s u l t i n g  from a reliable process... The picture
o f  k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  r e s u l t s  i s  f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t  i n  s t r u c t u r e :  A
founda t ion  o f  non - in f e r en t i a l  know l edge ,  p roduced  b y  non - inferential
but reliable processes, provides the basis for further  know ledge ,  p roduced  b y
re l i ab l e  i n f e r ences  f rom  the  founda t ions .  O n  th i s  a ccoun t ,  t he  skep t i c
i s  j u s t  w rong  to  t h ink  tha t  a l l  know ledg e  mus t  be  g rounded  in  good
reas ons .  P u t  ano the r  w a y,  t he  skep t i c  i s  j u s t  w rong  to  t h ink  tha t  a l l
know l edge  p ro ducing processes are reasoning processes(Greco, 2006, 10) 16.
Externalist  Theories  [of  the  ordinary  meaning  of  “knowledge”]  are  regularly
developed  as  theories  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  generally  and  not  simply  as
16 Greco is not a straightforward Reliabilist, contra what this quotation might suggest. For his more detailed analysis, 
see Greco (2007). 
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theories of non-inferential  knowledge. But they still  have a peculiar importance
in  the  case  of  non-inferential  knowledge  because  they  serve  to  solve  the
problem of the infinite regress  [my italics] (Armstrong, 1973, 157) 17. 
 according  to  contextualists,  the  skeptic,  in  presenting  her  argument,
manipulates the semantic standards for knowledge, thereby creating a context in
which  she  can  truthfully  say  that  we  know  nothing  or  very  little.  Once  the
standards  have  been  so  raised,  we  correctly  sense  that  we  only  could  falsely
claim  to  know  such  things  as  that  we  have  hands.  Why  then  are  we  puzzled?
Why don't we simply accept the skeptic's conclusion and henceforth refrain from
ascribing  such  knowledge  to  ourselves  or  others?  Be  cause,  the  contextualist
continues,  we  also  realize  this:  As  soon  as  we find  ourselves  in  more  ordinary
conversational contexts, it will not only be true for us to claim to know the very
things  that  the  skeptic  now denies  we know, but  it  will  also be  wrong for  us  to
deny  that  we  know  these  things.  But  then,  isn't  the  skeptic's  present  denial
equally  false?  And  wouldn't  it  be  equally  true  for  us  now,  in  the  skeptic's
presence,  to  claim  to  know?  What  we  fail  to  realize,  according  to  the
contextualist  solution, is that the skeptic's present denials that we know various
things  are  perfectly  compatible  with  our  ordinary  claims  to  know  those  very
propositions. Once we realize this, we can see how both the skeptic's denials of
knowledge and our  ordinary attributions  of  knowledge can  be correct  (DeRose,
1995, 4-5).
it seemed that the point of the argument was (a) to display a set of claims about the extent
and nature of our knowledge to which we recognize ourselves to be committed and (b) to
show  that  these  claims  jointly  lead  to  disaster...Austin's  response  shows  that  the
argument,  at  least  to  this  extent,  fails  to  accomplish  the  first  of  its  two
objectives:  a  crucial  premise  of  the  argument  [the  one  about  the  meaning  of
“knowledge”!]...  does  not  seem  to  be  among  our  commitments,  if  ordinary
practice is any guide (Kaplan, 2011, 353) . 
 Despite  the  lengthy  expositions,  the  criticism  is  quite  simple.  The  sceptic  does  not
understand  the  way  that  the  word  “know”  is  ordinarily  used  (Hill,  1999;  Goldman,
17 My emphasis. 
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1995; Bergman, 2011; Greco, 2011; 2000; Kaplan,  2000; 2011; Cohen, 2000; DeRose,
1995).  For Externalist  philosophers [Greco, Armstrong,  Hill,  Goldman, Bergman],  the
sceptic just flatly defines knowledge in a non-ordinary way. For Contextualists [Cohen
and  DeRose],  the  sceptic  fails  to  recognize  that  the  standards  for  correctly  saying  “I
know  that  P”  change  with  context.  On  either  view,  the  sceptic  fails  to  show  that
ordinary  assertions  like  “I  know  that  P”  are  false,  so  Scepticism  is  undermined 18.
Break out the champaign. 
2. Scepticism Defeated?
Has  the  Sceptic  been  unravelled?  One  place  we  might  have  questions  is  with  the
critic's  starting  conception  of  Scepticism.  According  to  the  critic,  Scepticism  is  the
denial of knowledge-attributions, but is that right? The critics I have mentioned almost
never  quote  sceptics  who  have  explicitly  said  (never-mind  argued)  that  knowledge
attributions are false. Typically, the denial of knowledge-attributions is just ham-fisted
into the sceptic's  mouth for the critic to begin his  discussion. It  seems dubious to me,
however, that sceptics really have meant to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. It is
hard  to  find  passages  in,  for  example,  Sextus  Empiricus  or  Hume  where  they  say
anything like “when ordinary people say that they know things, what they are saying is
false”.  In  fact,  Sextus  would  no  doubt  reject  outright  Greco's  interpretation  of  the
modes of Agrippa in the passage above. 
These  are,  of  course,  historical  claims  on  my  part,  and  they  are  not  claims  which  I
propose  to  defend  presently.  Still,  whether  or  not  sceptic's  have  meant  to  defend  the
views  attributed  to  them  above,  I  hold  that  the  knowledge-attribution  conception  of
Scepticism and the associated criticisms of it  are  both confused, not because sceptic's
have not historically denied knowledge-attributions, but because there is a far stronger
and more  interesting  way for  the  sceptic  to  develop his  position  than  in  the  direction
of denying knowledge attributions. 
In what follows I will  explore that way of developing the sceptic's position.  Section 3
18 For lucidity, I will continue to speak of this criticism as the idea that “the sceptic presupposes a non-ordinary 
definition of knowledge”. That isn't quite an accurate characterization of Contextualist approaches to Scepticism, but
those approaches do share the basic idea which I want to discuss. 
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makes  an  analogy between  the  critics  above  and  a  similar  critic  of  debates  about  the
existence  of  God.  Section  4  concerns  the  critic's  argument  that  there  is  no
philosophically  significant  alternative  version  of  Scepticism  to  the  knowledge-
attribution conception of Scepticism. The sections which follow show that argument to
be of no force whatsoever, and develop an alternative conception of Scepticism. 
3. An Analogy: Theism and The Problem of Evil
Suppose that Richard and Graham argue about whether or not there is a God19. They argue in the
usual ways – Graham with the argument from evil; Richard with the fine-tuning argument. Now
suppose I walk in and I tell Richard and Graham that the truth conditions of ordinary statements like
“God exists” are just these: (i) religious practices and beliefs make a lot of people happy and (ii)
lots of people believe very confidently that something created the universe. Suppose that I manage
to convince Richard and Graham that that's what “God exists” means.  I think if I interrupted the
debate in this way, neither Richard nor Graham would have any idea what I was trying to do. They
might come to agree with me that “God exists” means what I say that it does, for most ordinary
English speakers, but they would surely insist that the point is of no significance at all for their
debate. Moreover, Graham, even though he says things like “God does not exist” in his debate with
Richard, would laugh at the suggestion that his view was false or his arguments unsound because of
my quibbles about the words “God exists”. Graham and Richard would unite in explaining to me: 
“we have already agreed that we will mean by 'God exists' that there is some thing which is
all good, all powerful, all knowing and created the universe. Never mind what other people
mean. Don't get us wrong, its very interesting that other people mean something different,
but it doesn't have anything to do with our debate”. 
Graham and Richard can properly lecture me in this way because their views are not about the
words “God exists” as used in ordinary English. Richard is not saying that when ordinary people
say “God exists”, what they are saying is true, and Graham is not saying that when ordinary people
say “God exists”, what they are saying is false. Their views are about whether there is in reality a
certain entity, defined in a specific way. Moreover, the interesting and philosophically significant
positions that Graham and Richard could take are those about whether there is in reality an entity
19 Richard and Graham are of course Swinburne (1999) and Oppy (2006). 
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which meets their definitions. The parallel positions about whether ordinary people are speaking
truly in saying “God exists” are just besides the point. 
These same ideas are applicable in discussions of Scepticism. When faced with the criticisms of
Goldman, Greco, etc, the sceptic will surely reply:
“What I  mean by 'knowledge',  never-mind what anyone else means,  is belief  that meets
such-and-such conditions. I am interested in convincing you that you do not know anything,
in my sense of that word. Don't get me wrong, its very interesting that other people mean
something different, but it doesn't have anything to do with what I am trying to do”. 
4. Is Scepticism Significant?
Let's say that Semantic Scepticism is the view that ordinary knowledge attributions are false. If the
sceptic responds to his critics in the way I paint him as responding in the last section, then he cannot
be a Semantic Sceptic. He must agree that when people say things like “I know that P”, what they
are saying is true. His only qualification will be that he wants to convince the dogmatist that he does
not know anything, in the sceptic's sense of “knows”. But then, the critics will say, that conclusion
is of no significance whatsoever.
To  illustrate,  suppose  that  someone  claims  that  there  are  no  doctors  in  London.  This
will  at  first  sound  completely  absurd,  and  if  he  manages  to  produce  a  seemingly
cogent argument for this conclusion, we will be astonished – astonished because we all
thought  that  there  were  doctors  in  London,  and  the  critic  has  shown  otherwise.  But
suppose that when we press the critic and ask him what he means by 'doctor' he replies
that  he  means  a  person  who  can  cure  any logically  possible  illness.  At  this  point  we
will cease to be alarmed by the critic's conclusions. What he says is true. There are no
doctors  in the sense that  he has in  mind,  but  this  need not alarm or worry us  because
we never  thought  there  were  in  the  first  place.  Our  cause  for  concern  came  from the
fact  that  we  took  the  critic  to  be  arguing  that  there  are  no  doctors  in  the  ordinary
sense of the word,  and that is  just  what we believe there are – doctors in the ordinary
sense.  And  the  critic  has  done  nothing  to  show  that  our  belief  is  false 20.  The  critic's
20 This way of fleshing out the critic's position is due to Stroud (2008, 40-41) and, begins with Austin (1946). See also 
39
argument  is  unsound  if  concerning  the  ordinary  sense  of  doctor,  and  uninteresting
otherwise.
That  is  just  what  the  sceptic's  argument  is  like,  says  the  critic.  We find  the  sceptic's
conclusion  absurd,  but  then  once  he  explains  what  he  means  to  say,  we  find  his
conclusion boring because it does not contradict anything that we believe. 
5. Does the Sceptic Contradict What I Believe?
I find this way of thinking somewhat baffling. It isn't as though a necessary condition
for something being interesting for me is that it  contradict  some belief of mine or use
words  in  the  same  way as  me.  Interesting  things  can  be  framed  in  new concepts  and
concern things  about  which  I  currently have  no opinion at  all.  Moreover,  what  makes
the  doctor  argument  uninteresting  isn't  either  that  it  fails  to  contradict  something
which we believe or that it uses the word “doctor” in a non-ordinary way. What makes
it  uninteresting  is  just  that  we already knew very well  that  there  were no people who
can cure every logically possible illness, and so its no surprise to be told so. 
Even  setting  that  aside,  it  is  far  from  clear  that  usual  sceptical  arguments  do  not
contradict  anything that I  ordinarily believe.  The critic's  reply hinges crucially on the
claim that  if  the sceptic  does  not  contradict  our belief  that  we have knowledge of  the
world,  then  he  does  not  contradict  anything that  we  believe.  This  is  a  clear  non-
sequitur. It does not follow from the fact that the sceptic does not contradict one belief
of mine, that he does not contradict any belief of mine. 
Consider the sceptic who says that nobody knows anything about the physical world. It is logically
possible that the sceptic's conclusion, although it does not contradict our belief that we know about
the world, nevertheless contradicts  something else  that we ordinarily believe. Let X stand for the
stipulated meaning of the sceptic's word “know”, whatever that meaning is. When the sceptic says
we cannot know about the world around us, he says:
Kaplan's (2008) treatment of Austin's argument.  Although many philosophers are prepared to assert in conversation 
that the sceptic's conclusions are of no significance whatsoever if compatible with ordinary knowledge attributions, 
few seem prepared to argue for it in print. Thomas Uebel, for example, once remarked to me that such a Scepticism 
is “for the birds”, but he gave no argument for it. 
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(4) We cannot X about the world around us.
      Now, it is logically possible that I possess both of these distinct beliefs:
(5) I do know about the world around me.
(6) I do X about the world around me. 
We may suppose that the sense of “know” in (5) is the ordinary sense and that the sceptic's X is not
that ordinary meaning. Then, although my belief which I would express by (5) does not contradict
(4),  I  might have a different belief,  (6),  which  does  contradict  (4). Furthermore,  my belief that
contradicts (5) need not be so explicit as (6). Suppose that I have another concept, “schnowledge”
which is such that X is a necessary condition for “schnowing” something. Then I might hold both
(5) and:
(7) I do schnow about the world around me.
And (7) does contradict (4). Thus it is not true that if the sceptic's definition of “knowledge” is not
the ordinary one, then his conclusion does not contradict anything that we ordinarily believe. 
This is how the matter stands with respect to logic. An anonymous referee responded to this point
claiming that, while it is correct, it makes no difference. Sure, the reply goes, we might have all
sorts of beliefs which contradict (4), but the only relevant point is that (4) does not contradict our
belief that we have knowledge.
 I do not see why this must be the only relevant point at all. If the sceptic has a sound argument for a
conclusion  which  contradicts  something  that  we  believe,  I  do  not  see  why  the  fact  that  the
contradicting  belief  is  not  the  belief  that  we  have  knowledge  should  somehow  undercut  the
significance of the sceptic's conclusion. After all, he would still refute something which we believe. 
 Certainly, if we are thinking of the sceptic as someone who aims solely to refute our belief that we
have knowledge,  the fact that  his  conclusion does not  contradict  that belief  would be the only
relevant point, but  we are currently exploring whether there is any  other way for the sceptic to
develop his views, and so to insist that the only relevant point is whether the sceptic contradicts my
belief that I have knowledge is to beg the question. 
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The sceptic might, for example, aim to refute our belief that our evidence favours ordinary beliefs
about the world over the dream hypothesis, and if we really do have that belief, he will succeed in
contradicting something that we believe. If he is the Pyrrhonian, he might aim to refute our belief
that we have any reason at all to hold any belief whatsoever, and if we really do have that belief, he
will  succeed  in  contradicting  us.  If  the  critique  is  to   provide  a  solution  to  the  problem  of
Scepticism, it must really be a solution to the problem. It won't do for the critique to show merely
that Scepticism is not in conflict with beliefs about knowledge while conceding that it is in conflict
with various other beliefs of ours. Such a “solution” is so in name only. It must be claimed that
Scepticism does not contradict any belief of ours21. 
It might be countered, however, that we simply do not have the belief that our evidence favours
ordinary beliefs  about  the  world over  the  dream hypothesis,  nor  the  belief  that  we have  good
reasons for at least some belief or other. It might even be added that once I realize that my belief,
(5), does not involve a sense of “know” a necessary condition for which is X, I will be able to see
that I never really believed that I could do what the sceptic says I cannot. Once we clear aside the
confusions which arise when we frame the issue in terms of “knowledge”, perhaps it is just obvious
that I never did believe that I could tell whether or not I was dreaming. Perhaps it is plain that I
never did believe that there were good reasons to hold my own system of beliefs over any other.
Perhaps, it might be said, I was only tempted to think that I did believe these things because the
sceptic tricked me into accepting a necessary condition for knowledge which is  not one of my
ordinary conditions. 
This last argument is incredibly presumptuous about what I do and do not believe, and
more generally what  most  people do and do not believe.  It  presumes,  in the Cartesian
case, that nobody really ever believed that their evidence favoured that they are sitting
at  their  desks  over  the  hypothesis  that  they  are  dreaming,  and  that  they  were  only
tempted to suppose that they believed it because they got confused by the sceptic's use
of  the  concept  of  “knowledge”.  I  can  only  speak  for  myself  in  saying  that  I  really
think that  I  did believe,  prior  to  considering the sceptic's  argument,  that  my evidence
favoured  the  view  that  I  was  not  dreaming.  This  is  why  when  I  considered  what
21 You could combine the ordinary language critique with something else to obtain a full solution. You could argue, for
example, that the ordinary language critique takes care of Scepticism about knowledge  whilst something else takes 
care of Scepticism of another sort. But this is never what proponents of the critique do. Their papers and books 
argue that the sceptic uses a mistaken definition of “knowledge” and that is the full extent of the criticism. 
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Descartes  had  to  say about  there  being  no marks  by which  to  tell  whether  or  not  one
was awake or asleep, I was every bit  as astonished as he was. If this is right,  then the
sceptic's conclusion does contradict something that I believe. Equally, I am sure that I
really do believe that I have good reasons for at least most of what I believe – reasons
which  make  those  beliefs  superior  to  alternative  beliefs  I  might  have  held  instead.  I
leave the reader to determine whether they too have these beliefs. 
6. Substantive Scepticism 
The  sceptic's  conclusions  might  well  be  interesting  and  significant  even  if  they  are
compatible  with  ordinary  knowledge  attributions  and  even  if  they  do  not  contradict
something  that  we  believe .  Suppose,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  ordinary
meaning  of  knowledge  turned  out  to  be  merely  “belief  held  very  confidently”.  Of
course,  the  sceptic  will  not  deny that  there  are  such  beliefs.  If  it  were  true,  would  it
follow that  there is  no interesting  way for  the sceptic  to  develop his  position?  Surely
not.  Surely  he  could  argue  that  although  ordinary  knowledge  attributions  are  true
(because  many  people  believe  things  confidently),  there  is  still  no  reason  to  believe
anything at  all,  and nobody ought to believe anything either.  He could add, moreover,
that because of these two points, nobody knows anything in his sense of the word,  and,
that what is ordinarily called “knowledge” is really quite pathetic. It is a mere charade
of little to no value. This, at any rate, would be the pessimistic assessment that he tries
to convince us to make.
Call  this  pessimistic  assessment  of  ordinary  human  knowledge,  “Substantive
Scepticism”, to contrast  it  with Semantic Scepticism. The sceptic then tries to lead us
into  Substantive  Scepticism.  It  seems  to  me  that  Substantive  Scepticism would  be  an
interesting  and  significant  sceptical  position,  even  if  the  sceptic  conceded  that
ordinary  knowledge  attributions  are  true  and  that  Substantive  Scepticism  might  well
not  contradict  any of  our  pre-theoretical  opinions  – perhaps  we just  never  stopped to
think about any of these things before. 
7. Jackson and Ordinary Concepts
Despite  my  insistence  that  Substantive  Scepticism is  a  philosophically  significant  view,  some
philosophers will demur. Frank Jackson, discussing conceptual analysis, writes:
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 If I say that what I mean—never mind what others mean—by a free action is one such that
the agent would have done otherwise if he or she had chosen to, then the existence of free
actions  so  conceived will  be  secured,  and  so  will  the  compatibility  of  free  action  with
determinism. If I say that what I mean—never mind what others mean—by ‘belief’ is any
information-carrying state that causes subjects to utter sentences like ‘I believe that snow is
white’, the existence of beliefs so conceived will be safe from the eliminativists' arguments.
But in neither case will I have much of an audience. I have turned interesting philosophical
debates into easy exercises in deductions from stipulative definitions together with accepted
facts. What then are the interesting philosophical questions that we are seeking to address
when we debate the existence of free action and its compatibility with determinism, or about
eliminativism  concerning  intentional  psychology?  What  we  are  seeking  to  address  is
whether free action according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to our
ordinary conception,  exists  and is  compatible  with determinism, and whether  intentional
states according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to it, will survive
what cognitive science reveals about the operations of our brains (Jackson, 2008, 31).
According to Jackson, the interesting philosophical questions are questions couched in terms of our
ordinary concepts. Presumably what he says about “free action” and “belief” is the same sort of
thing he would say about “knowledge”. So, Jackson would argue that the interesting question about
knowledge is whether or not we have “knowledge” in our ordinary sense of “knowledge”. Thus, if
the sceptic has an argument that we do not know anything, but his concept of knowledge is non-
ordinary, his conclusion will not be that interesting. Why not? Jackson makes two points. The first
is  that  using  non-ordinary  concepts  in  philosophical  discussion  turns  interesting  philosophical
debates into 'easy exercises in deductions from stipulative definitions together with accepted facts'.
The second is that if I frame my discussions using non-ordinary concepts I will not have much of an
audience. 
Consider  Jackson's  first  point.  A lot  depends  on  whether  the  sceptic's  argument  is  an  “easy
deduction”,  and that  obviously depends on which argument  is  at  stake.  If  the argument  up for
discussion is Agrippa's Trilemma, its far from clear to me that the three options Sextus gives us –
regress, circularity and hypothesis – are really the only three logically possible options. If that's
right,  there might  be  other  options  worth exploring.  Certainly at  least  some philosophers  have
thought that there are – perhaps a view on which there are self-evident or indubitable truths from
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which other things can be inferred. Similar reflections hold with Cartesian sceptical arguments that
depend on the assumption that I cannot tell – just by looking – that I am sitting at my desk and not
deceived by an evil demon or having a grand hallucination. At least some philosophers have thought
that I really can tell, or that if I can't, I can at least argue the claim that I am sitting at my desk from
some more secure starting point. Now, I am not saying that any of these options will be in the end
satisfactory, but to take it that none of these accounts is viable and assume that if we grant the
sceptic his definition of “knowledge”, his Scepticism follows as an “easy deduction”, is to take
quite a controversial position without much – if any – argument.
Yet, let us grant that the sceptic's argument is an easy deduction from stipulated definitions. I am not
sure what relevance this has to the question of whether or not the sceptic's argument is interesting,
since there is no reason to suppose that an interesting argument must be very complex. I am inclined
to think that a simple argument for an independently interesting conclusion is more interesting than
a  complex argument  for  the  same,  because  a  simpler  argument  seems  less  likely to  contain  a
mistake. 
Turn now to Jackson's second point that a sceptical argument would not have much of an audience
if it deploys non-ordinary concepts. Is it true that people are generally not interested in concepts
which are different to their own? Many people are interested in scientific theories, even though the
concepts used in science are very different to the concepts used in everyday life. What strikes at
least some people as  interesting about philosophy is precisely that it gives one the opportunity to
consider radically different ways of viewing the world. There is no reason to suppose that using
non-ordinary concepts makes people less likely to take an interest in sceptical arguments.
8. Too High Standards
I  suspect  that  behind  all  of  the  insistence  that  Substantive  Scepticism  is  not  philosophically
significant and the insistence that Semantic Scepticism is the only kind worth discussing is the old
thought that the sceptic presupposes absurdly high standards for knowledge. The idea is, not merely
that the standards of the sceptic are non-ordinary, but that they are just unnecessarily high; so high
that it doesn't really matter if we can't meet them. The sceptic, according to the old critic, is just
whining that our beliefs don't meet some very intense set of standards that only a philosopher like
Descartes would fantasize about. That this does lie in the background is quite clear in the passage
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from DeRose quoted earlier:
 For  skeptical  arguments...  threaten  to  show,  not  only  that  we  fail  to  meet  very  high
requirements  for  knowledge of  interest  only  to  misguided philosophers  seeking absolute
certainty,  but  that  we don't  meet  even the truth  conditions  of  ordinary,  out-on-the-street
knowledge attributions. They thus threaten to establish the startling result that we never, or
almost never, truthfully ascribe knowledge to ourselves or to other mere mortals (DeRose,
1995, 4)22. 
DeRose writes here as though there are only two options for the sceptic. Either he whines about our
inability to reach absolute certainty, or he denies “out-on-the-street” knowledge attributions. If he
takes the former line, we can object that absolute certainty is a ludicrously high demand of interest
“only to misguided philosophers” and settle for lower standards. If he takes the latter line, he must
use the word “knowledge” in its “out-on-the-street” sense and show that knowledge attributions are
false. This is a false dilemma. The sceptic could set fairly modest standards for “knowledge”, far
short  of  absolute  certainty,  and  yet  take  no  interest  at  all  in  “out-on-the-street”  knowledge
attributions.   That  option is  made quite  attractive by the  fact  that  contemporary arguments  for
Scepticism don't presuppose absolutely certain standards for knowledge. Their requirements are in
fact fairly modest. I won't go into what exactly those standards are now – though I think they are far
more humble than generally assumed. I'll just point out that the standards aren't ones of absolute
certainty. 
A number of pressing sceptical arguments work given the empiricist assumption that the only ways
that humans have of knowing things about the world are sense perception and inferences from
things learnt by sense perception. 
There is the contemporary Cartesian Sceptical argument (Vogel, 2004). Say that two things, x and y,
are perceptually indistinguishable to you only if x and y effect your visual system (they produces
the same retinal image, or the same pattern of activity in the optic nerve), in the same way (Vogel,
1997, 16). For example, Homer will be perceptually indistinguishable from a molecule for molecule
replica of Homer just when the two would have the same effect on your visual system. The sceptic
will maintain that if Homer is perceptually indistinguishable to you from his replica, then you do
not know just by looking that who you are looking at is Homer, and the same for any x and y. Of
22 My  emphasis.
46
course, my sitting at my desk (or any similar proposition about the physical world) is perceptually
indistinguishable from classic sceptical hypotheses, like that I am a brain-in-a-vat having a massive
hallucination.  So I cannot know by perception that I am sitting at  my desk. Or plainly,  since I
cannot tell just by looking that I am not in a sceptical scenario, I cannot know just by looking that I
am sitting at my desk (Vogel, 1997). Combine that thought with the thought that, there is no good
argument from anything I can know by sense perception to the claim that I am sitting at my desk,
and we arrive at the conclusion that I cannot know that I am sitting there at all. The requirement for
knowledge here isn't that, for any P, to know that P, S must be absolutely certain that P, but just that
P can only be known either by perceptually distinguishing it from alternatives or by inferring it
from things known by perception. The sceptic is free to say that any such inference could be merely
probabilistic  in  character,  so  that  his  standards  are  a  long  way from a  general  requirement  of
certainty. 
The idea that being able to perceptually distinguish x from y is a necessary condition for knowing
by perception that x, will allow for the same sort of argument against our knowing that anyone else
has feelings, emotions or thoughts. After all, a person with a mind has the same effect on my visual
system as a mindless zombie who looks just like a person, and most philosophers think the usual
arguments for the existence of other minds are painfully weak. Note again the requirement for
“knowledge” here is not  a general requirement of absolute certainty. The sceptic would be happy
with either your being able to tell by perception that other people have minds, or with your giving
an argument for it,  and the argument need not be iron-clad; a good argument from analogy or
inference to the best explanation would do the trick. Are there any other ways that humans can
know things about the world beyond their own minds than by sense-perception and inferences from
what we learn by perception? The dominant empiricist tradition in philosophy says otherwise, and
no-one has yet defended any other source23.
I  have defended a sceptical argument against knowing that anything ever exists when we aren't
looking (or otherwise perceiving) (Burns, 2017). I suspect that the argument can be run on most of
the definitions of “knowledge” which contemporary philosophers favour, but it works given the
currently popular sort of definition where knowledge means something like “true belief produced
by a reliable process”. The basic idea is this. I can know that something about the physical world is
the case only by perception or inference from things I know by sense perception. But I cannot know
that anything exists when I'm not perceiving it by perception, because that is a contradiction. On the
23 See Gomes (forthcoming) for more on this. 
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assumption that I cannot know by inference that things exist when I'm not looking – and no one has
ever made the argument – then I cannot know it at all. The belief seems to be completely groundless
in any sense you might care about. Lest you think that the belief that things exist when you aren't
perceiving them is of little consequence, if I do not know such things, then I don't know that any of
my friends or family exist when I'm not around, nor that my kitchen exists when I'm not in it, nor
even that the wall behind me exists when I'm not looking at it! 
There is, of course, also the Agrippan Trilemma, which only sets the standard for knowledge at
having some non-question begging reason for the belief, no matter how weak the reason is. Yes the
sceptic asks that you have such a reason for every belief, but that is still a long way short of a
general insistence on certainty.
The point of Scepticism, as I am here thinking of it, is not that ordinary knowledge claims are false.
It  is,  rather,  that ordinary knowledge is  just  not that impressive – perhaps it  is even downright
pathetic. It might be that, in the ordinary sense of “knows”, we know all sorts of things. But the
sceptic, on the position I am here offering him, tries to convince us that our system of beliefs or
“knowledge” is depressingly doubtful, fragile and insecure. Ordinary human knowledge is in this
sense a charade of little to no value24. 
In the face of the sceptic's  pessimism, its  always open to the dogmatist  to make the too high-
standards objection whenever he feels under pressure. When the standards are set at certainty and
the sceptic argues that nothing can meet them, the dogmatist complains of the sceptic's fantastically
high standards, and lowers the standards to good but inconclusive reasons. When the sceptic argues
that nothing can meet them either, the dogmatist complains again that the standards are pointlessly
demanding, and abandons the demand for reasons all together, saying that its enough when a belief
is just caused in a reliable way. When the sceptic argues that a lot of the dogmatists beliefs don't
meet that standard either, the anti-sceptic might complain yet again, and retreat even further. How
many of these moves are acceptable? When should we just  admit that  the sceptic's  pessimistic
attitude towards our belief system is a sensible one? 
2 4 G r e c o  ( 2 0 0 6 ,  3 1 )  w r i t e s  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h a t  “ e v e n  i f  t h e r e  i s  some s e n s e  i n  w h i c h  
o n e  d o e s  n o t  r e a l l y  k n o w  w i t h o u t  [ m e e t i n g  t h e  s c e p t i c ' s  s t a n d a rd s  f o r  k n o w l e d g e] ,  i t  
d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w. . .  t h a t  k n o w l e d g e  i n  a n y  ordinary sense requires that.” 
That is indisputably true, but the substantive sceptic is not claiming otherwise. 
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That  is  what  the issue comes down to.  Is  the sceptic  right  to  despair that  we cannot  meet  his
standards, or is he foolishly whining about our inability to meet fantastically high standards? The
critic might say the latter,  but if that is what is wrong with Scepticism, the problem isn't that his
standards aren't the ordinary ones25. 
Chapter 3: Phenomenal Conservatism 
1. Phenomenal  Conservatism: An Initial Characterization
According to Chris Tucker (2013, 1),  “it is natural to think that many of our beliefs are rational
because they are based on... the way things seem”. He gives several examples. In the first, you
believe that there is a paper document because “it seems visually that way” (Tucker, 2013, 1). In the
second, I believe that I had cereal this morning because “I seem to remember eating it” (Tucker,
2013, 1). Whether or not this is a 'natural' view I do not know, but it is a philosophical view by the
name of Phenomenal Conservatism, and it has gained a decent following. Huemer (2013) defines
Phenomenal Conservatism in the following way:
(Phenomenal Conservatism)  For any subject S and any proposition P, in the absence of
defeaters, if  it  seems to S that P,  S thereby has at  least  some degree of justification for
believing that P. 
Huemer (2001, 22) says in one place that a justified belief is one that should be believed. In another
place, he writes that unjustified beliefs are “what one could be blamed for believing” (Huemer,
2001, 97). So Huemer recommends Phenomenal Conservatism as a standard for acceptable belief.
William Lycan explicitly puts it as a rule about how we ought to believe: “Accept at the outset each
of those things that seem to be true” (Lycan, 1988, 165). He takes that rule to be the same as
Phenomenal Conservatism (Lycan, 2013).
Various  forms  of  Conservatism  are  defended  in  contemporary  philosophy.  One  form  is
Conservatism simpliciter, which says that any seeming that P provides justification for believing
that P; the source of the seemings is irrelevant. That position is defended by Huemer (2001; 2013).
Some philosophers defend restricted forms of Conservatism, for instance, the claim that perceptual
25 For more on Semantic Scepticism and knowledge attributions, see Appendix A for a digression. 
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seemings confer justification (Pryor, 2000) or Mnemonic seemings (Pollock and Cruz, 1999), or
Moral  seemings  (Huemer,  2005).  These  specific  claims  are  compatible  with  Conservatism
simpliciter. Pryor, for instance, claims that perceptual seemings are a source of justification, but he
does not say that other seemings are not. But, there are also versions of Conservatism which say
that only certain kinds of seeming confer justification, or what amounts to the same, that we should
form beliefs guided by how things seem to us only in certain areas and not others (Brogaard, 2013;
Markie, 2013). 
Huemer proposes that Phenomenal Conservatism is a response to Pyrrhonian Scepticism (Huemer
2013, 349 ; Huemer, 2018). This chapter explains how. Section 2 takes a look at how Huemer, in
the  seminal  formulation  of  the  view,  took  Phenomenal  Conservatism  to  bare  on  Scepticism.
Huemer's  discussion there  is  unfortunately muddled,  but  there  is  a  much clearer  way of  using
Phenomenal Conservatism to critique Scepticism, and I offer it to Huemer in section 3. 
2. Huemer and Agrippa's Trilemma
What does Phenomenal Conservatism have to do with Pyrrhonian Scepticism? Although many of its
advocates  take  it  to  provide  a  powerful  anti-sceptical  epistemology,  the  only  person  to  have
explicitly considered how this might be so is Michael Huemer. 
In Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Huemer defines Scepticism as “any philosophical
theory  that  challenges  a  significant  class  of  common  sense  beliefs”  (Huemer,  2001,  18).  As
examples of 'common-sense' Huemer lists these: I am a human being. I have two hands. I have
spent my life at or near the surface of the earth. I have thoughts and feelings. There are other people
in the world. They have bodies. They also have thoughts and feelings. The earth has existed for
many years. It generally gets colder in the winter than it is in the summer. 2 is greater than 1. there
is  a  table  in front of me now (Huemer,  2001, 18).  He says  of these propositions  that  they are
accepted by almost everyone regardless of culture or time period; that they tend to be taken fore-
granted in ordinary life and that “if a person believes contrary to one of these propositions, then it is
a sign of insanity” (Huemer, 2001, 18). 
Huemer writes that a challenge to a proposition, P, is a claim that “could not be rationally accepted
in conjunction with P, in that it would be inherently self-defeating to do so” (Huemer, 2001, 19). He
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gives, again, several examples: It is raining, but I don't believe it. It is raining, but that's not true. It
is raining, but I have no reason to think so. It is raining, but the reasons I have for believing that are
false. It is raining, but I don't know whether it is or not (Huemer, 2001, 19). With this definition of
Scepticism at hand, Huemer distinguishes between different sorts of Scepticism. First,  there are
sceptics who argue that some significant number of common sense beliefs are false. Second, there
are sceptics who argue that common sense beliefs are not known to be true, and third, there are
sceptics who argue that common sense beliefs are unjustified (Huemer, 2001, 20). Which common
sense beliefs are challenged by the sceptic may vary, so that there are moral sceptics, inductive
sceptics, external world sceptics, sceptics about the past, sceptics about common sense tout court,
and so on. 
Next, Huemer identifies the sort of Scepticism that he will confront as that which “holds that (some
significant class of) common sense beliefs are not at all justified, which is to say: there is no reason
to  believe  that  they  are  true”  (Huemer,  2001,  20).  He  identifies  Agrippa's  Trilemma  as  I
characterized in Chapter 1 and puts the following argument in the sceptic's mouth (citing Sextus
Empiricus and I.T Oakley):
Huemer's Trilemma
(6) In order to know something, I must have a good reason for believing it.
(7) Any chain of reasons must have one of the following structures: Either (a) It is an infinite
series, (b) it is circular, or (c) it begins with a belief for which there are no further reasons. 
(8) I cannot have an infinitely long chain of reasoning for any of my beliefs.
(9) Circular reasoning cannot produce knowledge. 
(10) Nor can I gain knowledge by structure 2c, for (a) I would not know my starting beliefs
to be true (from (1)) and (b) I cannot gain knowledge by deriving it from assumptions that I
do not know to be true. 
(11) Therefore, I cannot know anything. 
Notice that because Huemer is concerned with the sceptic who says we have no reason to believe
anything at  all,  the talk about  knowledge is  really superfluous.  One could simply construe the
conclusion as “I cannot have any reason to believe anything” and then eliminate the first premise all
together, but for some reason this is not what Huemer does.
In any case, Huemer has several different responses to this form of Scepticism. His first is to argue
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that Scepticism is self-defeating because if it is true then even the sceptic cannot have any reason to
believe his own conclusions (Huemer, 2001, 27-31), an objection with which we have already dealt.
He then defends the “G.E Moore shift”. Following Moore, Huemer claims that it is 'more plausible'
that one of the premises of the sceptical argument is false than that he cannot know, or even have
any reason to believe, anything at all. I set these arguments aside for the moment, because we are
looking for a response which deploys the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism specifically. 
After having explicated Phenomenal Conservatism in some detail and replied to several objections,
Huemer returns to the above sceptical argument. He tells us that there are two ways of interpreting
the phrase “to have a reason for”. On the first interpretation, the sceptic means to demand that for
any belief, B, we have some other belief, N, from which B can be cogently inferred. If this is what
the sceptic means, then, Huemer says, (6) is false, because we might know something by “having a
non-belief state of awareness that supports” it – that is, we might know something by way of it
seeming to us to be true (Huemer, 2001, 177).  Another interpretation of 'have a reason for', says
Huemer, is “to have some sort of mental state that renders justified” (Huemer, 2001, 177). If that is
what the sceptic means, then according to Huemer (10) is false, because I can know something by
inferring it from a belief for which there are no further reasons, so long as that belief seems to me to
be true26 (Huemer, 2001, 178). 
This assessment is puzzling, because it seems to rely crucially on construing the sceptic as arguing
that nobody knows anything, but Huemer's official target is the sceptic who says that we have no
reason to believe anything, and that sceptic need not have any premise about knowledge as a part of
his argument. The Pyrrhonian sceptic  could just grant to Huemer that you can know something
without having any reason to believe it. Perhaps you can even know something if it seems to you to
be true, but, the Pyrrhonian will insist, this does not change the fact that there is no reason to believe
anything at all – his main point. I do not see, therefore, how what Huemer says here is supposed to
bare on Pyrrhonian Scepticism even as he himself originally understood it. 
3. A Reconstruction
There  is  another  way to  take  Phenomenal  Conservatism so  as  to  make  a  seemingly  powerful
response to Scepticism. Huemer and the other advocates of Phenomenal Conservatism mean to
26 This should not be understood as the thought that I can know that P by inferring it from Q, where Q seems to me to 
be true but is in fact false. Huemer's concept of knowledge has, like most philosophers, truth as a necessary 
condition. 
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defend it as an ethics of belief, and so perhaps that is a clue as to how the response to Scepticism
should be taken. 
The sceptic tries to lure the dogmatist into suspension of judgement. His strategy is just to 
repeatedly demand reasons for any and everything that the dogmatist believes. When the dogmatist 
runs out of reasons, the sceptic hopes he will suspend. The dogmatist will only suspend, however, if
he thinks that, he ought to believe something only if he is capable of answering all of the sceptic's 
questions. The Phenomenal Conservative, however, will reject that last view. He will insist that it is 
appropriate (at least to some degree), to hold a belief just because it seems to you to be true. Of 
course, if the dogmatist says to the sceptic, “I believe that P because it seems to me that P”, the 
sceptic will say, “Why believe that how things seem to you is how things are?”, but the Phenomenal
Conservative will here insist that dogmatist does not need to answer that last question. Dogmatist is 
entitled to believe that P just because it seems to him that P, even if he could not answer any further 
questions. If we become Phenomenal Conservatives, the sceptic cannot lure us into suspension.
The question we are left with is whether this is plausible. In the next chapter, I argue that it isn't.
Chapter 4: Do Seemings Exist?
In saying that we should accept, at least to some degree and absent defeaters, what seems to be true,
Phenomenal Conservatives commit themselves to the existence of certain mental states. They 
commit themselves to what they call “seemings”, where these are the mental states we are allegedly
in when we say things like “it seems to me that P”. I doubt, however, that there are any such states, 
and here I explain why. 
Section 1 clarifies what exactly Phenomenal Conservatives are committed to. Section 2 points out 
that they have not given any literal characterization of what a seeming actually is, and so no clear 
articulation of their view. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the main arguments for the existence of 
seemings. I claim that neither argument is cogent. 
1. What is meant by “Seems”? 
In saying that something “seems” to be the case, Phenomenal Conservatives mean to say that they
are having experiences with propositional content (Bealer 1999; Pryor 2000, 2004; Huemer 2001,
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2007, Huemer 2013, Cullison 2010; Chudnoff 2010; Brogaard 2013, 10; Lycan 2013, Skene 2011
and Tucker 2010). When it “seems to me that P”, I am, supposedly, having an experience with the
propositional  content  “P”.  Seemings  are  sometimes  described  as  having  a  distinctive
phenomenology “of ascertaining that a given proposition is true, or the feeling of being directly
presented with the truth of a proposition” (Moretti, 2015, 4). When it seems to me that an alarm
clock is ringing, the proposition ‘an alarm clock is ringing’ has a certain feel of truth about it. It is
claimed that these 'seemings' are sui generis; not reducible to any other mental states. 
As I have said, seemings are supposed to be experiences with propositional content. As Huemer
(2001, 71-73) expounds the view, these contents are “truth evaluable but non-conceptual”.  That
content represents things as being thus-and-so. To invoke Huemer's own metaphor, his position is
that, for example, when it seems that there is a bent stick in water, the senses are telling you that
there is a bent stick, as opposed to presenting you with meaningless qualia which you interpret as a
bent stick (Huemer, 2001, 71). A seeming is an assertive mental representation (Tooley, 2013).
The Phenomenal Conservative view, then, is that when I have one of these experiences, I have some
justification for believing the propositional content of that experience, absent defeaters.
2. Metaphors and Seemings
The concept of a seeming presupposed by Phenomenal Conservatism is rife with metaphor. The
most obvious of these metaphors is the idea that seemings are assertive. The term 'assertive' is a
term  which  ordinarily  applies  literally  only  to  people.  People  may  literally  assert  things,  but
seemings are not people and so it is not clear what can be meant by saying that the seeming 'asserts'
something as true. Seemings do not say anything at all (Tooley, 2013). A similar metaphor comes
out in Huemer's idea that in a perceptual seeming, the senses are telling us things about the world.
Neither seemings nor senses have mouths and so cannot be literally telling us anything. Seemings
could perhaps be understood as containing information, in the same way that a letter or an email
contains information, but we cannot suppose that the seemings literally tell us this information, any
more than it makes sense to suppose that the email literally tells us its contents. But, if the seeming
does not literally tell us its contents, then unless I do the equivalent of reading the email, I cannot be
aware of its content. Tooley (2013, 310-311) points out that there may be no way to replace this
metaphorical talk with a more literal characterization. 
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Michael Huemer (2013, 328) replies to Tooley's frustration about the lack of a literal analysis of
seemings. In a section labelled “Against Analysis” he writes:
“Michael Tooley is noticably frustrated by my failure to analyze the notion of its seeming or
appearing to one that P. One reason I have not tried to do so is that as far as I can tell,
philosophical analysis has never succeeded... but if I offer no analysis of “seems”, won't
readers be unable to understand what I mean by the term and hence unable to understand the
principle of phenomenal conservatism? Fortunately there is little cause for fear...  if,  as I
claim, there is a class of conscious mental states may be dubbed “seemings”, including states
that occur during the normal operation of perception, memory, and intellectual reflection,
then these states should be familiar to all normal individuals. I therefore need not provide a
philosophical analysis of seemings. I need only say enough to draw readers attention to these
familiar mental states” (Huemer, 2013 328-329).
The basic idea is simple. Huemer does not need to provide a literal analysis of what he means by
“seemings”  because  he  takes  it  that  everybody  is  already  familiar  with  seemings  in  his/her
experience. All you need to do is reflect on your past experience and you will see exactly what
seemings are, because you are in that mental state all the time. He does not need to explain exactly
what he means, because you can see what he means. 
This brings us to a more serious issue, however. Phenomenal Conservatives suppose that we are all
tacitly  familiar  with  seemings  and  that  we  only  need  to  be  pointed  toward  them  with  some
illustration, but reflecting introspectively on my own mental states, I am honestly very doubtful that
I am familiar with anything which might be characterized the way Huemer characterizes seemings. 
I will return to this introspective point later, but first let us consider the arguments which have been
made for the existence of seemings. There are two arguments for the existence of seemings. The
first proceeds by citing examples in which alleged seemings cannot be identified with other more
familiar states. The strategy is to eliminate the possibility of identifying alleged seemings with other
more familiar mental states, thereby encouraging the conclusion that seemings must be sui generis27.
I call this the Seems-Talk Argument. The second argument claims that seemings are part of the best
explanation of the phenomenon of blind-sight. I call this the Blind-Sight Argument. In the next
27 This argument is given by Huemer (2007); Moretti, (2015); Tucker, (2010) and, regrettably, me (Burns, 2017). 
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section I discuss the Seems-Talk Argument. 
3. The Seems -Talk Argument
It is common to talk of things seeming to be true. Cullison lists a number of examples:
It seems that it would be wrong to torture a baby. A few months ago, I saw a video of some
men  decapitating  another  man.  What  they  did  seemed  wrong  to  me.  Recently,  several
musicians  got  together  to raise money for AIDS research.  It  seems to me that  they did
something  good.  There  are  also  a  variety  of  non-moral  cases.  Proofs  and  arguments
sometimes seem valid. Certain logical principles seem true. It seems that the light is coming
from behind the person in this photograph. It seems that there is someone downstairs. It
seems that the stick is bent (Cullison, 2010, 260).
There are two ways of turning these observations of linguistic practice into an argument for the
existence of seemings construed as sui generis mental representations. 
Byerly (2012) interprets the Seems-Talk Argument as the argument that “because seeming talk is so
variegated, it has been observed that no single mental state with which those who are skeptical of
seemings are comfortable could be that which makes seeming talk appropriate in every instance in
which  it  is  appropriate”  (Byerly  2012,  772).  Let's  say  that  someone  skeptical  of  seemings  is
someone who denies the existence of seemings construed as sui generis mental states. We may
reconstruct Byerly's argument:
(STA)
(1) The use of the locution “it seems to me that...” is often appropriate in English.
(2) The use of the locution “it seems to me that...” is appropriate only if there is some
single mental state referred to by “seems”. 
(3) There is no single mental state with which those who are skeptical of seemings are
comfortable which could make the locution “it seems to me that...” appropriate in every
instance in which it is appropriate. 
(4) The mental state referred to in “it seems to me that...” locutions must be one with
which those skeptical of seemings are not comfortable. 
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Since those skeptical of seemings are those who are not comfortable with seemings construed as sui
generis, it follows that there exist such sui generis mental states.
This interpretation relies heavily on the idea of language being appropriate or inappropriate. The
trouble is that what is meant by “appropriate” is far from clear. In one obvious sense, seeming talk
is appropriate: seeming talk is a standard part of regular discourse the use of which is not morally
impermissible. Or, again, seeming talk is a useful way of reporting how things are whilst indicating
caution, lack of assuredness and the live possibility of mistake. Seeming talk being appropriate in
these senses is  not  sufficient  for  STA however,  because (2) is  false  on these interpretations  of
appropriateness.  Seeming talk could be appropriate  in  these ways even if  there were no single
mental state referred to by “seems”. In what way, then, is seeming talk appropriate but would not be
appropriate were it not for the existence of a mental state referred to by “seems”? Byerly never says,
nor do proponents of the Seems-Talk Argument.
 Moreover, the claim that seems talk would be inappropriate were it not for the existence of some
mental state to which seems talk refers (premise (2)) strikes me as completely gratuitous. Talk may
be appropriate for myriad reasons and not all of these have anything to do with whether there are
items in the world picked out by the words involved. As a scientific anti-realist might tell you, it
could be appropriate to talk as if there were such things as atoms, quarks and string even if there are
no such things, because it is useful to talk that way. Similarly, it might be appropriate to talk as
though there are such things as numbers, sets and moral truths even if there are no such things.
Likewise, it might be appropriate to use seems locutions even if there were no sui generis seemings
and indeed even if there were no mental states referred to by seems talk at all. For all that has been
shown, seems talk could be a kind of useful fiction. It all depends upon the purpose for which we
are talking. Thus, Byerly's interpretation of the Seems-Talk Argument is unsound28
It has been pointed out to me29 that I have assumed here that whether or not we should use a given
piece of language depends on our purposes, goals and interests, and not on whether there is some
single entity in the world to which we always refer in using the word. That might strike some as a
controversial assumption, and some will hold, with the proponent of STA, that a piece of language
28 Byerly's (2012) own criticism of this argument is that seems talk may be appropriate even though there are no sui 
generis seemings because seems talk is ambiguous between belief, inclinations to believe and qualia. He might be 
right that seems talk is ambigouus in ordinary English, but his again rests on the vague idea of talk being appropriate
or inappropriate.
29 By Sorin Baiasu. 
57
is legitimate only if there is some one thing to which we refer in using it. If we were to accept that,
I'd insist that the proponent of STA has given us no reason at all to think that seems locutions are
appropriate or legitimate in the first place. That is to say, there is no reason to believe (1), and since
(1) will be taken by these philosophers to entail the actual existence of a sui generis mental state, it
cannot merely be asserted without begging the question. 
So far I have argued that Byerly's Seems-Talk Argument hinges on a vague and problematic notion
of appropriateness. Still, there is a second interpretation of the Seems-Talk Argument that is much
stronger; namely, that our using seems locutions in the way we do commits us to believing that there
are  seemings.   It  is  noted  that  we use  the  locution  “it  seems  to  me  that....”  such that  we are
committed  to  thinking  that  there  are  sui  generis  assertive  mental  representations  distinct  from
beliefs, inclinations to believe and other familiar mental states. 
More carefully, consider some subject, S who uses the locution “it seems to me that P” in all of the
variegated ways suggested by Cullison above. The most obvious interpretation of what is meant by
such a locution is that there exists some mental state M, where M is the mental state of its seeming
to S that P. 
(5) It seems to S that P =  ∃(x)[M(x)]
Thus, the most obvious interpretation of seems locutions logically entails that there exists a mental
state which could be called a seeming. It does not yet follow from this that we are committed to the
existence of sui generis seemings, construed as a unique kind of mental state distinct from beliefs,
sensations and inclinations. We could maintain that all we mean by seems locutions is that we are
inclined  to  believe  that  P.  S's  seems  locutions  would  then  be  interpreted,  not  as  entailing  the
existence of a sui generis mental state, but as entailing that there exists a mental state of S's which is
the mental state of being inclined to believe that P.  The proponent of the Seems-Talk Argument
claims, however that this interpretation of seems locutions is not consistent with how we use seems
locutions. He claims that no mental state acceptable to those sceptical of seemings exists in every
case where we use seems locutions. 
 Cullison (2010, 262) first argues against the interpretation of seems locutions as reports of belief.
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Suppose that Pat knows that a popular clothing brand manufacture their clothing using child labour.
Pat then sees her friend buy clothing of that brand. It seems to Pat that what her friend did was
wrong. Suppose further that Pat has some evidence that refraining from buying clothing is not a
productive way to make the lives of child labourers better and actually makes things worse. The
evidence is enough to convince Pat to suspend judgement about whether or not her friend has done
something wrong, even though it seems to her that he has. Since Pat does not believe that her friend
did something wrong and it seems to her that he has, we have a case where we would use seems
locutions in the absence of the relevant beliefs (Cullison, 2010, 262). Cullison also follows Huemer
(2001, 71) in citing cases of perceptual illusion in this context. Take the case of a straight stick
immersed in water appearing bent. The stick seems bent although I do not believe that it is bent; I
am quite sure that the stick is straight30.  Lastly, there are cases of mnemonic seeming. Suppose that
I remember unwrapping a christmas present. It seems to me that the wrapping paper was red. I am
shown a recording of me unwrapping the present and the paper is in fact green. I no longer believe
that the wrapping paper was red, although it still seems to me, in my memory, that it was (Cullison,
2010, 263). All of these examples are intended to show that the way we use seems locutions is such
that it makes no sense to interpret them as reports of belief. 
Cullison next considers the view that seems locutions be interpreted as reports of inclinations to
believe. He argues that a person may be inclined to believe a proposition which seems to them to be
false. He cites a case in which a man's wife has a sudden religious conversion and he fears greatly
that she will divorce him if he does not share her religious beliefs. The fear is great enough to cause
in him an inclination to believe the key tenets of her religion, although all of them seem to him to be
false.  We may add to this Huemer's previously mentioned case of perceptual illusion. I might be so
familiar with the illusion created by sticks immersed in water that I am not remotely inclined to
believe that the stick is bent, but it still seems that way (Huemer, 2001, 71).  
Since Cullison notes that moral propositions, propositions about the past and propositions about
God can all  seem to be true,  he presumably holds that  seems locutions  cannot  be consistently
interpreted as reports of what modern philosophers would have called sensations and what are today
called qualia – the phenomenal qualities which are before consciousness and may be described as
differently shaped patches of colour. Cullision gives no argument for this, but it is easy to see what
he would say in the writings of other advocates of seemings. Huemer (2001, 67) cites cases in
30 Cullison  (2010, 263) also cites a case in which you hold a golf ball up to the sun and the golf ball seems to be the 
same size as the sun, but you do not believe that it is.
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which a person has a sense of their limb's position in space without looking at it. It seems to such a
person that, for example, their palm is facing downward, but they are not looking at their palm. I
myself once tried to distinguish seemings from sensations on the basis of several considerations.
First, it is possible to have seemings about mathematical or moral propositions (that 1+1=2 or that
killing is wrong) and these do not involve qualia (Burns 2017, 255). This view is held by Huemer
(2007), Tucker (2013) and Cullison (2010). Second, different people may have different seemings
whilst having the same qualia. Upon looking at a picture, it may seem to an Illustrator that there is a
painting by Arthur Rackham whilst it may seem to the untrained that there is a painting (Burns,
2017, 255). Third, I might have qualia of the sort I normally have when there are 2204 blades of
grass in my line of sight, but at best it only seems to me that there are many blades of grass (Burns,
2017, 263). All of these are cases where we would use seems locutions in the absence of relevant
qualia, and therefore seems locutions cannot be consistently interpreted as reports of qualia. 
This completes the Seems-Talk Argument. Since in each case discussed, it makes sense to say that it
seems that something is the case even in the absence of more familiar mental states, and since the
most  obvious  interpretation  of  seems  locutions  is  that  they  are  reports  of  mental  states,  it  is
concluded that we are committed to believing that there are sui generis seemings. This argument,
however, is fallacious. The argument assumes that in all of the cases presented the sense in which it
seems that a proposition is true must always be the same, but this assumption is gratuitous. If we
abandon that assumption, there is a way to interpret the “seems” locutions in each case without
postulating sui generis seemings. 
In the example involving Pat's friend buying clothing produced by child labour, we have a case in
which it is clear that the seeming that her friend did something immoral is not a belief, since she
explicitly suspends judgement in the face of a contrary seeming. But in this case, the sense in which
it seems to Pat that her friend did something immoral may well be that she is simply inclined to
believe that her friend did something immoral. On this reading, Pat is initially inclined to believe
that her friend did something immoral but because of her evidence she sincerely decides to suspend
judgement. It is psychologically possible, and I think it often happens, that a person consciously
suspends judgement on an issue even though they have an inclination to believe something about it.
And this is just what the seemings sceptic will say. He will say that the sense in which something
seems true to Pat is just that she has an inclination to believe, and no other sui generis mental state
need be postulated.
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In the perceptual illusion cases we have cases where it is clear that the sense in which it seems to
the subject that, for example, the stick is bent cannot be that he believes or is inclined to believe that
the stick is bent. The seemings sceptic can maintain, however, that the sense in which it seems to
the subject that the stick is bent is that the subject has various qualia which humans normally have
when they are looking at a bent stick, and there is no need to postulate any further sui generis
mental state. 
The case of it seeming to me that my Christmas present wrapping was red even after having seen a
recording showing it to be green shows clearly that the sense in which it seems to me that the paper
was red cannot be that I believe that the paper is red, since ex hypothesi, I no longer believe that.
Yet, the sense may still be either that I am still slightly inclined to believe that the paper is red –
after all, I could swear that it was red! - or that I have some fleeting mnemonic imagery as of a red
present, or perhaps both. In this case we can preserve a sense in which it seems to me that the
present is red without postulating a sui generis mental state. 
The man who fears that his wife will divorce him if he does not share her religious beliefs comes to
be inclined to believe those religious beliefs even though they seem to him to be false, but we need
not say that the sense of “seems” here has to be sui generis. We can say, instead, that the man has
contrary inclinations to believe. He has inclinations to believe both that the religious beliefs of his
wife are true and that they are false. 
In Huemer's case where it seems to me that my palm is facing down even when I am not looking at
it, it is true that the seeming cannot be identified with visual qualia of the kind I might expect if I
were looking at a hand, but the sense in which it seems to me that my palm is facing down is that
there are certain qualia which are associated with various muscular tensions throughout my arm and
these qualia are associated with my palm facing downwards31. 
My  own  earlier  arguments  are  no  better.  In  a  case  where  it  seems  to  me  that  a  moral  or
mathematical proposition is true, I cannot identify these with qualia, but it is plausible – or at least
not clearly false – that the sense in which moral and mathematical propositions seem to me to be
true is that I believe or am inclined to believe them. The same account is possible concerning two
people who have different seemings but the same qualia. One person is inclined to believe that there
is a painting whilst the art expert is inclined to believe that there is an Arthur Rackham painting.
31 Tooley (2013) makes this point as well. 
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And lastly I have the qualia associated with 2204 blades of grass but am inclined only to believe the
more vague claim that there are many blades of grass. Thus, in all of these cases it is possible to
identify the alleged seeming with some other more familiar mental state and it is never necessary to
postulate the existence of seemings. 
What I have done here is argued that in every case we may explain the sense in which it seems to a
person that some proposition is true without postulating sui generis mental states. It follows that our
using seems locutions in the many ways in which we use them need not commit us to postulating
sui generis seemings. I can meaningfully use seems locutions without presupposing the existence of
a special mental state which all of  these locutions refer to. I therefore cannot see any way to make
reflections  about  “seems”  locutions  in  ordinary  English  into  an  argument  for  the  existence  of
seemings. 
It  is  important  to  be  absolutely  clear  about  the  argument  I  have  made  here.  The  Seems-Talk
Argument is an argument by ontological commitment. It tries to show that I am committed, by
various things that I myself say, to the existence of sui generis seemings. I use seems locutions in a
large variety of ways and the most obvious way to interpret what I mean by these utterances is as
reports  of some mental state that I  am in. The argument goes,  however,  that there is  no single
mental state that I am in in all of the cases where I utter seems locutions, unless there are sui generis
seemings distinct from beliefs, inclinations and qualia. Thus, the only way that my utterances of
seems locutions might be true is if there are sui generis seemings. My own use of seems locutions
logically commits me, so the argument goes, to the existence of sui generis seemings. What I have
done in responding to this argument is provided an interpretation of my own seems locutions which
is consistent with all of the ways I use them and which does not entail the existence of sui generis
seemings – my interpretation only entails the existence of beliefs, inclinations to believe and qualia.
I have, in Quine's terms, found paraphrases for my seems locutions which do not commit me to sui
generis seemings. 
The response I have given may sound similar to that of Byerly (2012). His claim is that seems talk
is ambiguous between belief, inclination and qualia so that seems talk is appropriate because it
refers to these mental states. This is not my view. First, I do not interpret the argument as one about
the  appropriateness  of  talk,  for  the  reasons  given  earlier.  So,  I  do  not  say  that  seems  talk  is
appropriate or inappropriate. Second, it would be misleading to express my view as the view that
seems talk is ambiguous and refers sometimes to belief, inclination and qualia respectively. I have
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no view on how seems talk is used in ordinary English. My view is that my using seems talk in all
of the variegated ways I do use it does not commit me to the existence of seemings construed as sui
generis mental states, because my own seems talk may be understood as about beliefs, inclinations
and qualia. I do not think there are any examples which may be constructed such that I would say
that something seems to be the case even though there are no relevant beliefs, inclinations or qualia,
and so I do not think my use of seems locutions commits me to the existence of seemings. It might
be that things are different for the 'ordinary' user of the English language, but I leave him to grapple
with his own ontological commitments. 
I  have  examined  two  versions  of  the  Seeming-Talk  Argument  and  found  neither  of  them
compelling. 
4. The Argument from Blindsight
Chris Tucker (2010) argues for the existence of seemings on the grounds that they are part of the
best explanation of the phenomenon of Blind-sight. Blind-sight is a condition in which a person
with a damaged visual cortex cannot see anything in a certain region of their visual field, yet they
are able to “guess” with surprising reliability the motion and orientation of objects within their
blindspot   (Stoerig  1997:  225–6).  Tucker  argues  that  the  best  explanation  of  this  phenomenon
postulates the existence of seemings:
The  subjects’“blindspots”are  regions   in  their  visual  fields  that  lack  visual  imagery.
Nonetheless,  the  mechanisms  that  produce  seemings  function  well  enough  to  provide
information about the region of the environment that corresponds to the subjects’ blindspots
(Tucker, 2010, 230).
Tooley (2013, 313) suggests that the person's guessing the locations and orientations of objects in
the blind-spot is an action which may be explained by his having a slight degree of confidence in
the propositions guessed. According to Tooley,  this obviates the need to postulate seemings. As
Huemer (2013, 333) has replied, “one might still posit seemings to explain why the subject has such
an elevated degree of belief”. Such a person has, for example, the belief that there is a circle in the
blind area because it seems that way. 
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However, it is not necessary to postulate seemings to explain the elevated degree of belief in a case
of Blind-sight. Although a person with blind-sight has damage to his visual cortex preventing the
processing of visual information (which of course takes the form of various light waves)  from
being conscious,  the  processing  of  said  light  waves  still  occurs  subconsciously,  causing  in  the
person an increased degree of confidence that there are objects of certain shapes in their blind spot.
Of course, the source of this confidence will be opaque to the subject. 
We have,  then,  two explanations of blind-sight.  The seemings explanation and the unconscious
explanation. Note first that the unconscious explanation is simpler than the seemings explanation,
because the seemings explanation requires the postulation of more distinct kinds of entity than does
the unconscious explanation, since a proponent of the seemings explanation will be committed to
the existence of both seemings and the unconscious processing of visual information. It must be, on
the seemings explanation, this unconscious processing which causes the seeming. Moreover, the
seemings explanation raises the following issue. People afflicted with blind-sight are often very
surprised when they are told that their “guesses” are quite often correct, because they thought they
were simply guessing at  random (Stoerig 1997, 225–6). Yet,  if they were having an experience
which presents a proposition as true to them, one would not expect them to be so surprised. If such
people were having seemings, why would they be surprised to find out that things were just as they
seemed to be? Tucker explains this by claiming that the seemings  “are very weak and the subjects
understandably assume that, in the circumstances, they do not have any reliable access to what is
taking place in their blind spot” (Tucker, 2010, 231). This only raises a further question, however.
Why are the seemings weak in cases of blindsight? The seemings are apparently not weak in cases
of healthy sense perception which is accompanied by qualia. Yet, the mechanisms which produce
seemings still work, according to Tucker, in cases of blind-sight – it is only the visual cortex which
is impaired. There should be no reason, therefore, that seemings in blindsight cases are any weaker
than in full-blown perception.  No doubt it  will  be possible to explain this in order to save the
seemings explanation,  but all  of these extra details  make the seemings explanation vastly more
complex than the unconscious explanation, with none of said details having been empirically tested.
For  these  reasons  I  conclude  that  the  unconscious  explanation  is  superior  to  the  seemings
explanation  and  that  the  phenomenon  of  blind-sight  provides  no  good  reason  to  postulate  the
existence of seemings. 
I conclude that there is no good reason to suppose that there are any seemings. Of course, it does
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not follow from this that there are no seemings32. Yet, we are now in a position to appreciate how
strange a mental state a seeming would be and to return again to my claim that I cannot find on
introspection any such state. Consider again the case of the stick immersed in water. As I look at the
stick and reflect introspectively on my mental states I can find several things. I can find,  most
obviously, the qualia which lead me to suppose that there is a stick – the brown patches of colour in
an elongated shape for example. But we are told that this is not what the seeming is. I can find my
belief that the stick is straight, but we are told that this is not what the seeming is. I think I can find
a faint inclination to believe that the stick is bent, but even if I can, we are told that this is not what
the seeming is. The seeming is something other than any of these which in some sense asserts that
the stick is bent. Now, I can only make my own honest introspective report and ask the reader to see
for  themselves,  but  I  cannot  find  any  such  state  distinct  from the  qualia,  the  belief  and  the
inclination to believe. 
These, then, are the grounds on which I doubt that there are any seemings: there is no reason to
believe that there are any seemings, no one has given any literal explanation of what a seeming is
and  I cannot find any seemings on introspection. 
Chapter 5: The Self-Defeat Argument 
1. So Far
I have given one reason to think that Phenomenal Conservatism is an unacceptable policy of belief:
There are no such things as seemings.  In this  chapter I  examine the Self-Defeat Argument for
Phenomenal Conservatism. I will try to show that argument is no good. 
Section 2 states the argument. Section 3 highlights an important point which Huemer concedes.
Sections 4 criticizes the first premise of the Self-Defeat Argument. I argue that a crucial premise of
the argument is unmotivated and far from obvious. Sections 5 and 6 discuss whether the argument
entails that we should not deny Phenomenal Conservatism. I argue that it doesn't and, consequently,
even if  the conclusion of the Self-Defeat  Argument were true,  it  would not  be as worrying as
Huemer makes it sound. Section 7 is a conclusion. 
32 Tooley (2013) seems to think that it does follow but the argument seems to be fallacious. 
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2. The Argument Stated
Michael Huemer argues that the denial  of Phenomenal Conservatism is self-defeating (Huemer,
2001; 2007; 2013). Here is a rough statement of the argument:
I think the principle of phenomenal conservatism underlies judgement in general. I think
reflection will reveal that all judgement, whether inferential or not, is a process in which one
accepts  a  proposition  on  the  basis  of  how  things  seem  to  oneself.  If  phenomenal
conservatism is  false,  so  that  the  way things  seem to  oneself  is  irrelevant  to  epistemic
justification, then all judgement must be irrational (Huemer 2001, 107).
If this were not bad enough, the irrationality of all judgement extends to the denial of Phenomenal
Conservatism itself:
 the  rejection  of  Phenomenal  Conservatism is  self-defeating,  roughly,  because  one  who
rejected  Phenomenal  Conservatism would  inevitably  do  so  on  the  basis  of  how  things
seemed to himself; he would do so because Phenomenal Conservatism did not seem to him
to be correct, or because it seemed to him to be incompatible with other things that seemed
correct. Therefore, if this opponent of Phenomenal Conservatism were right, his belief in the
negation of Phenomenal Conservatism would itself be unjustified (Huemer, 2007, 39). 
He spells the argument out formally this way:
(1) All our beliefs (in relevant cases) are based upon appearances. 
(2) A belief is (doxastically) justified only if what it is based upon constitutes an adequate
source of (propositional) justification. 
(3)  Therefore,  if  appearances  are  not  a  source  of  justification,  then  all  our  beliefs  are
unjustified,  including  the  belief  (if  one  has  it)  that  appearances  are  not  a  source  of
justification (Huemer, 2010,  1).33. 
As Huemer points out, the argument does not conclude that Phenomenal Conservatism is true, but
that anyone who denies it must do so unjustifiably (Huemer, 2007, 41). Anyone who denies it ought
not to deny it!
33 See also Huemer (2007; 2013).
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Huemer, to his credit, includes the lemma “in relevant cases” in (1). He notes that sometimes beliefs
are formed on the basis of self-deception or as acts of faith, and that these will not be believed
because of how things appear to the person (Huemer, 2001, 55-57). He takes these exceptions to be
irrelevant  to  his  argument  because  such  beliefs  are  not  “plausible  candidates  for  being
justified”(Huemer,  2013, 341).  This suggests a  reformulation of (1).  According to  Huemer,  any
belief which we are pre-theoretically inclined to regard as acceptable is one which is based on how
things appear to us. Thus:
(1*)   All  beliefs  (that  are  plausible  candidates  for  being  acceptable)  are  based  on
appearances.
In defence of (1*), he holds that “reflection will reveal” that this is just how our thought processes
go (Huemer, 2014, 227). When we judge a proposition to be true it is either because it seems to us
to be so or because it follows from things which seem to us to be true. He writes:
 Consider some reasonable candidate for a justified belief, say your belief that 2+1=3. If you
reflect on this belief, I think you are just going to find it plausible that it is based upon the
appearance that 2+1=3 (its seeming to you that 2+1=3) (Huemer, 2014, 227).
So, the Self-Defeat argument is just this. The basis of any belief which we are pre-theoretically
inclined to regard as appropriate is how things seem to us.  If it is not acceptable to form a belief on
the basis of how things seem, it follows that no belief is acceptable. Among my beliefs is the belief
that Phenomenal Conservatism is false, and thus, my belief that Phenomenal Conservatism is false
is unacceptable.
3. The Uncontroversial Fact
I begin my evaluation of the argument by reminding the reader of a simple fact which Huemer
concedes:
(4) There are some cases where beliefs are not caused by how things seem.
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Remember, Huemer's (1*) says, not that every belief is caused by how things seem, but that all
beliefs which we are pre-theoretically disposed to regard as acceptable are caused by how things
seem – thus the qualification “in relevant cases” in (1*). Uncontroversial examples are easy to find.
Huemer himself lists instances of self-deception, faith and wishful thinking as examples (Huemer,
2013, 341). If I am disposed to believe in an afterlife because I want there to be an afterlife, my
belief may be caused by my wishful thinking, even though things do not seem to me that way. The
same may be said of a belief which is held in faith. For at least some people, it is not that they
believe that there is a God because it seems to them that there is, but rather because they very
deeply hope that there is, and that hope leads them to choose the belief. This uncontroversial fact,
which Huemer already admits, will be important later.
 
4. “Based”
There is some ambiguity in the words “because” and “basis” as used in the foregoing argument.
Huemer tells us that we believe that P because it seems to us that P, or that its seeming to us that P is
the basis of our believing that P. This may be interpreted in two ways. First, it might be held that we
believe that P because it seems to us that P, in the sense that the proximate causal origin of our
belief is that it seems to us that P. Sometimes Huemer explicitly speaks this way (Huemer, 2007,
39). Yet, it might also be held that we believe that P because it seems to us that P, in the sense that if
we were asked to defend our belief, we would cite the fact that it seems to us that way.
Take first the latter interpretation. Huemer's first premise would then read that all of our beliefs are
of a kind that we would cite the fact that they seem to us to be true in defence of them. This reading
of the premise would clearly be unsatisfactory, since sometimes I might cite another belief of mine
in defence, and make no reference to how things seem. It is best then to read the premise as saying
that all of our beliefs are of a kind that we would ultimately cite the fact that they seem to us to be
true in defence of them, where “ultimately” means if we were asked to defend that belief and any
further beliefs we invoke. 
 I think it cannot simply be assumed that most people would ultimately appeal to how things seem –
in Huemer's sense – to defend their beliefs in any (apparently acceptable) case. In defence of a
belief about the physical world such as that about the squirrel, many people might say “it seems that
there is a squirrel in the garden”, but it is far from clear that what they would mean by this is a sui
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generis mental state. Speaking again for myself, I would mean by this phrase only that I am having
sensations of a certain familiar kind. I might also sometimes say, in defence of a philosophical claim
of mine, “it seems to me that this philosophical thesis is true”, but I would not mean by this that I
am in a special sui generis mental state. I would mean simply that I am inclined to believe it. On
this reading of “based” premise (1) is, pace Huemer, not clear on reflection.
Now consider another way of reading (1). On the new reading, the premise says that all beliefs (that
are pre-theoretically plausible cases of acceptable belief) are based on how things seem in the sense
that seemings are the psychological-causal basis of the beliefs. Again, Huemer alleges that this is
“obvious on reflection”, but this is far from the case. There is almost always a plausible explanation
of the psychological-causal basis of a given belief which does not involve seemings at all, once it is
made  clear that seemings in Huemer's sense are neither sensations nor beliefs nor inclinations, but
special sui generis mental states quite apart from any of these. 
Let  us  consider  some  beliefs  which  are  pre-theoretically  plausible  cases  of  acceptable  belief.
Suppose that someone kicks me very hard in the shin. I come to believe that I am in pain. What
causes the belief? The obvious explanation is not at all one which appeals to seemings. The obvious
explanation is that I believe that I am in pain because I am in pain – that the pain itself directly
causes  the  belief.  Huemer  admits  that  beliefs  about  our  introspective  lives  are  not  plausibly
explained by appeal to seemings. He writes:
 ‘‘[i]t is plausible to maintain that, when I introspectively believe that I am in pain, my belief
is directly caused by the pain; it is plausible to deny that any distinct, intermediary state of
‘appearing to be in pain’ is required’’ (2007, p. 46)
Consider now beliefs about the physical world. Suppose I believe that there is a squirrel in my
garden because I look out of my window and see one. What is the psychological process which
causes that belief? According to Huemer, the cause will be that it seems to me that there is such a
squirrel  (Huemer,  2007,  37-38).  I  suggest,  instead,  that  the  belief  is  caused  by  the  sensory
experience or sensation of the squirrel. I see the squirrel, in having those sensations, and my seeing
it causes, directly, my belief that there is a squirrel. The causal chain that I propose is this:
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Squirrel → Sensations of a squirrel34 → my belief that there is a squirrel. 
Huemer, surely, would not deny that at least part of the causal chain which leads to my belief that
there is a squirrel involves both the actual squirrel and the sensations caused in me by it. Those two
elements seem quite plain. He will suppose, however, that there is a fourth element in the chain, so
that:
Squirrel → Sensations of a squirrel → it seems to me that there is a squirrel →  my belief
that there is a squirrel. 
But why postulate that a seeming is involved in the causal chain at all? The simpler theory is the
one without seemings and I see no reason to suppose that seemings must be involved. 
Our  uncontroversial  fact,  (4),  makes  the  problem  for  Huemer  more  acute.  If  he  admits  that
sometimes beliefs are not caused by how things seem, then why might things not always be that
way? On Huemer's own account, belief in the afterlife and belief in God might be caused like this:
Deep desire for there to be an afterlife → belief that there is an afterlife. 
Hope that there is a God → choice to believe that there is a God. 
He does not think, in these cases, that the causal chain must always be:
Deep desire for there to be an afterlife → seeming that there is an afterlife → belief that
there is an afterlife. 
Hope that there is a God → seeming that there is a God → belief that there is a God.
Huemer agrees that there are cases like these where seemings do not function as the proximate
cause of belief. But if it happens here, why can it not happen in the case where I see a squirrel?
Why must we postulate seemings in the case where I see a squirrel but not in cases of faith or
34 That my sensations cause me to see the squirrel need not mean that there is a literal screen of sensations or “veil of 
perception” between me and the squirrel. It could be taken that way, but it could equally be understood so that, 
although the sensation is not a literal image between me and the squirrel, it is the vehicle through which I see the 
squirrel. Huemer (2001) himself makes this clear. 
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wishful thinking?  I cannot see that Huemer has any answer to this question, and without one it is
very far from “obvious on reflection” that seemings are always the proximate causes of belief in
cases like the one where I see a squirrel. 
Here is one motivation one might give for postulating seemings in the squirrel case but not faith and
wishful thinking cases. It might be thought that unless it seems to me that there is a squirrel, then it
is inexplicable why I form the belief that there is a squirrel in response to those particular sensations
rather than any other belief, say, that there is a bowl of oats. By contrast, it is obvious why I form
the belief that there is a God when I hope that there is a God; the content of the hope becomes the
content of the belief by a deliberate choice. Equally, when I believe that there  is an afterlife because
I really want there to be one, the content of the desire becomes the content of the belief by self-
deception. 
However,  the explanation for  why I  come to believe “there is  a  squirrel”  when having certain
sensations as opposed to any other belief is readily available. The reason I form a belief about a
squirrel in response to those sensations is that that is how I have been taught to interpret those kinds
of  sensations.  I  was taught  that  something that  looks like  that  is  called  a  “squirrel”.  I  do not,
therefore, see any reason to postulate seemings in this case. 
For my criticism of Huemer's argument here, I do not strictly need to claim that my explanation of
the cause of the squirrel belief is true. I only need to claim that it is a plausible rival explanation. If
the seemings explanation is true, it is at least not “obvious on reflection” like Huemer supposes that
it is. The result is that Huemer's (1) is not itself “obvious on reflection” and so that there is no
reason to believe it. 
5. The Denial of Phenomenal Conservatism
It is clear that these issues are peripheral to the most important one, for Huemer will argue that even
if these other beliefs may be based, in either sense, on something other than how things seem to me,
my denial of Phenomenal Conservatism must be based on the fact that it seems to me to be false, or
that it follows from other things that seem to me to be true. Thus, I cannot deny that seemings are a
source of justification on the ground that that is how things seem to me, because that would be self-
defeating. To avoid the self-defeat however, we need only grant that certain kinds of seemings are a
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source  of  justification.  We need  not  grant  that  all  seemings  are,  as  Phenomenal  Conservatism
requires. We might hold, for example, that seemings are a source of justification in Philosophy,
whilst  denying  that  they  are  generally.  We  could  even  place  further  restrictions,  holding  that
seemings are a source of justification when discussing normative or ethical theory specifically, and
not when discussing other things. If we could find some principled motivation for denying that
other kinds of seeming are sources of justification whilst insisting that seemings in these areas are,
we could avoid self-defeat (BonJour, 2004, 359; Tooley, 2013).
I  shall  not  pursue  this  strategy here  because  I  reject  the  claim that  my denial  of  Phenomenal
Conservatism is based on how things seem to me. Take first the sense of “based” which has to do
with what I would cite to defend my belief. I would not say “Phenomenal Conservatism seems to
me to be false” or that “the denial of Phenomenal Conservatism follows from things that seem to
me to be true” in defence of my denial. I would say something like “Phenomenal Conservatism
presupposes  that  there  are  seemings,  and  there  are  no  seemings.  Therefore  Phenomenal
Conservatism is false”. Moreover, I would not admit that my claim that there are no seemings is
how things seem to me. Rather, I would say that there is no good argument for the existence of
seemings; that no one has provided a literal characterization of what seemings are, and that I am not
aware of any such state in introspection, which, according to Huemer, I should be. 
Next,  what  is  the  cause of  my  denial  of  Phenomenal  Conservatism?  The  causal  origins  of
philosophical beliefs is an interesting empirical question – one which sociologists might fruitfully
investigate. But I doubt that philosophers can do much other than speculate on such causes. For my
part, when I first came to deny Phenomenal Conservatism, I do not think that denial was caused by
a sui generis mental state, since as I have said, I am not aware of any such state. I think, in fact, that
my denial of Phenomenal Conservatism was first and foremost a causal result of my forming new
beliefs about Scepticism, sceptical arguments and sceptical writings, and second, a causal result of
my  rereading  Huemer's  work  to  understand  exactly  what  he  meant  by  “seemings”.  When  I
understood that, I speculate that the result was my being inclined to believe that I had never been
aware of any such states and my consequent suspicion that there were none. I am sure that Huemer
will want to say that seemings must be postulated somewhere in this explanation for it to make
sense, but he has not given any reason why that must be. In the absence of any such reason it is very
far from “obvious on reflection” that my denial of Phenomenal Conservatism is caused by how
things seem to me in Huemer's sense. 
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Thus,  I  deny that  reflection  reveals  that  any of  my beliefs  (that  I  take  pre-theoretically  to  be
acceptable) are “based” on how things seem in either of the senses canvassed by Huemer. If we may
sensibly deny this, we may also sensibly deny (1) and avoid both the conclusion that we have no
acceptable beliefs and that the denial of Phenomenal Conservatism must be unacceptable. 
6. Should I Deny Phenomenal Conservatism?
Even if we grant Huemer both premises of the argument and the conclusion, it seems to me of
relatively little significance.  Huemer takes his argument to show that the denial of Phenomenal
Conservatism is self-defeating, but in what sense is it self-defeating? He says that if Phenomenal
Conservatism  is  false  “all  judgement  must  be  irrational”  and  that  if  I  deny  Phenomenal
Conservatism I must do so “unjustifiably”, but when we see exactly what this amounts to, we see
that it is far less problematic than he makes it sound. 
Huemer's  second premise contains  the technical  distinction between a belief  being doxastically
justified  and  its'  being  propositionally  justified.  Although  the  distinction  is  well  known  in
Philosophy, it is worth explaining it as Huemer uses it, because the exact meanings turn out to be
crucial to the argument. Huemer introduces the distinction with an example:
suppose that Henry has been exposed to a number of rationally compelling arguments for the
theory of evolution. Despite understanding these arguments, Henry refuses to accept them,
through sheer stubbornness. One day, Henry’s tarot card reader tells him that, based on a
recent tarot reading, she has determined that the theory of evolution is true.  Henry then
finally accepts evolution. At this point, Henry has an unjustified belief in evolution, since his
belief is based on trust in a tarot card reader. But Henry has had all along, and continues to
have, justification for believing the theory of evolution—he still knows the cogent arguments
for evolution, which constitute adequate justification for the theory (Huemer, 2007, 40).
In the example, Henry's belief in evolution is inappropriate because it is based on something on
which he should not  base his  beliefs.  Henry does have some good arguments  for evolutionary
theory however, and if he believed on the basis of those, his belief would be appropriate. Thus, a
belief  is  doxastically  justified  if  and  only  if  it  is  based  on  appropriate  considerations  and
propositionally  justified  if  and   only  if  there  are  considerations  which  would  make  the  belief
appropriate if it were based on them. 
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It  is  a good thing  to have a belief  that is  propositionally justified,  but it  is better  for it  to be
doxastically justified.  If it  is only the former, then while you should believe it,  you should not
believe it  on the basis that you do. Huemer's argument is for the conclusion that if Phenomenal
Conservatism is false, then no belief is based on appropriate considerations – no belief ought to be
held on the basis of the considerations on which it is in fact held. This negative conclusion will
apply  to  the  denial  of  Phenomenal  Conservatism  itself,  with  the  result  that  if  Phenomenal
Conservatism is false, then I ought not to deny Phenomenal Conservatism on the basis on which I
do deny it. 
If I deny Phenomenal Conservatism whilst granting that all my beliefs are based on how things
seem, I must admit that all of my beliefs up to now are inappropriate in the sense that I should not
have formed them the way that I did. Of course, that is an alarming result, but it need not be a
disaster.  It  does  not  follow,  although  it  sounds  like  it,  that  we  ought  not  deny  Phenomenal
Conservatism. 
Return to Huemer's example of Henry the tarrot card reader who has excellent arguments for the
theory of evolution, but ignores them and believes in evolution because his tarrot cards told him that
it is true. Suppose that Henry realizes that tarrot cards are not a reasonable basis for belief. What
should Henry believe in this situation? Should he abandon his belief in the theory of evolution? But
Henry in fact has very good arguments for the theory. It would be silly for him to abandon it. What
he should do, it seems to me, is forget about the tarrot cards and continue to believe the theory of
evolution on the basis of his cogent arguments for it.  It would be silly of him to abandon it because
he realizes the deviant causal origins of the belief. Of course, he should not have formed the belief
the way he did form it – that was inappropriate -, but given that he has already formed it, and that he
has independently good reasons to believe it, he should continue to hold it. 
Now  let's  consider  all  of  my  beliefs.  Let's  grant  to  Huemer,  my  previous  objections  not-
withstanding, that all of my beliefs are causally based on how things seem to me. Suppose Huemer
is right that, up to now, I have formed my beliefs only on the basis of how things seem to me.
Suppose, further, that how things seem to me is not an appropriate basis for belief. It follows that I
should not have formed any of the beliefs I have formed in the way that I did form them, and I
should not, in the future, form any beliefs because of how things seem to me. Yet, both of these
implications are logically compatible with the claim that I should continue to hold the beliefs which
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I  have already formed. In fact,  if  I  have independently good reasons to believe what I  already
believe – as Henry does for the theory of evolution – I think that I positively should continue to
hold the beliefs I earlier formed on a poor basis. Thus, it does not follow from the Self-Defeat
argument that I should not, now, hold the beliefs that I already have. Of course, it does follow (a)
that I should not have formed my beliefs in the way that I did form them and (b) that I should not
continue to form beliefs because of how things seem to me. Once I realize that how things seem to
me does not justify belief, I must make a conscious effort to avoid forming beliefs on that basis35. 
Crucially, the argument cannot show that I should not deny Phenomenal Conservatism. Suppose
that I came to deny Phenomenal Conservatism because it seemed to me to be false. If Phenomenal
Conservatism really is false it follows that I should not have denied it that way. Nevertheless, that
fact is compatible with my now having very good reasons for denying Phenomenal Conservatism
and  so  also  with  my rightly continuing  to  deny it.  So,  although  I  must  admit  that  I  was  not
previously entitled to my denial of Phenomenal Conservatism, I may continue to deny it on the
basis of the good reasons for denying it which I have since found. 
I anticipate a reply from Huemer here. He might argue that, as a matter of psychological fact, I just
cannot do what I would need to do to have acceptable belief going forward. That is to say, it is a
psychological fact about human beings that they can only (at least in the relevant cases) form beliefs
on the basis of how things seem to them. Thus, there is no possibility of me trying hard not to form
beliefs on the basis of how things seem in the future, or of my basing my beliefs not on how things
seem but on other reasons for those beliefs which I have found. I must base my belief on how things
seem to me. Huemer might say, for example, that in trying to base a belief on good arguments the
result can only be that the arguments make it seem to me that something is true and that seeming
causes me to believe it. 
Turning to my denial of Phenomenal Conservatism specifically, Huemer might say that I simply
cannot do anything other than base it on how things seem to me. Nothing else can cause me to deny
it,  as  a  matter  of  psychological  fact.  If  arguments  of  any kind cause  me to  deny Phenomenal
35 This argument of mine depends crucially on a thought-experiment about Henry and the theory of evolution. In the 
context of the analysis of ordinary language, I am very critical of the use of thought-experiments (see later chapters),
and so the reader might find it contradictory that I here rely so heavily on thought-experiment. I do not have any 
objection to the use of thought-experiments as such. There is a great difference between using thought-experiments 
in thinking through whether we want to accept certain norms for belief and using thought-experiments to determine 
an objective fact about the empirical world – especially if using thought-experiments from the arm-chair and trying 
to derive conclusions about the empirical world which far outstrip the data available in said arm-chair. 
75
Conservatism, this can only be because they cause it to seem to me that Phenomenal Conservatism
is false and so cause me to deny it. 
Taking him this way, he will be saying that if Phenomenal Conservatism is false, then humans are
psychologically fated only ever to form beliefs that they are not entitled to hold. Such a claim seems
to me incredibly strong, and I see no reason to accept it. It certainly is not “obvious on reflection”.
Huemer admits that I can form beliefs on the basis of wishful thinking and other deviant causes. He
holds only that  I  do not do this  in  any case which we would pre-theoretically deem a case of
justified belief. But if Huemer admits that I can form a belief in the absence of seemings in some
cases, why think that when it comes to pre-theoretically clear instances of acceptable belief, I am
somehow psychologically restricted only to form those kinds of belief on the basis of how things
seem? Why could nothing else lead me to form those kinds of belief? For this reason, I do not think
such a reply on Huemer's behalf particularly plausible. 
7. Conclusion on the Self-Defeat Argument
The  Self-Defeat  Argument  for  Phenomenal  Conservatism  has  two  flaws.  First,  it  is  far  from
“obvious on reflection” that the first premise is true, as Huemer says that it is. Moreover, even if the
premise is  true,  it  does not follow that I  ought  not  to deny Phenomenal  Conservatism. It  only
follows that I ought not to have denied it in the way that I did deny it, but this is compatible with
my having very good reasons to deny it and with my rightly continuing to deny it going forward. 
Chapter 6: Is Phenomenal Conservatism
Scepticism? 
1. So Far
I have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is an unacceptable standard of belief. I have done so
on several grounds. First, there is no such thing as a seeming. Second, the Self-Defeat Argument for
76
Phenomenal Conservatism is unsound. 
Here  I  argue  that  even  if  we  do  accept  it  as  an  ethics  of  belief,  it  is  still  compatible  with  a
devastating version of Scepticism. Section 2 makes the basic argument. Section 3 considers and
criticizes how Huemer might reply to the basic argument. Section 4 considers one further way in
which the committed Phenomenal Conservative might try to wriggle free. I argue that he cannot. 
2. Phenomenal Conservatism is Compatible with Scepticism
Phenomenal  Conservatism is  typically praised  for  its  ability to  avoid Scepticism.  According to
Tucker (2013, 8), Phenomenal Conservatism “avoids both skepticism and regresses of justification”,
and Huemer writes that “most if not all skeptical worries are easily resolved” (Huemer, 2013). 
Even if Phenomenal Conservatism were an acceptable ethic of belief, it would still be compatible
with the main thrust of Scepticism. Despite the way that its many advocates praise it as an easy way
to avoid Scepticism, it is in fact compatible with a very implausible version of it. To see how this is
so, let us remind ourselves of Scepticism, and Agrippa's Trilemma. 
The sceptic tries to show to the dogmatist that he has, ultimately, no reason to believe anything at
all,  and he expects the dogmatist  thereupon to suspend judgement.  To accomplish the task,  the
sceptic repeatedly asks the dogmatists for reasons for his beliefs, with the result being that the
dogmatist  always  finds  himself  arguing either  in  a  circle,  from arbitrary assumptions  or  in  an
infinite regress. But none of those kinds of argument will yield a genuine reason for believing any
of its premises or their conclusion over the alternatives. Thus, the dogmatist cannot, ultimately –
and emphasis on the “ultimately” - think of any reason for his belief.  Once the sceptic has the
dogmatist admitting this, he expects the dogmatist to suspend. 
Now, if Phenomenal Conservatism were an acceptable ethics of belief, the dogmatist could rightly
retain his beliefs even if he has no reason to believe them. But even if Phenomenal Conservatism
has this advantage,  it  would do absolutely nothing to give the dogmatist any reason to believe
anything at all. Now if it is really true that we have, ultimately, no reason to believe anything at all,
that is a monstrous version of Scepticism, implying as it does that from a strictly impartial point of
view, no belief is better than any other; science and superstition are no different – even if we are
entitled to believe one and not the other. Our entitlements aside, it is only by a kind of blind faith
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that we believe anything at all. Phenomenal Conservatism is entirely compatible with this kind of
Scepticism. 
3. Does Phenomenal Conservatism Stop the Regress? 
Perhaps I have been too quick here. Perhaps seemings can also be good reasons to believe (Huemer,
2001, 177) and perhaps those reasons are capable of stopping the regress of sceptical questioning
without falling into one of the three problematic traps of assumption, circularity or regress.36. 
This is plainly not so. Suppose that I believe that P. A sceptic challenges me to think of a non-
question begging reason to believe that P. I cite the fact that it seems to me that P. A seeming that P,
according  to  Huemer,  is  an  experience  with  the  propositional  content  “P”.  That  content,  on
Huemer's own account, may be true or false, and, as BonJour (2004, 357) points out, this admission
raises the question of what reason there is for thinking that the content of the seeming is actually
faithfully representing the world.  In citing the fact that it seems to me that P as a reason to believe
that P, I plainly presuppose that such seemings do, either usually or at the very least on this specific
occasion, accurately portray the world. A relentless sceptic will demand a non-question begging
reason for this presumption. 
Huemer  has  two  different  responses  to  this.  The  first  comes  after  this  characterization  of  the
problem: 
But, it will be objected, one belief can only justify another belief if the first belief is itself,
justified. Similarly, therefore, shouldn't we say that a perceptual experience can only justify
a perceptual belief if the experience, itself, is justified? (Huemer, 2001, 97).
Then he writes this:
But the latter condition makes no sense. It does not make sense – it is a category error – to
say that an experience is justified or unjustified. … if I go near a fire, I just will feel a
sensation of warmth. What would it mean to say that I was “justified” in feeling warm?
(Huemer, 2001, 97). 
36 See chapter 1 for a reminder of what is wrong with each of these three. 
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There are two notions of “justified” which must be kept clear. In one sense that philosophers have
used the word “justified”, to be justified in holding a belief means that you have good non-question
begging reasons for holding it. It is this sense which I earlier called the Internalist conception of
justification. In another sense that they have used the word “justified”, to be justified in a belief
means that you should hold it. That is the deontological conception of justification associated with
the ethics of belief. 
If Huemer's Phenomenal Conservatism is to help in this context, it must provide a “justification” for
our beliefs in the sense of a non-question begging reason for them. When confronted with the fact
that seemings are insufficient for stopping the regress of requests for such reasons, Huemer claims
that it makes no sense to think of a seeming as “justified” or “unjustified” because “it cannot be the
case  that  you  should  or  shouldn't  have  an  experience”  (Huemer,  2001,97).  The  concept  of
“justified”  now  in  use  is  the  deontological  one.  That  concept  is  different  to  the  concept  of
“justification”  we  were  initially  concerned  with,  which  means  having  a  non-question  begging
reason. We may agree with Huemer that it makes no sense to think of an experience as something
which I should or shouldn't have, whilst insisting that there is still a perfectly intelligible question as
to what reason there is to think that the propositional content of the experience is in fact correct
(BonJour, 2004,  357).
Huemer's second response to the question of what reason there is to think that seemings accurately
represent reality is to say that seemings are “presumed  true, until proven false” (Huemer, 2001,
100). He compares the situation with that of a court case, in which a person is presumed innocent
until  proven  guilty  (Huemer,  2001,  100).  He  writes  that  this  presumption  in  favour  of  the
authenticity of seemings is the “Epistemological default position”. The purpose of the presumption
of innocence in a court case is to try to minimize the number of innocent people that are wrongly
punished, but there is no analogue of this rationale in the present context and so I cannot see any
motivation for the view that seemings should be presumed true.
In any case, the idea that seemings should be presumed to be accurate,  without any reason for
supposing the presumption to be true, is plainly the making of an arbitrary assumption – a form of
reasoning  which  was  already  ruled  out  as  unacceptable  on  the  ground  that  formally  identical
arguments from different arbitrary assumptions may be produced for two sides of any issue. Perhaps
it seems to me that there is no God, and so, if I assume Phenomenal Conservative principles, I
conclude that there is no God. Alternatively, I could arbitrarily assume that everything which seems
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to me to be true is false and I would then be lead to the conclusion that there is a God. Huemer's
Phenomenal Conservatism thus amounts to arbitrarily assuming that whatever seems to be true is
true. Nor does it make things any less arbitrary if we say instead that what we are assuming is that
whatever seems to be true is only probably true; or more probable than not; or even more probable
than it would otherwise be. Nor, lastly, does it make things any less arbitrary if we say that whatever
seems to me to be true is  true  (or  probably true or...)  unless  there  is  some reason to  suppose
otherwise.  I  conclude that Phenomenal  Conservatism is  an unsatisfactory response to Agrippa's
Trilemma. 
A proponent of Phenomenal Conservatism will surely not see things this way. He will object that I
have misconstrued his position. He does not claim that I can have a reason to believe that there is no
God by inferring it from the premise that it seems to me that there is no God, together with the
premise that seemings are correlated with the truth. He claims that when it seems to me that there is
no God, I just have a reason to believe that there is no God, without having to assume anything
further about seemings. How things seem is a 'non-inferential' reason for a belief (Huemer, 2001,
100).  I  do  not  see  how saying  this  helps  matters.  Even  if  we  concede  that  in  some sense  of
'justified', how things seem may be a 'non-inferential justification' for a belief, it is still plain that
there is a further question about the reliability of seemings which the sceptic will inevitably raise if
one appeals to a seeming as a reason for believing something. That Huemer and other Phenomenal
Conservatives cannot answer this question without making an arbitrary affirmative assumption is a
demonstration that their view does not stop the regress.
4. What is the Question?
The question which the sceptic raises and the Phenomenal Conservative must face is this. Why
believe that its' seeming to you that P makes it even so much as probable that P? 
There  is  some ambiguity  in  the  sceptic's  question  concerning  the  word  “probable”.  There  are
various  definitions  of  “probability”  used  by different  authors.  But  however  we  understand  the
notion, the prospects of the Phenomenal Conservative stopping the regress are bleak.
Let me begin with frequency and propensity interpretations of probability. On these interpretations,
probability is an objective feature of the world. It is identified, in the frequency interpretation, with
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the  actual  frequency,  expressible  as  a  fraction,  of  the  occurrence  of  a  phenomenon.  So  the
probability (in the frequency sense) of a coin landing heads on the next coin toss is the actual
number of times it has landed heads previously out of the total number of times it has been flipped.
On the propensity interpretation, the probability that the coin will land heads is identified with the
propensity of the coin to land heads. It is quite clear that if the Conservative maintains that his
believing that N makes probable N in either of these senses he will fail to end the regress. The
sceptic will immediately want to know what reason there is for believing that the Conservative's
believing that N really does make probable N in one of these senses. It is, after all, a substantial
claim about the world that when the Conservative forms a belief the frequency with which it is true
is even marginally higher than ½. Indeed, to assign any frequency at all is to make a substantial
claim about the world. On this interpretation, Conservatism would be a claim about the general
track  record  of  spontaneously  formed  beliefs.  If  we  interoperate  “probable”  this  way  the
Conservative cannot,  therefore,  appeal to his  Conservative principle to end the regress. For the
sceptic will straight away ask what reason there is to believe that the Conservative's believing some
proposition has the sort of track record he supposes it  to have in making a claim of frequency
probability. The same point can be made about probability in the propensity sense. 
Another  sense  of  'probable'  is  that  of  subjective  probability.  In  this  sense,  S's  belief  that  P is
probable (for S) if and only if S has high degree of belief. In this sense, the fact that S believes that
P does entail  that it  is  probable,  and one might maintain that it  simply makes no sense to ask
whether  S's  belief  that P is  subjectively probable for him,  because it  is  analytic  that it  is.  Yet,
subjective probability has  nothing at  all  to  do with truth.  It  is  only a  measure of the subject's
confidence in a proposition.  If the Conservative claims that it  seeming to him that N makes it
subjectively probable that N, the sceptic can agree. He knows that the Conservative is confident that
N, but is asking what reason there is to believe that N! 
Richard Swinburne (2001) claims that believing that P makes it logically probable that P, absent
defeaters.  Logical  probability  is  thought  of  as  analogous  to  logical  entailment  –  as  'partial
entailment'37.   The  model  of  entailment  suggests  that  logical  probability  is  an  internal  relation
between propositions and that in turn suggests that there must be at least two propositions serving as
relata. There is an ambiguity in Swinburne's claim, between the claim that the act of believing that P
makes it logically probable that P and the claim that the proposition “S believes that P” makes it
logically probable that P. The same moves are available to the Phenomenal Conservative. He could
37 See Fumerton (2007). 
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maintain that the mere existence of a seeming that P makes it logically probable that P, or he could
maintain that the proposition, “it seems to S that P” makes it logically probable that P.
Consider the first position. A proposition cannot be said to 'just be' entailed, not by anything in
particular but just entailed. It is tempting to suppose that, analogously, it makes no sense to think of
a proposition as partially entailed, not by anything in particular but just partially entailed. If so, it
cannot make sense to suppose that a proposition is partially entailed, not by anything in particular
but just partially entailed (that is, logically probable), because it seems to be true. Propositions are
entailed only by other propositions. In the same way, it does not make sense to suppose that a
proposition is partially entailed by a seeming. Only propositions partially entail other propositions. 
We must, then, take the claim to be that the proposition “It seems to S that P” makes logically
probable that P, for any value of S and P, absent defeaters38. On this interpretation, the answer to the
sceptic's question “why believe that N?” is “It seems to me that N, and it seeming that N makes N
logically probable”. Once this is made explicit, it is clear that there is a request for justification that
the sceptic can make. He can ask what reason there is to suppose that its seeming that N really does
make it logically probable that N. 
In answer,  a  Conservative can only claim (and Swinburne,  2001 does  claim),  that  relations  of
logical probability are accessible a priori. As Fumerton (2007) points out, the nice thing about a
priori relations of logical probability is that, apparently, whenever one is backed into a corner by the
sceptic, one can 'discover' the relevant probability relations a priori. Faced with a question about
why  a  proposition  about  the  physical  world  should  be  believed,  it  is  revealed  a  priori  that
propositions  about  sensory experience  make logically  probable  propositions  about  the  physical
world. Faced with the question of why anything about the past should be believed, we discover a
priori  that  propositions  about  apparent  memories  make  propositions  about  the  past  logically
probable. And crucially, faced with radical scepticism about everything we discover a priori that the
mere fact that a proposition seems to be true makes that proposition logically probable. 
If we really can come to be directly aware, a priori, of the truth of Phenomenal Conservatism, then
the regress will have been ended, thus providing a non-question begging reason for why we believe
38 I did consider the thought that assessments of logical probability should be relativized to subjects, so that the claim 
would be that “S believes that P” makes logically probable, for S, that P. However, since the logical probability is 
supposed to be an objective internal relation between propositions, I cannot see any grounds for supposing that what
is logically probable for me given one set of propositions may not be logically probable for you given those same 
propositions. 
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everything we do believe. It seems to me that it is, at best, dubious whether we can discover any a
priori connection of partial entailment between seeming that P and P. I do not have a non-question
begging argument against the position. I can only make a phenomenological appeal. On reflection, I
do  not  think  I  can  discover  any such  a  priori  probability  connection.  One  might  just  as  well
postulate that my really wanting that P makes it logically probable that P. Indeed, it is hard to avoid
the thought that postulating a priori probability relations of a Conservative character is nothing
more than a desperate attempt to avoid scepticism. As Fumerton puts it:
 when I look for the inferential conservative’s probability connection I find only the not very
surprising contingent fact that I usually end up believing P when I find myself inclined to
believe P. I don’t find any logical or quasi-logical connection between it seeming to me as if
P and P. Foundationalists who embrace foundational knowledge of epistemic principles must
always exercise philosophical self-discipline to ensure that their choice of principles is not
guided solely by their overwhelming desire to avoid skepticism. I can’t help but feel that to
defeat skepticism wielding the weapon of epistemic conservatism shows all the signs of theft
over honest toil (Fumerton, 2007, 85). 
I  conclude  that  on  any  understanding  of  'makes  probable'  that  is  of  any  help  against
Scepticism,  there  is  a  further  request  for  justification  that  the  sceptic  can  and  will
make.  Phenomenal  Conservatism  does  not,  therefore,  stop  the  regress.  If  we  are  to
accept  a  belief  because  it  seems  to  us  to  be  true,  that  can  only  be  because  we
arbitrarily  assume that  how things  seem is  at  least  a  somewhat  reliable  guide  to  how
things are. Pace Huemer, sceptical worries are far from “easily resolved” by his views.
The fleet-footed sceptic remains unchallenged. 
Chapter 7: The Implications of Doxastic
Conservatism39
1. Is Doxastic Conservatism Plausible? 
If Phenomenal Conservatism won't work owing to the difficulties I have mentioned, perhaps old-
39 Some of the argument of this section was developed as part of my M-phil thesis. It was also published by me in 
(Burns, 2017). 
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fashioned Doxastic Conservatism will do better40. Doxastic Conservatism is:
DC. S is (to some degree) entitled to believe that P if and only if S believes that P, absent
defeaters (Swinburne, 2001, 141).
It is quite clear that if Doxastic Conservatism is true, then all of the beliefs philosophers have in the
past struggled to see as acceptable will be acceptable in a very plain and straightforward manner.
Do you believe that there is an external world? Do you believe that other people have minds? Do
you believe that murder is wrong or that 2+2=4? How about that the future will resemble the past or
that the world exists when unperceived41?  If so, you may well find yourself entitled to believe all of
these things according to the Doxastic Conservative ethic of belief. If we accept DC, turning back
the sceptic is easy. The dogmatist can say “I believe that P, and what entitles me to believe it is that I
believe it”.  The sceptic  will,  naturally,  balk.  He will  ask,  “why think that  what  you believe is
actually the truth?”, and dogmatist will have no answer. But if DC is true, he does not need an
answer!
Most advocates of the view cite this as a virtue of it (Tucker, 2013; Markie, 2013). Virtue it may be,
but  a  number  of  philosophers  have  argued that  the  view is  too  permissive  – that  it  allows  as
acceptable beliefs which are obviously silly, and that therefore we should not accept it. Some of
these objections seem to me of no force at all, although I do agree that, in the end, the view is too
permissive. 
I will examine a number of versions of this criticism put forward by others, before attempting my
own. Section 2 assesses a criticism due to Tooley. Section 3 looks at Markie's criticisms. Section 4
develops  my  own  criticism.  The  basic  idea  is  that  what  is  unattractive  about  Phenomenal
Conservatism is that it licences obviously silly beliefs. In section 4 I look at Lycan's attempt to
avoid this implication. In section 5 I show that Lycan cannot really avoid it, although I concede that
he significantly weakens the force of my criticism. 
2. Philosophy and Phenomenal Conservatism
40 The problems for Doxastic Conservatism that I bring out here also arise for Phenomenal Conservatism, with some 
modifications. 
41 Although I do not think Phenomenal Conservatism can in the end justify this last belief. See me (Burns, 2017). 
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As I have stated DC so far,  it  is  an ethic of belief  for every domain.  It  does not say that,  for
example, in moral matters we should accept (to some degree) that things are how we believe them
to be absent defeaters. It says that we should do this in every area, and that presumably includes in
Philosophy. 
Yet, think for a moment about the sorts of opinions that have been put forward in philosophy. Here
are a few examples.
(1) There actually exists an infinite number of concrete possible worlds.
(2) Nothing exists except minds and there ideas.
(3) Everything that exists is physical.
(4) There is no such thing as an immaterial soul.
(5) There is an immaterial soul. 
(6) There are objective moral truths.
(7) There are no objective moral truths.
(8) Truth is relative.
DC implies that any philosopher who believed that any of these were true was entitled to believe it,
so long as they could stave off objections. Berkeley,  for example, was entitled to hold (2), and
David Lewis need not offer any argument for (1), since he was non-inferentially entitled to believe
it. Swinburne (1986) need not bother with arguments for the existence of the soul, because he is
entitled to believe it by the fact that he believes it.
Tooley (2013, 318-319) suggests, though he does not outright say, that this is unacceptable. You
might think that (and indeed I am inclined to think), if any one is entitled to (1) – (8) it will take a
very serious amount of argument. It is not sufficient, you might think, that you already believe them
to be true and you are capable of staving off objections. 
The objection will not work, however. DC only states that one is entitled to some small degree. In
Lycan's (2013, 301) formulation, “the justification furnished by [Doxastic Conservatism] is minute,
the  faintest  edge,  infinitesimal  if  you  like”.  The  mere  fact  that  you  believe  that  P will  make
appropriate a very faint degree of confidence that P, but nothing more than that. Thus, in order to be
fully entitled to any of (1) – (8), philosophers will have to work much harder. They will need, for
example, as the view is developed by Lycan (2013), for the belief to stand in substantial coherence
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relations to an entire system of beliefs. The point is that the more subtle version of the view does
not imply that any of (1)-(8) are acceptable by merely seeming to be true. 
One might insist that even the more subtle version is unacceptable, because unless there is some
positive reason to accept (1)-(8), then they are not acceptable even in the slightest degree, but to say
this is to beg the question against Doxastic Conservatism (Lycan, 2013). 
3. Markie's Counter-Examples42
Markie asks us to consider a case in which a gold miner who yearns to strike gold finds a pebble
and, as a result of wishful thinking, it seems to him to be gold. Meanwhile, another gold miner
looks at the same pebble and it too seems to him to be gold, but this is because he has learned the
skill of accurately identifying gold. “Certainly my wishful thinking should not gain my perceptual
belief the same positive epistemic status of defeasible justification as your learned identification
skills.”  (Markie, 2005, 356-357). 
Doxastic  Conservatism does not say otherwise than Markie suggests.  The expert  miner will  be
entitled  to  a  far  greater  degree  than  the  wishful  thinker,  because  the  expert  will  have  many
supporting  beliefs  about  the  appearance  of  the  pebble,  about  what  gold  looks  like,  about  the
likelihood of finding gold in that location, and so on. All of this will increase the initial justification
which the expert gets from his belief, and none of it is available to the wishful thinker (Lycan, 2013,
303). 
In another example, Markie again argues that Doxastic Conservatism is too permissive. Suppose
that I see a walnut tree in my garden, and I believe both that the tree is a walnut and that it was
planted on April  24,  1914.  The first  belief  results  from my skill  in  identifying trees,  but,  let's
suppose, the second belief is the result of a malfunction in my brain. Markie then argues:
its  seeming to me that the tree was planted on that date outstrips the phenomenological
character  of  my  experience  and  my identification  skills.  My perception  cannot  directly
justify my belief about the planting date. Nonetheless, according to (DC), both my belief that
it is a walnut tree and my belief that it was planted on April 24, 1914, are prima facie, and so
42 Markie's examples are aimed at Phenomenal Conservatism, but they are even more forceful against Doxastic 
Conservatism, and yet they still fail! 
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defeasibly, justified for me (Markie, 2015, 357).
As in the previous example, however, there is a vast difference between the two beliefs. With the
first belief, I have many beliefs about what walnut trees look like, about what was in my garden
yesterday, about what trees grow in the area and so on. All  of this will increase my justification for
believing that the tree is a walnut tree, and no such coherence with other beliefs is available for my
belief about when the tree was planted (Lycan, 2013, 303). 
Markie points out that my belief cannot be made acceptable  my sensory experience, because there
is  no aspect of the experience which indicates the date on which the tree was planted.  This is
obviously the case, but Doxastic Conservatives do not say  that the sensory experience justifies the
belief; they say that the belief does.
4. Doxastic Conservatism and Religious Belief
The  crucial  idea  behind  charges  that  Doxastic  Conservatism is  to  permissive  is  just  this:  that
obviously  silly  beliefs  are  acceptable  given  the  theory.  This  is  most  clearly  shown  not  by
philosophical beliefs or beliefs which result from some sort of cognitive malfunction, but by radical
forms of religious belief. 
I  have  argued elsewhere  that  Richard  Swinburne's  (2004;  2011)  version  of  Conservatism  has
counter-intuitive consequences of just this kind (Burns, 2017). Consider again a very strong version
of Doxastic Conservatism, on which if you believe that P and you have no defeaters, then you are
fully entitled to believe that P. 
Suppose I believe very strongly that the great pumpkin will return every Halloween. I have never
seen the great pumpkin, nor had any sort of religious experience of the great pumpkin, nor do I have
any testimony to that effect. I have no argument for the existence of the great pumpkin at all. It is
just something that, when I think about it, I believe. Perhaps I really wished as a child that the great
pumpkin  did  exist  because  it  would  make  Halloween  more  interesting  and  eventually  became
utterly convinced of it. Let's add, moreover, that I do not realize that this is the cause of the belief.
Perhaps I believe in the great pumpkin because it is a vital part of my religion. A very strong version
of DC will be forced to say that I possess a great deal of entitlement for my belief; perhaps even
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more than I have for more ordinary propositions like that I had oats for breakfast. I will be, then,
fully entitled to believe in the great pumpkin, absent defeaters. 
Swinburne (2011) argues that the great pumpkin worshipper is not entitled, all things considered, to
his beliefs even within the framework of a very strong version of DC. He writes:
We do not normally need a priori principles to rule out ‘wild’ basic-beliefs (beliefs that one
has seen fairies,  or knows the future from an astrological chart,  etc.),  since a posteriori
criteria will normally rule these out. We almost all have theories rendered (subjectively and
—I suggest—logically)  probable by other basic propositions (including what ‘everybody
knows’ about how the world works) which rule out ‘wild’ basic propositions from being
overall  probable.  If  someone  believes  that  he  has  seen  the  Great  Pumpkin  return  at
Halloween, then this belief is normally rendered improbable by a lot of other evidence (in
the  form  of  his  or  her  basic-beliefs  or  what  others  have  told  him  or  her  about  their
observations) (Swinburne 2011, 203).
Swinburne's reply is to say that a person will normally hold many other theories derived from how
things seem to them as well as the great pumpkin theory. The conditional probability of the great
pumpkin theory given those other theories will be low. 
Let's  consider,  then,  someone  who  is  as  Swinburne  describes,  so  that  he  does  have  many
background theories given which the probability that the great pumpkin exists is low. PC alone still
does not yield the result that such a belief is all things considered unacceptable. The problem is that
the conditional lowering of probabilities is symmetrical (Burns, 2017).  Consider three propositions:
B1. The great pumpkin returns to town every Halloween.
B2. If the great pumpkin came to town, someone would see him.
B3. Noone has ever seen the great pumpkin. 
The three are jointly inconsistent. Any two of them may be true, but not all three. Let's suppose that
I nevertheless believe all three through different sources. B1 is, like before something I believe
because I wished it were true as a child and it came to seem to me to be true. Swinburne holds that
typically I will not have good reason, all things considered, to believe B1 because I will have other
theories, B2 and B3, and the probability of B1 given those is low. This claim about probabilities
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may be true. Yet, it is also true that the probability of any one of the triad is low given the other
three and all three are propositions which, according to PC, I have prima facie justification for
believing since they either do seem to me to be true or else derive from things which seem to me to
be true.  Which conditional determines what I am right in believing (Feldman 2011, 296)? Is the
great pumpkin belief unsupported by our other opposing beliefs and theories making it unacceptable
or is it  instead that all our opposing theories and beliefs are unsupported by our great pumpkin
belief? Nothing in DC provides an answer to this question and so there is no way for his theory to
yield the verdict  that  the great  pumpkin belief  is  not  supported by the subject’s  total  evidence
(Burns, 2017). 
5. Modest Doxastic Conservatism Again
Of course, the easy way out is the same as the way out against Markie's and Tooley's objections;
insist  that  a mere belief  that  P provides only entitles you to an infinitesimally small  degree of
confidence that P, and nothing more.
The proponent of DC can then maintain that a great pumpkin worshipper gains only a vanishingly
small amount of entitlement from the seeming that the great pumpkin exists and that, no matter how
strongly it seems to him to be true, that entitlement will ordinarily be easily defeated by the person's
counter evidence (that no other pumpkin is capable of walking or talking; that pumpkins are clearly
visible objects and no-one has ever seen the great pumpkin, not even on Halloween, etc.). The result
will be that the great pumpkin theory is not acceptable after all; not by the standards of DC.
This move does nothing, however, to resolve the problem concerning the direction of entitlement
which was raised in the last section. It is still the case, even on the weaker principle, that conditional
probabilities are symmetrical. Each of B1-B3 is improbable given the other two and there is no non-
arbitrary  way,  deploying  Doxastic  Conservatism  alone,  to  say  which  conditional  probability
determines what the pumpkin worshipper is entitled in believing. 
Lycan (1988), however, integrates his Conservative principle into a larger Coherentist account, and
thereby appears to have an easy way out of the forgoing issues. Lycan's (1988) epistemological
picture is this43. Each belief we have possesses a minimal degree of credibility by the very fact that
it is believed. The only way for those beliefs to gain any more significant degree of credibility is by
43 I provide only the barest sketch of a complex position. See Lycan (1988). 
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standing in relations of coherence to one another. Those very same beliefs, however, may end up
with no credibility at all, or there may end up being justification for their negation, depending on
how neatly they 'fit'  with the rest  of the system. On such a view, I  have nothing more than a
vanishingly small amount of entitlement to any single belief that is independent of other beliefs. I
may be entitled to a great deal of confidence in a whole system of beliefs if it exhibits a large
amount of coherence. 
Lycan distinguishes four sorts of coherence:
consistency with other spontaneous beliefs; consistency and fit with the wider belief system;
being explained; and holding metabeliefs about the source of the belief (Lycan, 2012, 9).
The first two forms of coherence are requirements of logical consistency and Lycan calls a belief
which is logically consistent both with the subject's other spontaneous beliefs and his wider belief
system “tenable” (Lycan, 2012, 9). Beliefs may become more than merely tenable, however, the
more the truth of those beliefs is  explained by other believed propositions.  Lastly,  a system of
beliefs  is  more  coherent  for  having  meta-beliefs  which  attribute  reliable  sources  to  first  order
beliefs. For instance, a system of beliefs which contains many beliefs about the physical world is
more coherent for containing meta-beliefs about the reliability of sense perception than it would
otherwise be. 
Now, turning back to the issue of the symmetrical lowering of probabilities, Lycan might admit that
each of B1-B3 is improbable given the other two, but insist that whether or not the worshipper is
entitled to believe in the great pumpkin has nothing to do with conditional probabilities.  Rather, a
more global evaluation of the coherence of the whole system of beliefs is required. In a typical
subject, they would have good reason to reject at least one of B1-B3, since accepting all of them
introduces a degree of incoherence – one of them is probably false. In a typical sane person, B2 and
B3 will stand in far stronger coherence relations than B1 – they will explain and be explained by
many other  propositions  the  person  believes.  The  existence  of  the  great  pumpkin  will  neither
explain nor be explained by little if anything that an ordinary person believes. A typical system of
beliefs, moreover, will not contain meta-beliefs which attribute reliable sources to belief in the great
pumpkin.  On the contrary,  most people would have at  least  tacit  meta-beliefs to the effect that
beliefs about supernatural matters of this kind do not stem from reliable sources. Thus B1 will not
cohere with the system as well as B2 and B3. It will be an explanatory anomaly, and for that reason
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should  be  rejected.  Thus,  because  Lycan's  Conservatism  is  integrated  into  a  more  complex
Coherentist view, his position yields the intuitively correct result that apparently silly beliefs do not
have the same credibility as common-sense beliefs about our immediate surroundings. Commenting
on the implications of his theory for “wild” beliefs, he writes:
It is the third and fourth kinds of coherence that are not exhibited by what  we may call
“wild” spontaneous beliefs—superstitious forebodings, déjà vu, mild hallucinations, and the
like. Such beliefs may be tenable in my sense, but normally they are soon ruled out by their
failure to be explained and/or by our having reason to think that they have no reliable source
(Lycan, 2012, 10).
6. The Great Pumpkin Returns
There is, however, a way to alter the great pumpkin example so as to rehabilitate an objection to
Lycan's position. Suppose that the great pumpkin worshipper is, while delusional, a great system
builder. He is able to add to his system of beliefs a series of propositions which might strike any of
us as absolutely mad, though they seem utterly obvious to him:
B4. Magical pumpkin seeds are left every Halloween in my bedside drawer with a note
which reads “Enjoy! Regards. Great Pumpkin”. 
B5. Every Halloween night a message appears in the clouds which prophesies the return of
the great pumpkin in the town square at a given time.
B6. I have been to the town square at that time for the last six years and always heard the
laugh of the great pumpkin. 
B7. No-one has seen the great pumpkin because he only shows himself to believers.
B8. I once saw a large pumpkin flying through town square late at night.
B9. Belief in the great pumpkin is produced by the magic of the pumpkin working in our
hearts. 
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Let's also stipulate that our pumpkin worshipper has never actually seen nor heard anything which
would confirm any of these, nor had any testimony to that effect or anything of the sort. Suppose
that he is someone who never leaves his bedroom. He just sits in his room and these things all seem
to him to be true. If B4-B9 are added to the great pumpkin worshippers belief system, it is far from
clear that B1 should be rejected to maximize the coherence of the system. After all, B1 explains B4,
B5, B6 and B8, whilst B7 explains how B1 might be true despite B2 and B3. B9 is a meta-belief
attributing belief B1 to reliable sources. There may be some room for argument here, since one
measure  of  coherence  in  Lycan's  view is  simplicity,  and  it  might  be  thought  that  the  simpler
explanation of B2 and B3 is not B7 but the negation of B1. The point is, however, that if we can
make it less clear whether B1 should be rejected simply by expanding the system of beliefs so as to
cohere more with B1, it should be possible to continue expanding, to the point where B1 coheres so
well with the system that there is not only no reason to reject it, but excellent reason – given Lycan's
account – to accept it. That is, the great pumpkin worshipper can become entitled in believing that
the great pumpkin exists, just by continuing to add more and more to his great pumpkin theory44. 
Even  more  ominously,  Tooley  (2013)  points  out  that  Doxastic  Conservatism  looks  to  licence
dangerous religious beliefs very easily:
imagine another  person,  Jim,  who believe in  Jod, a  jealous  deity who wants  those who
believe in him to kill the evildoers who worship false gods, or none at al,  and who will
reward only those people who do this. Neither Jim nor those who share his belief claim to
have had experiences of Jod. But it certainly seems to Jim, and very strongly indeed, and
also to those who share his belief, that Jod exists, and they are not aware of any defeaters of
this belief... moreover, it may very well also seem to them that they should certainly carry
out the will of Jod by killing the evildoesrs... (Tooley, 2013, 320).
The point is that Jim might easily integrate his religious belief into a coherent system of other things
that he believes. The great pumpkin worshipper might believe that:
(B10) We ought to carry out the will of the great pumpkin by killing anyone who denies or
44 It might be thought that when the worshipper adds B4-B8 to his system, he will notice that he is randomly or 
arbitrarily adding them and that his method of arriving at them is unreliable. This could then provide a good reason 
for rejecting them. Not necessarily. Our worshipper is delusional, so perhaps he does not realize that spinning 
theories as he is doing is unreliable. Perhaps he even thinks he is an infallible oracle!
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doubts his existence, or otherwise fails to pay him the proper respect. 
The great pumpkin worshipper's belief system now includes an incredibly dangerous belief, and one
which, by Doxastic Conservatism, must be an acceptable belief because he believes it and it coheres
with all  of the other madness which he believes. As Tooley points out in this connection, such
dangerous beliefs are not so far removed from the real world, because many religions have held in
the past or else continue to hold that “heritics, apostates, or both should be put to death” (Tooley,
2013, 320). Not only do or have many religions contained such ideas, but, moreover, those ideas
have  been  well  integrated  into  coherent  systems  of  religious  belief.  Of  course,  some of  those
systems have had tensions in various places, but they are very rarely irremediable. The consequence
is that religious believers who hold to a dangerous and yet coherent religious system like that of the
great pumpkin worshipper are fully entitled in so doing, according to Doxastic Conservatism. 
Note that I am not here raising what is sometimes called the 'multiple systems' objection – that more
than  one  total  system of  beliefs  may  be  maximally  coherent  and  yet  the  two  systems  might
contradict one another, leaving a coherence theorist with no account of why one system should be
believed over another. Nor is the present point that coherence is not truth conductive. Rather, the
point is that Lycan's standards for belief may be met by systems of belief which are obviously silly
– systems which are such that nobody should take them seriously. 
Lycan (2012) plainly accepts this consequence of his theory, insisting that if a 'wild' or 'crazy' belief
happens to be part of a significantly coherent system, the person is right to believe it. It seems to me
that  this  result  is  obviously incorrect,  although I  admit  that  this  version  of  the  great  pumpkin
objection  is  far  more  complicated  than  the original  version  and so far  more difficult  to  assess
clearly45. I leave the reader to decide.
The argument I have been developing against Doxastic Conservatism may be summarized in this
way:
(1) Doxastic Conservatism implies that obviously silly beliefs are rightly held.
(2) But those obviously silly beliefs are not rightly held. They are silly.
(3) Therefore, Doxastic Conservatism is false.
45 For other objections to Coherentism, see BonJour (2008). 
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I conclude that Doxastic Conservatism is unattractive.  
Chapter 8: Michael Williams' Contextualism
1. Williams' Conception of Scepticism
Michael Williams explains Agrippa's Trilemma this way:
Suppose, then, that I make a claim—any claim. You are entitled to ask me whether what I
have said is something that I am just assuming to be true or whether I know it to the case. If
I  reply that  it  is  something I  know, you are  further  entitled to  ask me how I  know. In
response, I will have to cite  something in support of my claim: my evidence, my credentials,
whatever. But now the question can be renewed: is what I cite in defence of my original
claim something that I am just assuming or something that I know? If the former, it will not
do the job required of it: you can't base knowledge on a mere  assumption. But if the latter, it
will in turn need to be backed up, and so on. Of course, attempts to provide justification
come to a halt. But how? The sceptic will say that we just run out of ideas: either we have
nothing to say, or we find ourselves going back over old ground. As an implied claim to
knowledge, then, every statement I make invites a new challenge; and in the face of these
constantly renewed challenges, I can do only one of three things: 
1. Keep trying to think of something new to say—i.e. embark on an infinite regress 
(Mode of Infinity). 
2. At some point, refuse to answer—i.e. make a dogmatic assumption (Mode of 
Assumption). 
3. At some point, repeat something I have already said—i.e. reason in a circle (Mode 
of Circularity). 
None of these gives us what we want.... the conclusion seems to be that justification is a
complete illusion (Williams, 2001, 62). 
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The sceptic tries to convince us that we have no reason to believe anything at all, and that, because
of this fact, we ought to suspend judgement about everything. As Williams puts it, the idea is that
“we never have the slightest justification for believing one thing rather than another” (Williams,
2001 58-59) and that “we can never even get to the point of having justified beliefs” (Williams,
2001, 59). But, he says, this conclusion is “the product of contentious and possibly dispensable
theoretical preconceptions” (Williams, 1991, 1). He sets  for himself  the task of exposing those
preconceptions in order to show that, although once we accept the sceptic's standards for acceptable
belief,  there is  no avoiding total  suspension of judgement,  those standards “may be reasonably
declined” (Williams, 2004, 122). 
The rest of this chapter is an explication of Williams' views on Scepticism. Section 2 discusses what
Williams takes to be the standards of acceptable belief underlying Agrippa's Trilemma. Section 3
articulates Williams' proposed alternative epistemic standards.
2. Williams on the Sceptic's Standards
Williams gives several different characterizations of the sceptic's ethics of belief. In one place, he
says  that  the  sceptic  assumes  Clifford's  (1877)  doctrine  that  “it  is  irresponsible—always,
everywhere, and for everyone—to hold a belief on less-than-adequate evidence” (Williams, 2004,
128).
Clifford's dictum is supposedly analysable into four different principles:
(PG1) No Free Lunch Principle. Epistemic entitlement—personal justification— 
does not just accrue to us: it must be earned by epistemically responsible 
behaviour. 
(PG2) Priority Principle. It is never epistemically responsible to believe a  
proposition true when one's grounds for believing it true are less than adequate. 
(PG3) Evidentialism. Grounds are evidence: propositions that count in favour of 
the truth of the proposition believed. 
(PG4) Possession Principle. For a person's belief to be adequately grounded, it is 
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not sufficient for there merely to be appropriate evidence for it. Rather, the 
believer himself or herself must possess (and make proper use of) evidence 
that makes the proposition believed (very) likely to be true (Williams, 2001,  147). 
The  introduction  of  these  four  principles  by  Williams  seems  to  me  only  to  confuse  things.
According  to  him,  (PG1)  and  (PG2)  together  imply  “the  uniform  subordination  of  personal
justification  to  grounding.  By  (PG2),  believing  on  less  than  adequate  grounds  is  always
irresponsible and hence, by (PG1), never justified” (Williams, 2001, 147-148). But it is hardly a
surprise that the conjunction of PG1 and PG2 should imply that it  is irresponsible to believe a
proposition in the absence of adequate grounds, because PG2 implies this all by itself – in fact, it is
a mere rewording of PG2. PG1 is therefore redundant.
PG3 and PG4  allegedly “add to this a strongly internalist account of what it is for someone's belief
to be adequately grounded” (Williams, 2001, 147-148).  If my belief that God exists is produced by
a cognitive process which is in fact reliable, you might say that that is a grounding – of sorts – for
the belief. But PG3 and PG4 are designed, according to Williams, specifically to rule this out, and
to insist that the only things which count as grounds are things which are cognitively accessible to
the believer. 
All of this may be vastly simplified, however, by removing all mention of “grounds” (and anyway,
Clifford's principle itself does not contain the word “grounds”). If we were to do that and remove
the redundant PG1, we would be left with the following:
 (PG2*). It is never epistemically responsible to believe a proposition when one's evidence
for believing it is less than adequate. 
 (PG4*) For a person's belief to be epistemically responsible, it is not sufficient for there
merely to be evidence for it. Rather, the believer himself or herself must possess evidence
that makes the proposition believed likely to be true46. 
We thus have, not four distinct principles but two. The first is a mere rewording of Clifford's dictum
itself, whilst the second is an important qualification which serves to underscore the thought that
merely externalist justification is insufficient for responsible belief formation.  Let's just call the
46 There is no sense to be made of PG3 at all once we remove the reference to “grounds” from our analysis of 
Clifford's dictum. 
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combination of PG2* and PG4*, “Evidentialism”.
We may now see how it is that Williams thinks that Agrippa's Trilemma presupposes Evidentialism:
At the heart of the Agrippan argument is the apparently fatal trilemma: any attempt to justify
a belief must open a vicious regress, end with a brute assumption, or go in a circle. The
sceptic concludes that no one is ever justified in believing one thing rather than another.
Given the distinctions we have just drawn, we see that this conclusion concerns epistemic
entitlement:  personal justification. However, all the sceptic's argument shows is that there
are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence. This is a point about grounding.
To get from what he argues to what he concludes, the sceptic must take it for granted that no
belief is rightly held unless it rests on adequate and citable evidence. He needs the Prior
Grounding  Requirement.  More   precisely,  he  needs  the  Dependence  Thesis  (to  link
responsibility  with  grounding)  and  Strong  Internalism  (to  identify  grounding  with  the
possession of evidence). Nothing less will do the job (Williams, 2001 148). 
The sceptic first tries to convince the dogmatist that he is no reason for his belief. According to
Williams, the sceptic wants us to infer from this that our beliefs are unjustified  in the sense of
blameworthy (Williams, 2001, 148). To arrive at that further conclusion, however, the sceptic has to
presuppose Evidentialism; he has to presuppose that it is never responsible to hold a belief for no
reason.  Thus  PG2*.   Moreover,  the  sceptic  must  understand  “reason”  and  “evidence”  in  the
internalist way – as the sort of thing to which the believer has cognitive access. For if the sceptic
does not presuppose this, the mere existence of a reason for the belief which falls entirely outside of
my grasp will be sufficient to end the regress. Thus PG4*. If the sceptic is to persuasively arrive at
the conclusion that we should not hold beliefs, he must presuppose Evidentialism.  
 
Williams calls this view various things – Cliffordism, Evidentialism, the prior grounding conception
of justification. 
3. The Default and Challenge Model
Williams does not just claim that Evidentialism is presupposed by Agrippa's Trilemma. He claims,
moreover, that it is a contentious and entirely optional bit of philosophical theory. Opposing it, he
offers a rival doctrine, which he calls a “default and challenge model of justification”, about which
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he has this to say:
The difference between the 'Prior Grounding' and 'Default and Challenge'  conceptions of
justification is like that between legal systems that treat the accused as guilty  unless proved
innocent and those that do the opposite, granting presumptive innocence and throwing the
burden of proof onto the accuser.  Adopting the second model, epistemic entitlement is the
default status of a  person's beliefs and assertions. One is entitled to a belief or assertion
(which, remember, is an implicit knowledge-claim, unless clearly qualified) in the  absence
of appropriate 'defeaters': that is, reasons to think that one is not so entitled (Williams, 2001,
149). 
The Default and Challenge model thus turns out to be the view that “a person is entitled to a belief
in the absence of appropriate ‘‘defeaters’’: i.e., reasons to think that he is not so entitled” (Williams,
2004, 133). Evidentialism entitles the sceptic to enter “brute challenges”. He can legitimately ask,
for any claim that I make, “why believe that?”, paying no attention to the context in which I claim
it.  If I fail  to answer any such question,  it  will turn out that my claim is unacceptable.  On the
Default and Challenge model, a belief can be rightly held by default and “there is no universal
default entitlement to enter a challenge” (Williams, 2004, 133). 
Now, Williams is not suggesting that just any and every belief is rightly held just because it is
believed.  The qualification  “in the  absence  of  appropriate  defeaters”  is  crucial.  Sometimes  the
sceptic's challenge will be reasonable, but not always:
Appropriate defeaters cite reasonable and relevant error-possibilities. There are two main
types. Non-epistemic defeaters cite evidence that one's assertion is false: this evidence might
be purely negative, or it might be positive evidence for the truth of some incompatible claim.
Epistemic  defeaters  give  grounds  for  suspecting  that  one's  belief  was  acquired  in  an
unreliable or irresponsible way. Here the objector concedes that his interlocutor's claim or
belief might be true but denies that it is well grounded (Williams, 2001, 149). 
Putting all of this together, a belief is rightly held unless there is a defeater – some evidence that the
belief is false or some positive reason to think that the belief was acquired unreliably. Taken in this
way, Williams' position is a version of  Conservatism – the view that a belief is acceptable (to some
degree) because it is believed (Lycan, 2013). This is how Williams initially states the view, but the
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many subtle qualifications he adds to it suggest something quite different. 
In various other places, Williams adds myriad other factors which might affect a belief's default
justificatory status. Entitlements are, as he puts it in one place, “contextually determined”, and in a
very  severe  way  (Williams,  2007,  100-105).  Whether  a  particular  belief  may  be  legitimately
challenged often depends on whether a challenge there is even intelligible:
 to be legitimate, a challenge must at least be intelligible. Th is is not automatic. I take it for
granted that two plus three equals fi ve. It would be ridiculous for someone to say “I see
what you mean, but why do you say that?” Anyone who thinks that a challenge is in place
here does not see what I mean (Williams, 2007, 100)47.
In  a  similar  fashion,  according  to  Williams,  certain  perceptual  judgements  are  insulated  from
challenge, and in this connection he quotes Wittgenstein:
Suppose now I say “I’m incapable of being wrong about this: that is a book” while I point to
an object. What would a mistake here be like? And have I any clear idea of it? 155. In
certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake (Wittgenstein, cited by Williams, 2007,
100)48. 
It seems that Wittgenstein is straightforwardly mistaken on this point. It might not be a book at all,
but a hallucination. I seem to have a perfectly clear idea what such a mistake would be like. I walk
into the room, I see an item, I point at it and say “this is a book”. Perhaps I even seem to pick it up,
riffle through the pages and read a few words. I put it down. Someone else comes into the room and
asks what I'm doing. I tell them “I was just having a look at this book”, again pointing to the item.
They look puzzled. “What are you talking about?”, they say. They conclude that I must have drank
too much, because there is no book at all. After an hour or so away, I return to the place where I
seemed to see the book, but it isn't there. I made a mistake. There was no book. Thus, the question
47 This is pretty much identical to the well-known Empiricist account of empirical justification (See BonJour, 2008). 
48
As another side note, this too seems to be close to a traditional Empiricist account of empirical justification (Stace, 
1934). Williams works hard to distinguish his view from these by arguing that  “the kind of certainty that is 
connected with the impossibility of mistake – or with the unintelligibility of epistemic challenges – does not allow us
to defi ne the epistemic kinds that are the hallmark of traditional foundationalism” (Williams, 2007, 101). He 
suggests that whether something like “this is a book” may be justified by default depends on the circumstances. If I 
am in a paraphernalia store, which sells not only books but also cigarette boxes that look like books, “this is a book” 
could be legitimately challenged (Williams, 2007, 101). The position is thus importantly different.  
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“why believe that what you are seeing is a book?” raises a perfectly intelligible doubt.
I  am  not  sure  whether  Williams  appreciates  this,  but  he  also  seems  to  hold  that  perceptual
judgements can be acceptable by default even if a challenge to them is intelligible:
Even when intelligible,  challenges are not always legitimate.  They can be far-fetched or
utterly  groundless.  Th  e  logical  possibility  of  a  certain  kind  of  error  is  not  generally
sufficient  for  a  legitimate  challenge.  Often  one  needs  some  reason  to  think  that  the
possibility is  live:  that  there  is  some reasonable  probability of  its  having been realized.
(Williams, 2007, 102)
It might be absurd for me to question whether what I am holding is a book if I am in a library
riffling through the pages. There is simply no reason to think that I might be mistaken here. On the
other hand, it might be sensible to question it if I am in a store which sells not only books but boxes
which look just like books (Williams, 2001, 101). 
 Challenges can, according to Williams, also fail to be legitimate if they are irrelevant to our current
concerns. So we may be entitled to a belief because it sets the direction of enquiry (Williams, 2001,
160). If our goal is to pursue historical research on ancient Greece, the view that the earth has
existed for more than five minutes cannot be questioned. Questioning it would simply be to give up
on that kind of inquiry. According to Williams, beliefs which have this role are rightly held:
Methodological necessities are a source of default entitlements because they determine the
direction of inquiry. For example, serious worries as to whether the Earth even existed five
minutes ago, or whether every piece of documentary evidence is some kind of forgery, do
not result in an especially scrupulous approach to historical investigation (Williams, 2001,
160). 
It is not just, as the sceptic would have it, that we accept that the earth existed five minutes ago for
practical purposes, so that we can go on with what we need to do. Rather, that presupposition is, in
Williams'  words  “a  fundamental  fact  about  the  logic  of  inquiry”  (Williams,  2001,  160).  It  is
important to be clear about this point. It is pretty obvious – and I think few would deny – that as a
matter of descriptive fact what Williams says is true. It is true that pursuing historical research into
ancient Greece logically requires the assumption that the earth existed for more than five minutes. It
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cannot be denied that there are these kinds of methodological necessity to be found in various forms
of inquiry. What Williams is saying, however, is more than this. He is saying that methodological
necessities are rightly held because they are necessary for the inquiry. 
Methodological necessities,  on Williams' view, 'fix the angle of scrutiny'  (Williams, 2001, 160).
They enable us to look into a particular issue from a particular perspective, taking certain things for-
granted. We are entitled to the takings-for-granted by the very fact that they enable the enquiry, but
they are by no means the fixed unchangeable assumptions the sceptic paints them as being. If we
choose to investigate from a different angle, we can simply  change the takings-for-granted, but we
cannot operate without any such assumptions at all:
We can no more inquire into everything at once than we can travel simultaneously in all
directions (Williams, 2001, 160-161). 
Thus, whether we are entitled to a belief by default may change as our choices of inquiry change. A
belief that is rightly held in the context of one inquiry may cease to be so from a different angle,
where the aims of inquiry are different (Williams, 2001, 161). He again sees this in Wittgenstein:
163. We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all reports about him are based on
sense-deception,  forgery  and  the  like.  For  whenever  we  test  anything,  we  are  already
presupposing something that  is  not  tested.  Now am I  to  say that  the  experiment  which
perhaps  I  make  in  order  to  test  the  truth  of  a  proposition  presupposes  the  truth  of  the
proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?....  We just can’t
investigate everything, and for this reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I
want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (Wittgenstein, cited by Williams, 2007, 102).
There are also other economic considerations which Williams introduces. I earlier mentioned that a
belief's justificatory status may be defeated by counter-evidence, but the amount of evidence is not
at all fixed. How much  evidence is needed before we rightly become suspicious of a once default
claim will depend on what the costs are of being wrong, how important the issue is to us and so on.
It may even be that a particular issue is of such great importance, and the costs so great if we are
mistaken  about  it,  that  we  cannot  rightly  take  any  position  on  the  matter  even  if  it  is  a
methodological necessity of a desirable kind of enquiry. Williams sums up all of this:
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Methodological,  dialectical,  and  economic  factors  concern  primarily  the  epistemic
responsibility dimension of justification. They reveal that the  relationship between personal
and  evidential  justification  is  multiply  contextual.  In  the  first  place,  with  respect  to
maintaining  epistemic  responsibility,  the  existence  of  a  properly  motivated  challenge
determines  whether  evidential  justification—in  the  strict  sense  of  citable  evidence—is
required at all to secure personal justification. In the second place, contextual factors fix the
adequacy  conditions  on  evidential  justification's  securing  personal   justification.  Most
importantly, they determine what potential defeaters ought to be excluded. These will never
amount to every logically possible way of going  wrong, but will be restricted to a range of
relevant  alternatives.  However,  there  are  two  sources  of  irrelevance  that  must  not  be
confused. An error- possibility may be beside the point—strictly irrelevant to the subject in 
hand—or, while not strictly irrelevant, it may be too remote a possibility to be worthy of
serious consideration (Williams, 2001, 161). 
All of this serves to underline the crucial point. On the Default and Challenge model, the sceptic
cannot legitimately enter brute challenges all over the place without concern for context. He cannot
just ask “why?” without presenting some specific evidence that the belief in question is mistaken or
dubiously arrived at. He cannot, as Williams puts it, engage in “freefloating suspicion”. He must
motivate his challenge. And, crucially, he cannot conclude from our failure to answer such brute
challenges that our beliefs are irresponsible. Williams thus concludes that if we reject Evidentialism
in favour of the Default and Challenge model, “the threat of radical, general scepticism will no
longer be on the table” (Williams, 2004, 134). 
Before moving on, we must recognize that the Default and Challenge model is a genuine alternative
to  Evidentialism.  The  Default  and  Challenge  model  sometimes  feels  very  much  like  a  mere
description of everyday practices of epistemic evaluation (at least,  for a certain sort of people).
Williams  (2007,  105))  even  says  at  one  point  that  his  view  is  “more  descriptive  than  it  is
theoretical”. But this cannot be allowed to confuse things. The view certainly does try to stay very
close  to  everyday  epistemic  evaluation,  but  it  is,  at  the  same  time,  an  endorsement of  those
evaluations.  The Default  and Challenge model  is  not  just  a  mere  attempted  description  of  our
practices; to oppose Evidentialism in the way Williams wants it to, it must be a theory of what
makes a belief responsible or acceptable.
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Like with the sceptic's standards, Williams has various names for his own view. He sometimes calls
it “The Default and Challenge Model” and sometimes “Contextualism”. Both names are apt.
Chapter 9: Contextualism and “Ordinary
Practice”
1. Arguments?
Why would anyone favour Williams' account of right belief? He gives two arguments.
 There are two main lines of defense for the contextualist view: that it stays much closer to
ordinary  epistemic  practice;  and  that  alternatives  serve  only  to  generate  unnecessary
skeptical puzzles, such as epistemic relativism (Williams, 2007, 99).
The first argument is the subject of this chapter. The second argument is the subject of the next.
Section 2 clarifies the sceptic's epistemic standards. Section 3 states the argument Williams gives
against them. Section 4 contends that the argument is of no force. 
2. The Sceptic's Standards Explicated (a bit)
Williams  argues  that  the  Default  and  Challenge  view  fits  better  with  “the  phenomenology  of
everyday epistemic practices” than Evidentialism (Williams,  2001, 254).  Williams characterizes
Evidentialism in this way:
(PG2*). It  is  never  epistemically responsible  to  believe  a  proposition  when one's  evidence  for
believing it is less than adequate. 
 (PG4*) For a person's belief to be epistemically responsible, it is not sufficient for there merely to
be evidence for it. Rather, the believer himself or herself must possess evidence
3. The Ordinary Practice Argument
The Default and Challenge view is supposed to be more in line with everyday epistemic evaluations
than Evidentialism  in a number of ways. 
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First, everyday practice allegedly has no place for brute challenges. We do not normally allow the
question “why believe that?” unless there is some particularly salient reason to doubt the belief in
question:
 If  I  think  you  might  be  making a  mistake,  that  you  have  not  shown proper  epistemic
responsibility, or that your epistemic procedure may have been flawed, I ought to be able to
say how and why. Groundless, freefloating suspicion is not ordinarily considered a basis for
a reasonable challenge (Williams, 2004, 133).
Evidentialism is in sharp contrast to this, because it allows the entering of brute challenges in the
absence of Williams' “how and why”. It allows “freefloating suspicion”. 
Second, it is often possible to reject challenges to provide reasons. That is, we normally allow room
for declining to offer further reasons when asked:
[Evidentialism] leaves no room for legitimate challenges to challenges. But such challenges
to challenges are a pervasive feature of ordinary reason-giving (Williams, 2001, 144). 
Third, ordinary practices supposedly contain an important distinction between justifying a belief
and being entitled (justified) to hold it it:
It  is  certainly  true  that  to  justify  a  belief  is  typically  to  marshal  evidence,  offer  one's
credentials, explain away apparent counter-evidence, and so on. Justifying, in other words,
just is giving grounds. But being justified is not always a matter of having gone through a
prior process of justification (Williams 2001, 154). 
This distinction, Williams says, is captured by the Default and Challenge view, because sometimes
a belief may be acceptable without having undergone a process of justification – for it may be
acceptable by default. Evidentialism makes no room for the distinction, because it insists that every
right belief must be one which has been justified. 
Williams admits that it is possible to square Evidentialism with these (alleged) features of ordinary
practice. We might say, for example, that although ordinarily we do not allow the entering of brute
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challenges, this is only because of the constraints of practicality. We simply cannot, if we want to
get anything done, allow brute challenges. Nevertheless, when we set aside practical constraints we
will recognize that, strictly speaking, our beliefs are irrightly held in virtue of our failure to answer
such challenges.  Similar  extensions of  Evidentialism could be made to  accommodate the other
elements of ordinary practice which Williams raises. Doing this, however, severely increases the
complexity of Evidentialism. We have to attach to the basic view about epistemic responsibility a
series  of  descriptive  hypotheses  about  ordinary  practice,  designed  to  explain  away  apparent
conflicts between the basic Evidentialist view and ordinary practice. Such hypotheses, moreover,
are added on to Evidentialism in ad hoc fashion, with no motivation save for preventing it from
being at odds with our practices. The Default and Challenge view, on the other hand, needs no such
further hypotheses and is thus theoretically superior (Williams, 2001, 154-155).  
Williams says that all of this looks badly on the sceptic, because:
[the sceptic's] conception of justification cannot be read off ordinary epistemic procedures. It
has nothing to do with ordinary doubts of justifications, which are always in various ways
restricted. Rather, its function is to make room for an extraordinary, unrestricted kind of
doubt: general (hence radical) Skepticism (Williams, 2007, 135). 
It  is  this,  then,  that  Williams  meant  by  saying  that  Scepticism  presupposes  contentious  and
dispensable theoretical considerations, and what he means in various other passages, where he says
that Scepticism is not “natural” or “intuitive”. 
4. The Argument Evaluated
All of this is very quick. Williams makes three points about ordinary epistemic practice:
(1) Brute challenges are not part of ordinary epistemic practice. If you think I might be wrong in
claim, you must have something specific in mind and some reason to think it might be the case.
You cannot legitimately just ask, in a vacuum, “why?”, as the sceptic does.
(2) It is often legitimate to “challenge a challenge”. That is, to question the appropriateness of
someone asking you to provide further reasons for your claim.
(3) Being entitled to hold a belief is not always a matter of having gone through a process of
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prior justification.
One place we might have reservations is in Williams notion of “our epistemic practices”. Who is
meant by “our”? If Williams means everybody in the world, he is surely wrong that all of their
practices have the features which he describes. Some people do, pace Williams, allow the entry of
brute challenges. If I confess to believing that there are ghosts, I assure you that lots of people I
know will enter the challenge “but why?”, and they won't think it acceptable for me to dismiss their
challenge on the grounds that the existence of ghosts is a “presupposition” of my practices as a
medium. Moreover, many critics of religious belief make brute demands for reasons for accepting
religious claims, and they take the failure of religious believers to answer such challenges to show
that religious belief is unacceptable. If you are unsure of this point, think here about what students
say on Philosophy of  Religion  courses,  or  what  scientists  like  Richard  Dawkins  and Laurence
Krauss  say  in  debates  about  religion.  Equally,  I  have  spoken  with  plenty  of  people  in  other
disciplines who make the same objection. The assumption, as has been pointed out by Plantinga
(2000), is that religious belief is reasonable only if the believer can answer a brute request for
evidence49. 
As for (2), it seems to be part of my own practice and of some of the people around me, but I've no
idea whether it is part of “ours” in any interestingly wide sense. But assuming it were true, there is
no reason to think it is at odds with Evidentialism. Suppose that we are investigating the history of
49 I hold that there is no interesting sense in which everyone shares the same epistemic standards. Disputes between
philosophers  about  the  correct  epistemic  standards are rife.  Some philosophers  defend simplicity as  a  criterion  of
reasonable theory choice in every area (Swinburne, 1997). Some hold that simplicity is a legitimate criterion in science
but not in philosophy (Huemer, 2009). Some advise against the criterion of simplicity in scientific research (and biology
specifically (Crick, 1988) whilst others are more generally doubtful of the value of simplicity (Bunge, 1961). 
Some accept and some reject the legitimacy of inference to the best explanation (Boyd, 1981; Douven, 2002; Van
Fraasen, 1989). Some hold that the mere fact that you hold a belief makes it (to some degree) reasonable to hold it,
absent defeaters (Lycan, 2013) and others find that view preposterous (Christenson, 1994; Burns, 2017). There are those
who  hold  that  it  can  some  times  be  reasonable  to  hold  a  belief  in  light  of  pragmatic,  economic  or  utilitarian
considerations (Leary, 2017; Rinard, 2018; Harman, 1999; James, 1979) and there are others who insist that we ought
only to form beliefs on the basis of good reasons or evidence (Clifford, 1999; Way, 2016; Conee and Feldman, 2004).
Williams holds that a belief may be reasonable if it is a methodological necessity of an inquiry that we are interested in
pursuing, but I deny it.  It  is quite clear that there are many disputes among philosophers about the best epistemic
standards. It seems to me that there is no reason to think that philosophers are, in this respect, any different to the rest of
the population. 
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ancient Greece and someone raises the question as to why we should believe that the earth is more
than five minutes old in the first place, never mind as old as required for a study of ancient Greece.
Someone might  dismiss  the  challenge,  saying something like  “that  doesn't  really  matter  at  the
moment”.  According  to  Williams,  that  dismissal  is  perfectly  appropriate  according  to  “our”
epistemic practice. 
But Evidentialism does not say otherwise. It is not the view that any time anyone comes up to you
and insists that you give reasons for one of your beliefs, you ought to either defend it or suspend
judgement. It is the view that you should suspend judgement if you have no reason at all for the
belief. “Having” a reason, however we should interpret the phrase, is obviously not meant to be
interpreted such that you “have” a reason only if you would tell anyone who asks what that reason
is any time that they ask it, regardless of what else you are doing at the time. That is a maximally
uncharitable interpretation of the view. 
As concerns (3),  it seems true of my own practice, and for all I know it is true for some fairly wide
sense of “our”, but Evidentialism does not prevent a distinction between acceptable belief and the
process of justification. Believing something at some time is right, at that time, if and only if you
have some reason to believe it at that time. This does not mean that you need to tell those reasons to
anyone, so as to have completed a “process of justification” . Note, crucially, that there is no need at
all to amend any further ad hoc hypotheses to Evidentialism in order to make this distinction. It is
not as though I am adding to Evidentialism various other ideas so as to accommodate (3). Rather, all
of this is already part of Evidentialism on any charitable reading of it. It does not say, not even as
Williams originally states it, that a belief is acceptable for S only if S has in the past completed the
process of its justification. It says merely that a belief is acceptable for S only if S has good reasons
to believe it.
The situation, then, is this. Williams says that Evidentialism is at odds with ordinary practice in
three respects. The first of those seems not to be a feature of ordinary practice, at least for lots of
people. The other two features are perfectly compatible with Evidentialism. 
So what of Williams' claim that the sceptic's standards have “nothing to do with ordinary doubts or
justifications” (Williams, 2007, 135)?. Well he might be right, but he certainly hasn't shown it. 
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Chapter 10: Williams Radical Relativism 
1. The Second Argument
I turn now to Williams' second argument for Contextualism – to wit – the claim that “alternatives
serve only to generate unnecessary skeptical puzzles, such as epistemic relativism” (Williams, 2007,
99). Pace, Williams, I think his view is a severely implausible version of epistemic relativism. If I
can show this, it follows both that Williams has no motivation for his Contextualism and that the
view is independently quite implausible, even by Williams' own admission.
Section 2 distinguishes different versions of Relativism. Section 3 discusses Fogelin's charge that
Williams is a Relativist. Sections 4 and 5 argue that Williams is, despite his protestations to the
contrary,  committed to an implausible Relativist  standards of belief.  Section 6 argues that even
despite  having  adopted  Relativism in  an  effort  to  avoid  Scepticism,  Williams'  views  are  still
compatible with the heart of Scepticism.  
2. Versions of Relativism
According to O'Grady (2002), a Relativist about some phenomenon, X, says that X is dependent on,
co-varies  with,  or  is  relative  to,  some  other  variable,  Y.  Ashton  (manuscript),  a  defender  of
Relativism, concurs. Baghramian (2010) gives three examples:
(a) Justice is relative to local norms.
(b) Truth is relative to a language-game. 
(c) The measurement of temperature is relative to the scale we use.
Focussing in on truth, Baghramian writes:
 Relativism about truth, or alethic relativism, at its simplest, is the claim that what is true for
one  individual  or  social  group  may  not  be  true  for  another,  and  there  is  no  context-
independent vantage point to adjudicate the matter. What is true or false is always relative to
a conceptual, cultural, or linguistic framework (Baghramian, 2010).
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Thus:
(RelativismT) There is no such thing as objective truth. There are only relative truths which
hold for some people and not for others. 
The Relativist about truth thinks that there are things that are true-for-me and things that are true-
for-you, these might well be entirely different from one another and there is no further fact about
whose beliefs are “really true”. Suppose that you believe that there are aliens and I believe that
there are no aliens. The Relativist about Truth will say that “there are aliens” is true for you and
“there are no aliens” is true for me, and there is no answer to the question whether there are “really”
any aliens. All truth is relative in this way50. 
I do not think there is anything in Williams' work which suggests Relativism about Truth, so I set
that aside.
A version of Relativism which comes closer to the point is Relativism about acceptable belief. That
would be the view that whether a belief is acceptable is relative to some other variable. Ashton
(manuscript)  defines her own epistemic Relativism this way:
The epistemic form of relativism which we are concerned with holds that justification is
relative to some kind of epistemic framework, where an epistemic framework is a set of
propositions that a given epistemic community uses to distinguish ‘good’ beliefs, or those
that should be believed, from ‘bad’ ones, or those which shouldn’t be believed. Put simply:
epistemic relativists (usually) believe that justification is relative to some sort of standard of
use (Asthon, manuscript, 2). 
Fogelin's characterization of the view concurs, with him defining it as the view that “S is justified in
believing that p if P is justified within the framework in which S is operating” (Fogelin, 1994, 96). 
So, the epistemic relativist holds that whether we ought to hold a belief is relative to the framework
in which we are operating. Further to this basic characterization, Ashton adds another idea:
50 There is no need to look further into what might be meant by these assertions, because I will not have anything more
to say about RelativismT. 
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the  endorsement  of  equal  validity  –  the  idea  that  all  the  different  sets  of  justified
propositions,  which  arise  as  a  result  of  the  various  possible  epistemic  frameworks,  are
equally valid (Ashton, manuscript, 2).
 
We may, therefore, define Relativism about acceptable belief in this way:
RelativismJ. (a)  S's  belief  is  acceptable  if  it  is  acceptable  relative  to  his  epistemic
framework, and (b) all frameworks are equally valid. 
RelativismJ may be further divided in terms of which frameworks it is talking about. So cultural
RelativismJ is the view that whether S's belief is acceptable is relative to the epistemic framework
of the S's culture. Subjective RelativismJ, on the other hand, is more egocentric. According to it,
each individual person has their own epistemic framework relative to which his or her beliefs are
justified. A belief may be reasonable-for-me or reasonable-for-you, but there is no such thing as
reasonable simpliciter (Williams, 2001, 220). 
A “framework” might be thought of as a set of assumptions – about responsible ways of forming
beliefs, about what kinds of considerations count as evidence and which don't, and about which
methods of inquiry are reliable. It may even include certain fundamental assumptions about what
the world is like. You might have as part of your framework, for example, the belief that the world
is ordered and stable,  and for that reason capable of explanation in  terms of scientific  laws of
nature. Or your framework might include the belief that God exists and makes his presence known
to us through the holy spirit.  
A Relativist about justification will hold that whether you ought to hold a belief depends on whether
it is licensed by your framework. So, given that you have the ordered-world framework, believing
that  miracles  do  not  happen  is  quite  reasonable.  Equally,  given  that  you  have  the  religious
framework, belief in miracles may be acceptable. A defender of Relativism about acceptable belief
thinks that this is all  there is to be said about the matter.  There is no further fact about which
framework is acceptable. 
RelativismJ presupposes an assumption which it is worth pointing out. It assumes that there are
such things as “epistemic frameworks” that are relied on by – for cultural RelativismJ – different
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cultures or – for subjective RelativismJ – different individuals, in their evaluation of beliefs. It is
relative to these frameworks which all evaluations of belief are to be made, and there is no way to
evaluate the frameworks themselves. 
It  is  undeniable that  there are differences across cultures and historical  eras in how beliefs  are
formed and evaluated. Cultures of earlier times relied heavily on oracles and seers in predicting the
future. We do not. Some cultures rely heavily on ancient scripture as a basis for beliefs about the
origin of the human race and the world itself, but that practice is not at all a universal one today. It
was once quite common to rely on mythical fables as explanations of physical phenomena – the
weather for example. Today all of these issues are handled much differently by most of us – in a
way  you  might  loosely  call  “scientifically”.  Myths  and  fables  are  replaced  with  experiments,
observation and theory. It might be tempting to think that this difference between contemporary
culture and that of previous eras is a sign of progress – we have realized the proper way of learning
about the world is through scientific procedures. But to the Relativist about Justification this is a
fantasy. Our way of doing things is not better in any way than the ancient reliance on oracles, myths
and fables.  It is just different. Our beliefs are acceptable relative to our framework; their beliefs are
acceptable relative to theirs and there is no way to evaluate the frameworks themselves. 
There  is  some  ambiguity  in  the  above  characterization  of  RelativismJ,  specifically  when  the
Relativist says that “our way of doing things is not better in any way than the ancient reliance on
oracles”, or equally when he says “no framework is superior to any other” or “there is no way to
evaluate the frameworks themselves”. What is meant by these claims? 
Suppose that our way of doing things is, in fact, a reliable way of discovering the truth. Well then
there is one sense in which our way of doing things is better than reliance on oracles. I do not think
the Relativist is charitably taken as denying that if our way of doing things is reliable then it is
better, nor is he charitably taken as explicitly denying (or affirming) that our way of doing things is
reliable. The Relativist does not have anything to say on that matter at all. 
I  propose that when the Relativist says these things, he is accepting a form of Scepticism. The
Relativist is suggesting that our way of doing things is “not better” in the sense that there is no non-
question begging reason to think that it is more reliable than the use of oracles. He is suggesting
that,  ultimately,  there  is  no  reason  to  favour  our  framework  over  the  ancient  framework.  As
Williams puts the Relativist view:
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There is no common ground, substantive or methodological, on which argument between
those who see the world from different standpoints can proceed. Clashes between them are
thus power struggles, 'objectivity' being no more than the dominant world-view's preferred
self-description (Williams, 2001, 220). 
So the Relativist about justification really has three views. First, he accepts the sceptical view that
there is, ultimately, no reason to believe anything at all. Second, he holds the view that whether we
ought to hold a belief depends, not on whether there is some reason to believe it, but on whether it is
licensed given our framework. Third, he holds that all frameworks are equally good51. 
3. Williams and Relativism
Many philosophers, Williams included, hold that Relativism is a sort of response to Scepticism. It is
an attempt to avoid Scepticism, although exactly how is often not very clearly explained, either by
advocates  of  Relativist  views  or  by their  critics.  Here  is  one  way to  understand the  Relativist
gambit.  Agrippa's  Trilemma,  as  we  have  seen,  presupposes  Evidentialism.  The  sceptic  has  to
assume Evidentialism if he is to arrive at the conclusion that no belief is reasonable or rightly held.
Williams' response is to reject Evidentialism. We might think of the Relativist as, like Williams,
rejecting Evidentialism to avoid the sceptical conclusion. He rejects Evidentialism in favour of the
view that a belief is acceptable if it is acceptable-in-framework. The question which then faces us is
to  what  extent  the  Relativists'  replacement  for  Evidentialism is  like  Williams'  replacement  for
Evidentialism. 
Well, the Relativists' picture of things has it that a belief is right when it is right within a particular
framework52. A framework might include principles about what kinds of argument are legitimate or
illegitimate  (inference  to  the  best  explanation,  deduction,  argument  by analogy etc)  as  well  as
substantive claims about  the world (Odin is  the king of  the  gods.  Everything is  fated.  We are
radically free. Everything is physical. Etc). The framework in question may be that of the individual
(as in subjective RelativismJ) or the wider culture (as in cultural RelativismJ). The assumptions
which comprise the framework cannot be thought of as responsible or irresponsible, reasonable or
51 I will not explore the reasons that the Relativist might have for holding any of these views. 
52 The Relativist must hold, on pain of consistency, that his theory of justified belief is itself only justified relative to 
the framework in which he is operating. 
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unreasonable on this view. The framework itself has no normative status whatsoever. What's more,
it  is  not  possible  to  provide  anything  like  a  good  reason  to  believe  any  of  the  framework
assumptions, nor to have any reason to reject one in favour of another. They are totally in-evaluable.
Fogelin (1999) rejects RelativismJ because of the rigid status it gives to framework beliefs. He
points out that even if a belief is reasonable for you given your framework, the framework itself
may be unreasonable – you “may be using astrological  tables” (Fogelin,  1994, 96).  Imagine I
belong to a culture who believe ourselves to be capable of contacting the dead for their opinions on
present matters. I believe that Plato is thrilled with the present state of Philosophy, and I believe it
because I went to see an alleged medium who told me so. My belief might be quite reasonable
given my framework – say that my framework includes the belief that certain mysterious people can
reliably contact the dead and speak to them through crystal balls. My framework itself, however, is
unreasonable.  
Williams says that he too rejects RelativismJ, and for the same reason that Fogelin does (Williams,
2001, 226). He says that on his view “frameworks” are no more immune to criticism than anything
else is:
 Fogelin’s criticism misses the point that contextualists not only can but must be as fallibilist
about epistemic frameworks as they are about beliefs in general. For contextualists, there is
no  sharp  line  between  epistemic  and  factual  commitments,  and  so  no  clear  boundary
between methodological propositions and propositions within a method. Fogelin’s criticism
equates  the  contextualist’s  revisable  methodological  presuppositions  with  the  relativist’s
ultimate principles....  I said that talk of 'frameworks' is harmless provided that we do not
take it too seriously. But such talk is best avoided. Almost inevitably, it encourages us to
think  of  contexts  of  justification  as  insulated  from  external  criticism,  a  view  that
contextualism is simply not committed to (Williams, 2007, 108).
On first hearing Williams' view, it might be tempting to think of his suggestion that whether a belief
is acceptable depends on the context as the very same claim as the Relativists claim that whether a
belief is acceptable depends on the framework. It is tempting to think of Williams' “contexts which
set the direction of inquiry” as rigid frameworks immune from any sort of evaluation, but this is not
at all what Williams has in mind. It is true that Williams holds:
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(C1) All justification takes place in a context of presuppositions and other circumstances 
which are not currently under scrutiny. 
But he also holds: 
(C2) These presuppositions and circumstances can themselves be articulated and challenged,
but only by a recontextualization of the original  justificatory procedure, a
recontextualization that will involve presuppositions of its own. 
And
(C3) Recontextualization can go on indefinitely. But this is the open-endedness 
of inquiry, not a vicious regress of justification (Williams, 2001, 227). 
These two further theses, Williams thinks, distinguish his view from Relativism, on which epistemic
frameworks  cannot  ever  be  evaluated  in  any sense  at  all.  While  the  Relativist  sees  alternative
epistemic frameworks as completely isolated from one another,  incapable of being brought into
dialogue for any sort of criticism at all, Williams sees the assumptions of a context as always open
to criticism from the perspective of a different context.  According to Williams, his view is, for this
reason, not Relativism about justification. 
4. Criticism, and Astrology
If Williams' position is not Relativism about justification, it is at least cut from a very similar cloth;
a cloth which looks to all the world like Relativism. There are some striking parallels. First, both of
them reject Evidentialism in response to Agrippa's Trilemma. Second, the Relativist says that all
right belief  is  right-in-framework, and that there is  nothing that is  acceptable (or unacceptable)
simpliciter.  Williams  says  that  all  acceptable  belief  is  acceptable-in-context,  and  that  there  is
nothing  that  is  acceptable  (or  unacceptable)  simpliciter.  The only difference  –  which  Williams
thinks is crucial – is that Williams' view allegedly has room for the critical evaluation of contextual
assumptions whilst the Relativist openly denies any such possibility. 
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It  is  worth  looking  more  closely,  however,  at  what  Williams  calls  criticism  of  contextual
assumptions.  On Williams'  view,  a  proposition which is  an assumption  in  one context  may be
evaluated from another perspective, taking up new assumptions and working out of another context.
So the assumption that  spiritual mediums are reliable might  be operative in the context  of my
inquiries into the opinions of long dead philosophers, but it is evaluable if we come at it from a
context in which sense perception is taken to be reliable – because from that angle it is quite clear at
least most purported mediums are con-artists using well known psychological manipulations to trick
clients. 
The general idea is this. Suppose that the belief that P is acceptable in a context which takes fore-
granted  assumptions  Q,  R,  S.  In  that  context  Q,  R,  S are  acceptable  by default  as  a  result  of
whatever contextual factors may be in play. In such a context, Q, R and S cannot be challenged. It
is, nevertheless, possible to  evaluate Q, R and S by 'recontextualizing'. That is, Q, R and S can be
evaluated if we move to a different context where they are not taken fore-granted any more. In
moving to a different context, we must take fore-granted other propositions, T, U, V, relative to
which we will assess Q, R and S. Equally, T, U and V are immune to challenge in this context, but
we could shift the context so as to evaluate them.  Any contextual assumption is so evaluable, by
taking up different contextual assumptions and looking at things from there. 
The question which must be raised, however, is how much of this “recontextualizing” is really
evaluation and criticism and how much of it is playing charades. Consider Theism – the view that
God exists. It is, perhaps, possible to find some arguments for Theism if we make a handful of
assumptions to 'fix the direction of inquiry'. Perhaps I assume that Jesus rose from the dead; that the
Principle of Sufficient Reason is true and various other things. From there, I could quite well be
entitled in believing Theism. Of course, that Jesus rose from the dead and the Principle of Sufficient
Reason is  true is  probably not a  pair  of assumptions  for  which a  person would typically have
default-entitlement  as  a  result  of  methodological  and  pragmatic  factors  of  the  kind  Williams'
envisages. Still, I can imagine perfectly well a context in which “Jesus rose from the dead” is a
methodological necessity of further inquiries – for example, into what Jesus did after having risen,
how people reacted to seeing him, what happened, biologically, to his body after he rose and so on.
The point is, with some ingenuity, it should be possible to imagine a context in which the following
is true for some logically possible inquirers:
(Context 1)
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(1)  Propositions  A,  B  and  C  are  default-acceptable,  because  they  are  methodological
necessities of the inquiry we want to pursue; because it is useful to assume them for now and
because the resulting inquiries promise to be valuable to us in various respects. 
(2) Further, given propositions A, B and, C, it is reasonable to believe Theism. 
 But equally, if I take a handful of different assumptions I can find some arguments for the view that
God does not exist – Atheism. With some ingenuity, it should be possible to imagine a context in
which, for some logically possible inquirers:
(Context 2)
(3)  Propositions  D,  E,  and  F  are  default-acceptable,  because  they  are  methodological
necessities of the inquiry we want to pursue; because it is useful to assume them for now and
because the resulting inquiries promise to be valuable to us in various respects.
(4) Further, given propositions D, E and F, it is reasonable to believe Atheism. 
According to Williams, it is possible to evaluate any of A – F by shifting to another context where
they are not default-acceptable. Well suppose we move to a context where Theism itself is default-
acceptable  (perhaps  we  are  in  the  context  of  philosophical  theology).  If  Theism  is  default-
acceptable, together with various other things, we can generate a third logically possible context:
(Context 3)
(5) Theism, together with Propositions G, H and I are default-acceptable, because they are
methodological necessities of the inquiry we want to pursue; because it is useful to assume
them for now and because the resulting inquiries promise to be valuable to us in various
respects (again, perhaps it is the context of philosophical theology).
(6) Further, given Theism, G, H and I, it is reasonable to believe that all of D, E and F are
false. 
I claim that all of these three are logically possible contexts which might be occupied by some
logically possible set of inquirers. In Context 1, it is reasonable to believe Theism given A, B and C.
In context 2 it is reasonable to believe Atheism given D, E and F, and in Context 3 it is reasonable
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to deny D, E and F given Theism, G, H and I. Now add a final wrinkle – that on Williams view
there is no answer to the question “is Theism acceptable?” which is independent of any of these
different contexts.  It  seems to me that what you have here is not evaluation at  all,  but various
propositions  'butting heads'  with one another  until  we blindly choose one context in which we
would  prefer  to  stay,  at  least  for  the  moment.  What  Williams  advertises  as  the  evaluation  of
contextual assumptions is starting to look like a silly game, in which all we do is see what follows
from various propositions.
Now, Williams will no doubt say that the choice is not “blind” at all, but is made on the basis of
pragmatic, methodological and economic considerations. Yet, to say this is just to admit that, in the
relevant  sense,  the  choice  is  blind.  The  choice  will  not  be  one  which  is  settled  by  superior
arguments, for the arguments in each context are, as Sextus would say, equipollent. In each case,
you  start  with  some  assumptions  that  there  is  no  reason  to  accept  and  you  arrive  at  certain
conclusions acceptable relative to those assumptions. The choice between assumptions, on Williams
account, can only ever be utilitarian. We make our choice on the basis of which assumptions are
useful for our purposes, which ones are necessary for the inquiries we are interested in and which
ideas are valuable to us. Of course, different people at different times and places inevitably have
different purposes, interests and values, and there are certainly all kinds of logically possible people
with different values to us contemporary western philosophers. The result  will  be that different
contexts will be preferable to different people. 
Now return to Williams, Fogelin and astrology. Fogelin rejected RelativismJ on the grounds that,
although it may be reasonable to believe that P given your epistemic framework, the framework
itself may be unreasonable. You might be using astrological tables. Williams claims that his view
can accommodate such criticism. What,  then,  would Williams be able to say about astrological
tables? At most he could say this:
(Williams' Criticism of Astrology)
 “I see that you have come to believe that P on the basis of astrological tables. Given that
astrological tables are reliable, it is quite reasonable to believe that P, but wait just a moment.
I have been working from a different context where the reliability of astrological tables is
not taken fore-granted. Instead, assumption X is taken fore-granted. From the perspective of
assumption X, astrological tables are unreliable and so, from the perspective of assumption
X, the belief that P is not reasonable”.
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[and now Williams must add the fatal qualification..]  I didn't accept X because there are
good reasons  to  believe  it.  I  accepted  X because  it  was  useful  for  my purposes  and  a
necessity for the sort of inquiry I wanted to get into”.
If Williams makes this qualification, he admits that his criticism of the astrological belief is hardly
worth the name, because all he ends up saying is that the belief that P is unacceptable given the
purposes, values and interests which Williams has. Of course, the defender of astrology is free to
reply:
(The Astrologists' Reply)
“Well, that's interesting. I don't really care about the sort of inquiry that takes X fore-granted,
nor am I interested in the same things as you. What I really care about is astrology, and I'd
love to know more about the relationships between different star signs. See you”. 
Now, the important thing about the astrologists reply here is not merely that he is capable of saying
it. He can say anything he likes. The important point is that, if the astrologist says this then he is, on
Williams account, not doing anything wrong. He is conforming to Williams' proposed epistemic
standards and so being completely reasonable in the face of Williams' criticisms. Crucially, that is
the only sort of rational criticism which Williams can make room for. The only criticism Williams
can give of what seems like an obviously unreasonable belief-forming practice is one which the
Astrologist can reasonably brush aside merely by saying that he isn't interested in doing things from
the same context as Williams, because he really likes Astrology. 
Thus, although Williams can pay lip service to the idea that epistemic frameworks can be evaluated,
the kind of evaluation on offer is ultimately hollow. 
It  is  an  often  touted  objection  to  Relativism  that  it  makes  “anything  goes”  the  standard  of
reasonableness.  Since  a  belief  is  reasonable  if  it  is  reasonable-in-framework,  and  there  is  no
evaluating frameworks, then so long as you can produce a silly enough framework, any and every
belief will turn out reasonable. Suppose I had a crystal ball which told me every morning, “you are
a poached egg”. If I operate within a framework which includes the assumption that the crystal ball
is reliable and discounts evidence to the contrary then my belief that I am a poached egg will be
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reasonable. 
The problems revealed in this section illustrate just how true it is that “anything goes” on Williams'
account. Of course, in one sense, not everything does go on Williams' account. For one thing, what
goes is determined by the context. In any given context, some things are reasonable and some aren't,
but as Fogelin notes:
this response to the question ‘Doesn’t anything go?’ seems only to invite a new, higher-
order, question: ‘Doesn’t any context go?’ (Fogelin, 1999, 169).
And the answer Williams must give on this point is “yes”. There are no restraints on what can and
cannot be built in as a contextual assumptions – it all depends on what you want to investigate, how
important it is to you and so on. And this lack of restraint leads to what I take to be an identical twin
of Relativism. Since any context goes, any and every belief will be acceptable in some contexts and
unacceptable in others and there is nothing more to be said than that. What's worse, any attempted
criticism of your views may be reasonably turned aside by your lack of interest in the perspective
from which the criticism comes. “Any context goes” is barely any different to “anything goes”, and
certainly no more plausible. 
5. Some Restraints
I have been arguing that Williams cannot really make space for rational criticism. What he presents
as a cogent criticism of astrology turns out to be smoke and mirrors. It looks like cogent criticism,
but the Astrologist can reasonably brush it off simply by virtue of not being interested in the context
out of which the criticism comes. Again, I stress that the important point is not merely that he can
brush it off, but that he can, on Williams view, justifiably brush it off; and that is the best Williams
can do by way of external criticism of astrology.
Williams does try to locate sources of criticism which exist irrespective of context. The aim of these
posits is to make another attempt at securing space for rational criticism. By identifying context
independent sources of external criticism, rational evaluation can amount to something more than
stubbornly pitting sets of propositions against one another. The propositions can be evaluated from
the outside.
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The first source of criticism Williams adds is the intelligibility constraint which we saw earlier.  If
something is  unintelligible  then we will  be right  in  denying it,  regardless of  context,  and this,
according to Williams, yields a large amount of cross-context commonality:
Intelligibility  constraints  guarantee  the  existence  of  a  wide  range  of  cross-contextual
commitments and entitlements (Williams, 2001, 227). 
I am content to grant that the intelligibility constraint must hold in every context. A context which
did not respect it would be one which contained unintelligible propositions, and I take it that you
cannot be entitled in believing an unintelligible proposition. I cannot be entitled in believing that P
if I cannot even understand P. The problem, however, is that the intelligibility constraint does not do
nearly as much work as Williams suggests that it does. Quite literally anything that I can think of is
intelligible and so barely anything is really ruled out by insisting on intelligibility. To have moved
the view from “anything goes” to “anything intelligible goes” is hardly any more plausible. 
Williams also introduces another constraint which he insists is cross-contextual – the evidence of
sense perception:
Furthermore, observational evidence operates cross-contextually (Williams, 2001, 227).
This is, on the face of it, a sensible suggestion, but it won't help Williams produce a criticism of
Astrology within the resources of Contextualism. Suppose that Williams approaches the astrologist
and points out to him that his astrological beliefs are wildly at odds with beliefs that result from
sense perception. Why should the astrologist care, on Contextualism? Why should he not say, as
some old religions would have said: “Well I don't  really care about sense perception. Its pretty
useful for practical purposes, sure, but the whole thing is an illusion. Sense perception is completely
unreliable. Reality is revealed in deep meditation on astrological truths”. Would the astrologist be
doing anything wrong on Williams view? Its' hard to see how. The astrologist operates in a context
in which the reliability of sense perception is not acceptable – it isn't part of the context at all. So
why should the astrologist take the fact that his beliefs are at odds with sense perception seriously?
Another way to put the point is this. If what I am entitled in believing depends on my context, and
my context does not contain the reliability of sense perception as a background assumption, how
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will I be blameworthy, given Contextualism, in completely ignoring sense perception? 
Now, if sense perception were construed in a very traditional way – so that the experience provides
a direct awareness that something is true – then the answer would be quite clear. Sensory experience
would carry with it a direct grasp of the truth and since such sensory experience would be available
in every context that we could operate, it would serve as a constant external criticism. Any time we
adopted a belief at odds with sensory experience, there would be a completely context independent
reason for thinking that the belief was false – the belief would be at odds with our direct awareness
of how the world is -, thus making possible a powerful sort of rational evaluation of belief. 
Unfortunately,  Williams'  understanding of the role of sense-perception is  purely Externalist.  He
denies that sense perception itself gives one any reason at all to believe anything (Williams, 2001,
97). He writes:
how could merely having experiences or sensing sense-data justify anything? However basic
knowledge is  understood, it must be capable of standing in logical relations to whatever
judgements rest on it. For example, it must be capable of being consistent or inconsistent
with them. But this means that even basic knowledge must involve propositional content and
so cannot  consist  in  a  mere  relation  to  a  particular.  Sensing  a  sense-datum is  no  more
knowing anything than is standing next to a lamp-post.  (Williams, 2001, 97).
And again, in connection with Russell's paradigmatic internalist conception of experience:
Many foundationalists have contrasted the givenness of experiences or sense-data with any
kind of judgement. Russell's 'acquaintance' is supposed to be a direct relation to a sense-
datum, conceived as a sensory particular: for example, a red patch in 
one's visual field. This account of experience gains an air of intelligibility from its analogy
with ordinary talk about acquaintance with people and places: knowing the Prime Minister,
knowing Manhattan,  and so on. But the analogy is superficial.  Russellian knowledge by
acquaintance is supposed to be prior to—thus independent of—all propositional knowledge,
which Russell refers to as 'knowledge by description'. Knowing people and places is nothing
like that. It is impossible to 'know Manhattan' without knowing anything 
whatsoever about Manhattan. Acquaintance with sense-data is supposed to be a form of non-
propositional knowledge. This is what I claim we cannot understand: how something can be
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non-propositional and yet knowledge. Knowledge provides evidence,  grounds for further
inferences. But only that which can be true or false—thus prepositionally contentful—can
confirm or refute (Williams, 2001, 98).
Sense-perception is, on his account, a process which happens to reliably produce true beliefs about
the world much like a thermometer reliably tracks the temperature (Williams, 2001, 173-185; 227;
2007, 105). But how on earth are we to understand the role of sense-perception in this way? If what
I am entitled in believing depends on my context, then how can the mere fact that sense perception
is in fact reliable make any difference to what I am entitled in believing when my context does not
even contain the assumption that sense perception is reliable in the first place? Williams could say, I
suppose, that what I am entitled in believing does not depend on context; it just depends on which
contextual assumptions are in fact reliably produced or (perhaps) just which assumptions are true.
To say that, however, is just to abandon Williams' brand of Contextualism for Externalism53. He
cannot have both, or at least, it is entirely mysterious how they are supposed to fit together. 
The only role left for sense perception to play, then, is one where observational evidence is relevant
only if the reliability of sense-perception is default-acceptable. And to say this is just to say that the
reliability of sense perception is merely one more contextual assumption which may or may not be
made depending on your interests, values and purposes. The upshot is that there is no theoretical
space for Contextualism to make room for anything more than what is, to my mind, a seriously
hollow  form of  rational  criticism.  Williams'  position  is  a  radical  version  of  Relativism  about
reasonable belief.
7. Why The Dogmatist Should Kill the Sceptic
Return to our ongoing debate between the sceptic and the dogmatist. The dogmatist claims that P.
The  sceptic  is  frustratingly  demanding  that  he  think  of  reasons  for  that  belief.  How  can
Contextualism help the dogmatist out? Well, if Contextualism is true, then in some contexts the
dogmatist will be entitled to believe that P. Will he be entitled to believe it now, in his debate with
the  sceptic?  It  is  hard  to  see  how the  Contextualist  can  say anything  other  than  “no”.  If  the
dogmatist has agreed to operate in the sceptic's context, with Agrippa's Trilemma looming in the
background, then he has agreed to operate in a context where he is entitled to nothing by default; he
53 Externalism, as I pointed out in the introduction, isn't an ethic of belief at all, and so, if Williams moves to 
Externalism, he just abandons the current topic. 
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must earn his beliefs by thinking of reasons for them. So long as the dogmatist  remains in his
discussion  with  the  sceptic,  he  won't  be  entitled  to  believe  anything.  He will  have  to  suspend
judgement. The sceptic will have won the battle! 
Unless, that is, the dogmatist makes a more ominous move. Dogmatist could pull out the hammer
he carries around for dealing with troublesome philosophers, and proceed to kill  the sceptic by
bashing his head in, so bringing an end to the context in which he needed reasons for his belief.
Well, now that the very restraining context is at its end, dogmatist will be entitled to his belief again.
Can dogmatist's believing go from unreasonable to reasonable, from blameworthy to blameless, or
from open to criticism to beyond reproach, by his killing anyone who dares question him? It can
given Contextualism. As long as there is no one around pesky enough to create contexts where your
beliefs are not default-acceptable, you remain entitled to believe them; so keep your hammer ready
just in case!
Of course, the Contextualist can say that dogmatist ought not to kill other people, but that won't
change things. He ought not to kill other people, but if he does then, by Contextualism, he can
increase the credibility of his beliefs. 
The point doesn't just go for the dogmatist and his plight to avoid the sceptic. It goes for anybody. If
I get tired of being in contexts where other people expect me to have reasons for my beliefs, I could
just  kill  them all,  or  round them all  up and ship them to the moon.  Then I  will  have default-
entitlement to believe everything that I do believe, no matter how ridiculous it might be. Now, it is
one thing to say, like the Conservatives say, that everybody has at least some default-entitlement to
what they already believe just because they believe it; and it is one thing to say, like some others
say, that I cannot be properly criticized or blamed for my beliefs at all; but it is quite another thing
entirely to say that I can  earn entitlement to my beliefs by killing anyone that would create an
uncomfortable context. How is that absurd result not a consequence of Contextualism? 
8. Williams' Scepticism
The serious implausibility of Williams' position is plain. If this is the cost for avoiding Scepticism,
it  is  indeed a  very high price.  But what has Williams gained for having paid it?  Williams has
avoided Scepticism as  he  conceives  of  it.  He has  avoided the  view that  we ought  to  suspend
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judgement about everything:
(S*) We ought not to believe anything. 
He has avoided (S*), essentially, by building an alternative standard of belief to the sceptic. Doing
this, however, does absolutely nothing to address one of the fundamental aspects of Scepticism. So,
let us remind ourselves of that aspect. 
The central concept involved is that of a reason for a belief which actually indicates its truth. The
reasons in question are meant to fit several constraints. First, they are supposed to be non-question
begging; they are supposed to be the sort of thing which might convince someone who did not
already hold the beliefs in question. Second, they are supposed to answer the sceptic's question,
“why believe that?”. And third, they are supposed to be reasons which the believer has, in the sense
that they are more or less readily available to reflection. The sceptic denies that we can have any
such reasons:
(S) There is no complete reason to believe anything at all. 
Once this is made clear, it is made equally clear that nothing Williams says undermines (S) or the
case that the sceptic makes for it via Agrippa's Trilemma. Williams in effect stops the sceptic from
inferring  (S*)  from (S)  by  denying  Evidentialism.  Undermining  (S*)  is  neither  necessary  nor
sufficient for undermining (S) and Williams allows the sceptic to reach (S) without objection. 
Moreover, various aspects of Williams position themselves suggest (S). Take the idea that there is
no such thing as a belief that is acceptable simpliciter, but only beliefs that are acceptable given the
context. I suggest that if one thinks that there are genuinely good, internally accessible and context
independent reasons for thinking that various things are true, the idea that there is no belief that is
acceptable simpliciter will appear itself massively implausible. Then there is the great struggle that
Williams has to find some sort of context independent source of rational criticism – the struggle
which ends with an acceptable but largely unhelpful appeal to intelligibility and a promising but
ultimately useless appeal to sense perception. As I had cause to explain earlier, if sense perception
could have been understood as yielding a reason – in the internalist sense – for a belief then the
problem of rational criticism disappears completely. Any set of “contextual assumptions” will be
answerable to  the contents of experience in  the straight-forward sense that  the content  of such
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experience may itself be a reason for or against the assumptions in question. We have already seen
that Williams denies that this is really possible54 and to that extent comes closer to (S). 
Now,  you  might  think  that  denying  the  traditional  Empiricist-Internalist  conception  of  sense
perception is not the same as being committed, even tacitly, to (S). You might, after all, think that
there are other good reasons for beliefs about the world, even if sense perception cannot itself be
understood as their source. Yet there is no trace of this in Williams work. He nowhere gives any
account of the structure of justification (in the internalist sense) at all. The only places where he
addresses the issue are explicitly negative – his extended criticism of Empiricist Foundationalism of
the  sort  we  find  in  Russell  (Williams,  2001,  96-104)  and  his  equally  heavy  criticism  of
Coherentism, with particular reference to BonJour's work (Williams, 2001, 117-137)55.  
There is even at least one place where Williams outright admits that the sceptic has successfully
shown (S):
However, all the sceptic's argument shows is that there are limits to our capacity to give
reasons or cite evidence (Williams, 2001, 148). 
The “limit to our capacity” which the sceptic  shows with his argument is this. That if you question
any belief for long enough, it will eventually be revealed that it rests on sheer assumptions that there
is no reason to believe and that no belief is better than any other in this respect. 
It is perhaps worth spelling this out a bit more carefully, for the last time. (S) is not obviously
equivalent to the idea that there are “limits to our capacity to give reasons”. Of course, one can
produce arguments for a given belief by starting from premises which your conversation partners
agree with. Such arguments are apparently reasons of a sort, and in the context of convincing your
conversation partners, they are quite good ones.
But such arguments score merely dialectical points. Any proposition whatsoever can be established
by arguing from assumptions that there is no reason to believe. This goes for any proposition P and
its negation, -P.  It is this last point which leads us from the idea that there are limits to our capacity
to give reasons to (S). If all we can produce is an argument from assumption, then no matter how
54 If there is any doubt about this, the chapter “The Problem of Basis” in Williams' (2001) is an extended criticism of 
the idea that sensory experiences may be understood as good reasons for beliefs. 
55 According to Williams, Coherentism is “Foundationalism in disguise” (2001, 137). 
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helpful that argument is in a particular dialectical context, there is an equipolent argument for the
contrary conclusion which starts from different arbitrary assumptions. Faced with a pair of such
arguments, it is quite clear that there is no reason at all to believe either conclusion (unless you, for
no reason at all, happen to be convinced by one of the sets of premises). Since such arguments are
possible for any and every belief, it follows that, in the last analysis, there is no reason to believe
anything at  all  over anything else.  The concession that there are limits  to our capacity to  give
reasons just is (S) with a more palatable coat of paint. 
The way that Williams puts the point really does make it seem harmless, but I stress that this is an
illusion created by his way of putting it. If we really do have no reason to believe anything at all
then it follows that I must at some point just arbitrarily accept various propositions. I must accept
propositions which are such that I cannot explain, even to myself, why I find them convincing.
They will be rationally inexplicable from my perspective. As BonJour puts it,  “if I have no reasons
for thinking that my beliefs are true, then I am “flying blind” in an obvious way” (BonJour, 2008,
175). The implausibility of this result is not diminished at all either by framing it in terms of “limits
to our capacity” or by saying that our beliefs do not violate the proper norms of acceptable belief. 
One final point is worth making in this connection. Imagine someone who comes to be concerned
with their beliefs as a result of Agrippa's Trilemma. Imagine that the person comes to realize that
there are intelligible questions to be asked about why they believe various things which they usually
take fore-granted, and imagine that any 'common-sense' answers which they might be inclined to
produce are quickly shown to be vague, imprecise and problematic. This is, I take it, the situation of
someone who discovers  Agrippa's  Trilemma and is  subsequently introduced to the fallibility of
sense-perception, its compatibility with radical sceptical hypotheses and so on. They come to the
philosopher who is an alleged specialist on the topic. The philosopher tells him: “don't worry. Your
beliefs might be acceptable by default! If you are in the right context, you may not need reasons for
them. To think otherwise is to be in the grip of the dubious Evidentialist standard of right belief”. 
I  think  the  ordinary  person  will  find  all  of  this  quite  unsatisfying.  His  original  question  has
effectively been ignored. He began by wondering what reasons he has for his beliefs and he finishes
his conversation with the philosopher still wondering that very same thing. 
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9. Conclusions on Contextualism
I have argued here that Contextualism is a highly implausible ethics of belief. I have argued so on 
several grounds. First, Williams' two arguments for Contextualism (that it fits with ordinary practice
and avoids 'sceptical puzzles') are both of no force at all. Second, Contextualism is a maximally 
implausible version of Relativism. Third, even given Contextualism, we are still left with a puzzling
kind of Scepticism. 
Chapter 11. Giving The Sceptic His Due
1. The Sceptical Policy
Dogmatist: P
Sceptic: Why believe that?
Dogmatist: Because Q
Sceptic: Why believe that?
Dogmatist: Because R.
Sceptic: Why believe that?
Dogmatist: Because n.
Sceptic: Why believe that?..
In playing a well-known dialectical gambit, the sceptic tries to convince the dogmatist to suspend
judgement. When would the sceptic be happy? When would he be prepared to accept P, or prepared
to leave the dogmatist's belief as it is? In other words, what are the sceptic's standards for acceptable
belief? And what can be said in defence of those standards56? But what exactly is that policy for
belief? And what can be said in defence of it? That is my question. I'll try to defend the sceptic's
standards for belief here.  I warn you, if you're a philosopher, you probably won't find it all that
plausible no matter what I say, but if it is the job of the philosopher to explore all of the different
coherent ways of thinking about important philosophical questions (Shand, 2017), then I won't be
doing that job if I shy away from presenting a view because the good guys won't much like it. So,
I'll give it a go.  
56 It isn't quite right to say that they are “the sceptic's standards”. He doesn't himself accept them. He tries to lure the 
dogmatist into suspension of judgement by showing the dogmatist that his beliefs don't meet certain standards. For 
that purpose, it is only necessary that the dogmatist accepts those standards. It is, nevertheless, useful to speak in this
way rather than saying “what are the standards that the sceptic hopes that the dogmatist accepts in trying to lure him 
to suspend judgement?”. Talk of “the sceptic's standards” is short hand for this mouthful. 
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I  will  argue that  there are  no strong criticisms of the sceptical  policy for belief,  and that  it  is
plausible in at least two respects. Section 2 explicates the sceptical policy. Section 3 distinguishes it
from other ideas in epistemology. Section 4 is even further explication. Sections 5 and 6 give two
motivations  for  the  sceptical  policy.  The  remaining  sections  consider  and  defend  it  against
objections. 
2. Extreme Evidentialism
According to Richard Fumerton:
The [sceptic]…wants  to  know why we can  legitimately conclude  that  a  certain  way of
forming a belief is legitimate, and the [sceptic's] philosophical curiosity isn’t going to be
satisfied by being told at any stage of the game that it just is. (Fumerton 2006, 184).
When it comes to the debate between sceptic and dogmatist, we know from Sextus Empiricus and
the Modes of Agrippa that certain answers the dogmatist could give won't satisfy the sceptic. 
The  dogmatist  could  try  making  an  assumption  and  refusing  to  defend  it  against  any further
questioning. He could hold that God exists and that this follows from the premises “my religious
text is infallible” and “my religious text says God exists”. He could then insist that he doesn't have
any further defence of those assumptions, nor does he need one.  We know that the sceptic won't be
happy with that, for the reason given by Sextus and made  clear by Barnes (2007). For any two
contradictory propositions, P and -P, I can give an argument from arbitrary assumptions for both
sides. I can oppose your argument for P with the argument: “P, because Thor said P”, where I don't
have any reason to think that Thor said P or that Thor is reliable or even that Thor exists. If I accept
an  argument  on  the  basis  of  arbitrary  assumptions,  there  is  a  further  question:  why  those
assumptions and not any others?
The dogmatist could try arguing in a circle. He could argue that God exists because his religious
text says so, and the text is reliable because it is is the word of God.  We know the sceptic won't like
that, for the reason given by Sextus and made clear by Barnes (2007). For any two propositions, P
and -P, I can give a circular argument for each side, with nothing to choose between them. If you
give what you think is a knock-down argument for P, I'll just return: “-P is true because Thor said
so, and Thor is trustworthy because he said -P, and -P is true”. We aren't getting anywhere here.
128
When you have a circular argument for P, there is, again, a question left over about why any of the
beliefs in that circle rather than another circle should be accepted. 
The dogmatist could try arguing on infinitely with the sceptic, citing further and further new reasons
at every stage of questioning. We know the sceptic won't like that, for the reason given by Sextus
Empiricus and made clear by Barnes (2007). An infinite series of reasons is nothing more than a
long  list  of  sentences  in  which  one  is  inferred  from the  other.  For  any  pair  of  contradictory
propositions, P and -P, an infinite chain of reasons can be produced on both sides. If you argue that
P on the grounds of what you think is a very powerful infinitely long argument, I could counter with
an equally long argument of my own: “-P is true because Thor told me so, and Odin told me that
Thor is infallible, and Loki told me that Odin is infallible, and Hades told me that Odin is infallible,
and Zeus told me that...”. Why should anyone prefer the infinitely long argument for P over the
infinitely long argument for -P? 
If the sceptic is not happy with any of those three options, when would he be happy? Here is where
I think the sceptic's policy for belief strikes most philosophers as outrageous. He holds that you
should believe something only if there is no further question about why it rather than anything else. 
Suppose that you believe that P. I can ask, “why believe that P?”. If the answer to the question,
“why believe that P?” is some other proposition, Q, then “why believe that Q?”, and if the answer to
that question is some other proposition, R, I can ask, “why believe that R?”. The questions keep
coming. Say that a “complete reason” for believing that P is a chain of reasons which would answer
all  of  those  “why?”  questions  about  P.   In  that  sense  a  complete  reason  is  an  unconditional
indication that the belief in question is true. The sceptic says that you should believe that P only if
you have one of those57. 
Let's call this proposal Extreme Evidentialism:
57 The issue is a little more complex than that. If you infer P from Q, then the inference from Q to P also presupposes 
an inference rule – something like “Q makes probable P”and the inference rule may or may not be true. 
Is it enough to be justified in believing that P on the basis of Q that the relevant inference rule is in fact true, or must I 
also have some reason to believe that the inference rule is true? Fumerton (1995) calls the latter part the Principle of 
Inferential Internalism (PIJ) and defends it by appeal to examples. Given PIJ, the threat of an unmanageable infinite 
regress looms. The most radical sceptic will also insist on that as well, but one thing at a time! 
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Extreme Evidentialism. S is entitled to believe that P only if S has a complete reason for 
believing that P5859. 
I'll sometimes call it “EE” for brevity.  One qualification: The sceptic obviously doesn't mean to say
that the ordinary meaning of the words “entitled”, “justified”, “acceptable” or the like are captured 
by EE. EE is a proposal for how we should regulate our believings. We should believe that P only 
when the belief meets the standards of EE. EE is an epistemic prescription60.  It is akin to a rule 
about actions, e.g, “do not kill”. EE says  “don't believe without complete reason”61. 
3. What EE is Not.
You might think that, despite my protestation to the contrary, EE entails the view that to be entitled
in believing anything at all I must have an infinite sequence of reasons for believing it62.  It doesn't.
For one thing, as I just explained there is a question left over about why P should be believed, even
when you have an infinite  series  of reasons for it.  So EE is  incompatible  with Infinitism.  For
another, EE just doesn't say anything about how many reasons one needs for a given belief. It might
be, for all that it says, that there are some beliefs such that no question of the form “why believe
that?” is even intelligible, and so, the answering of questions comes to an end long before infinity.
McGrew (1995) seems to hold  that  view about  certain  introspective  beliefs.  Perhaps  Fumerton
(1995) holds it  too.  On the assumption that that view about introspective beliefs is correct, the
sceptic's standards would have been satisfied. That would be a happy result, but that is all  on the
assumption that that is the right view about introspective beliefs. I don't say that it is, and if it isn't
the sceptic will surely remain unhappy with the dogmatist's beliefs about his introspective states.
EE  is  also  compatible  with  Coherentism given  certain  other  incredibly  controversial  views.  A
Coherentist will hold that a belief is acceptable only if it is part of a sufficiently coherent system,
where “coherent” is  understood in a sufficiently robust  way – perhaps in  terms of  explanatory
power (Lycan, 2012). Given a correspondence theory of truth, a person who satisfies Coherentist
standards will not satisfy EE. A belief system can be maximally coherent (in the Explanationist
58 I call the view “extreme” to distinguish it from Conee and Feldman's (2004) Evidentialism. As they state the view, it 
is apparently compatible with some versions of Conservatism. This view isn't.
59 Note that I say “only if” to indicate a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, condition.
60See Stich (2001) for the difference between normative and descriptive projects in epistemology. 
61 It probably makes more sense to speak of degrees of confidence than of belief/dis-belief. In which case the view is 
that you shouldn't have any degree of confidence at all in P unless you have a complete reason for believing that P. 
You should be confident in P to the degree that “matches” the strength of your complete reason for it. 
62 Weiland (2013) thinks that the sceptic who argues with the dogmatist in this way presupposes Infinitism.
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sense) and there will still be a further question about why that system should be believed over some
rival  equally  coherent  system.  That  is  sometimes  called  the  “multiple  systems  objection”  to
Coherentism.  Given a coherence theory of truth,  on the other  hand, the problem disappears.  A
maximally coherent system will be a true system, and so there will be no further question about why
we should think it true. The sceptic will be happy with the dogmatist who has a perfectly coherent
set of beliefs, given a coherence theory of truth. But most philosophers find the coherence theory of
truth outrageous. I think I find it outrageous as well, so long as it is interpreted to imply that there is
just no such thing as “the way the world is” independent of what we coherently believe about it.
Without the coherence theory of truth, the sceptic will demand an answer to the question: “why this
coherent set and not that one?”. 
EE  is  obviously  incompatible  with  some  major  positions  in  contemporary  epistemology.  It's
incompatible  with Conservatism (Huemer,  2013),  because EE implies  that  a  person should not
believe that P just because they believe or are inclined to believe that P, nor just if it seems to them
that P. In every such case there will be a further question: why think that what seems to you to be
true is a reliable indication of the truth? 
EE is also incompatible with Externalist  theories of justification of every sort (Goldman, 1979;
Plantinga,  2000).  It won't do that my belief does, in fact,  stand in some nice causal,  modal or
nomological relation to the facts. If my belief is,  for example,  reliably produced but I have no
reason to think it is true, EE implies that I should not hold any such belief.
Lastly,  EE is incompatible with Contextualist theories of justification (Williams, 2004), because
those theories imply that some beliefs are sometimes “default acceptable” - acceptable for no reason
– if  the  context  is  right  (Williams,  2004),  and no proponent  of  EE,  sceptic  or  otherwise,  will
concede that63. 
All of this might make you think that EE is just the view that to be entitled to believe that P, you
must have a reason for P which makes it absolutely certain that P. It is not that view. Suppose that
you are justified in believing some propositions P, Q, R because, let's say, there is no intelligible
question about why P, Q, R should be believed. Suppose that you infer another proposition,  S,
63 It isn't just flatly incompatible with Externalism and Contextualism. If they are theories about the word 
“justification” in English, which sometimes they are presented as being, then EE is compatible with them. They are 
incompatible only insofar as Externalism and Contextualism are proposals about how we should form and evaluate 
beliefs.
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because S is the best explanation of P, Q and R. Your belief that S satisfies the standards of EE. You
have some reason for believing that S (it is the best explanation of P, Q and R), and P, Q and R are
such that there is no further question about them. Nevertheless, your belief that S is not absolutely
certain. It might turn out that what is the best explanation of your data is in fact false64. So EE does
not set the standard for belief at absolute certainty. It sets the standard at having some answer to the
question “why believe that P?”. 
4. Having Reasons
EE requires that I “have” complete reasons in order for my belief to be acceptable. When do you
“have” reasons?  Feldman (2004, 219-241) usefully distinguishes various senses in which a person
might “have” reasons for a belief whilst formulating his own Evidentialism. He eventually settles
on this in defending his own Evidentialism:
(1) S has p available as a reason at t if S is currently thinking of p (Feldman, 2004, 232).
Feldman understands the notion of “thinking of” fairly loosely. What one is “thinking of” at t is to
include everything which one is consciously aware of at t. Suppose I look out of the window and I
see a tree.  The visual information that I am aware of then will be included as something I am
“thinking of”. As will anything that I am occurently believing at t, and even anything that I am non-
consciously  believing  at  t.  Thus  he  writes  that  the  evidence  one  has  at  any  time  consists  in
“everything one is  thinking of,  consciously  and perhaps non-consciously,  as  well  as  non-belief
states of which one is aware” (Feldman, 2004, 240)65. 
There are various other alternatives to (1). Here is another:
(2) S has p available as a reason for q at t iff S would think of p if S were to think about 
what evidence there is for q. 
On that version of Extreme Evidentialism, a person “has” a complete reason for believing that q iff
the person would think of that complete reason if they were to think about what reasons there are
for q. 
64 Here again is the thorny issue about inference rules. An argument to the best explanation presupposes that the 
criteria of best explanation are truth conductive. Do we need some reason to believe this, or is it enough that they are
in fact truth conductive? Like I said,  the sceptic will probably want the latter view, but even that is not to set the 
standards for belief in general at absolute certainty. 
65 See Feldman (2004) for a defence against some tempting objections. 
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Feldman objects to (2) on the grounds that “it restricts a person's available evidence concerning
some proposition to those things whose relevance the person appreciates” (Feldman, 2004, 230). He
gives an abstract example where I “consciously believe both p and d, but fail to recognize that d
constitutes strong evidence against p” (Feldman, 2004, 230). According to Feldman, a version of
EE which understands “has” in the sense given by (2) “may lead to the result that I am justified in
believing p when in fact I surely am not” (Feldman, 2004, 230). 
This is a curious objection. Of course it may lead to the result that I am justified in believing that p,
but it also may not, depending on the details of the case. The mere fact that I consciously believe p
and  d  does  not  by  itself  determine  whether  I  am  justified  in  believing  that  p  on  Extreme
Evidentialism. It all depends. If I have a complete reason for believing that p and I don't have any
such for believing that d, it is quite clear what EE will say; I should believe that p. But this result is
not at all implausible. If I am able to answer all challenges to p but unable to do so for d, it is clear
which one I should favour. On the other hand, if I don't have a complete reason for p, EE will
predict that I am not justified in believing that p, and there is nothing implausible about that. To
insist otherwise would be to beg the question66. 
If EE is interpreted along the lines of (2), the sceptic has the high ground by a long way. He can
show that a person is ought not to believe what he does just by repeating his request for reasons
until the person is at a loss with how to respond. He doesn't have to do anything more than that.
Things are hardly any better  if we require that,  to be entitled to believe that P at  t,  I  must be
“thinking of” a complete reason for P, at t, in Feldman's wide sense of “thinking of”. It is no more
plausible that I have the resources to answer all of the sceptic's questions in my mind in Feldman's
wide sense. For this reason, the sceptic need not settle on (1) or (2)67. Either is fine. 
I'm sure that by this point most philosophers are sharpening their knives. They will think that EE is
completely absurd. I think EE is far more defensible than many would suppose, however. I turn first
to what can be said in its favour.
5. Impartiality
Perhaps the best argument for Extreme Evidentialism is the one which in fact attracts me to it. That
66 In fairness to Feldman, the objection seems to arise because he isn't considering Extreme Evidentialism, but a more 
modest version of Evidentialism. 
67 Again, it isn't strictly speaking the sceptic, who needs (1) or (2). See footnote 1.
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argument starts from the assumption that we should not be impartial in our inquiries. Consider this
scenario, due to Lammenranta (2008): 
Ivan, Smith and Jones are sincere truth-seekers. They want to know the truth about things.
Ivan is an impartial observer who is watching on as two people, Smith and Jones argue about
whether or not P. Smith holds that P and Jones holds that -P. Both Smith and Jones have their
arguments for P and -P respectively, but in the end those arguments depend on at least one
premises for which neither Smith nor Jones can provide any reason at all. The result is that
neither Smith nor Jones is convinced of the opposing view. Ivan does not have his own
belief  about the issue and this  is  the first  time he has ever heard anything about  it.  He
suspends judgement about whether or not P. 
In the scenario, Ivan plays the role of an impartial judge of the dispute. He does not favour either
Smith nor Jones for no reason. He assesses the situation looking only for reasons to favour P or -P. I
suggest that that is, intuitively, just what Ivan ought to be doing. He ought not to be taking sides
willy-nilly,  because he happens to  like Smith's  hair  or because Jones has a suave accent.  Now
consider another:
Ivan and Smith are sincere truth-seekers. They want to know the truth about things. Ivan is
himself in the place of Smith. Ivan argues that P and Jones argues that -P. Both Ivan and
Jones argue for their views but do so depending on premises for which neither of them can
provide any reason at all. The result is that neither Ivan nor Jones is convinced of the other
side. Of course, this time Ivan does have his own belief about the matter: he believes that P.
Ivan is, again, in his role as an impartial judge of the dispute. This time, however, Ivan is himself
party to the dispute. Yet, because Ivan is impartial, he does not favour any side of a dispute for no
reason, and the same goes when the dispute involves himself. Of course, from the point of view of
someone who asserts either P or -P,  the arguments do not seem to be equally good. To Ivan P seems
to follow from premises which are, though not supported by reasons, plausible on their own. To
Smith the same is true of -P. But since Ivan is an impartial person, he is able to appreciate Smith's
point of view as well as his own, and to see that they are both equal  (Lammenranta, 2008, 20).  My
suggestion is, again, that, intuitively, Ivan does just what he ought to do. He should not just favour
himself willy-nilly.
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The upshot is that when someone actually disagrees with me about P, I ought not to favour P just for
no reason. If we can convince ourselves of that much, however, it is only a short step to the idea that
I should never prefer a view for no reason, even if no-one in fact disagrees with me. I could, after
all, make it so that no-one in fact disagrees with me by devious tactics. I could bribe my opponents
to keep quite. I could move to another country where my views are more popular. I could kidnap
those  who  disagree  and  brain-wash  them;  or,  I  could  just  kill  them  all.  Yet,  it  is  incredibly
implausible to suppose that I could gain an entitlement to believe that P by such horrible means. If I
am doing something wrong in believing that P, it does not suddenly become right by my doing other
far  more  horrendous  deeds  (Lammenranta,  2011,  209).  If  that's  right,  then  it  does  not  matter
whether any one is around to disagree with me or not. If any one even could disagree with me, I will
not favour P just for no reason. From that idea it follows that for any proposition, P, I ought not to
believe that P for no reason; and that's Extreme Evidentialism. 
Perhaps another way of looking at the same point is this. It is very tempting to think that any reason 
which is less than a complete reason is worthless to an impartial inquirer. If a reason for P is less 
than complete then there will be a question of the form, “why believe that?” which is left open once 
we have understood the reason for P. We saw that earlier on.
An argument is, in the end, just a set of sentences which is supposed to somehow indicate the truth 
of another sentence.  But, so long as there is an open question about why those sentences and not 
others, its easy to drum up a set of sentences for the opposite conclusion, with nothing to choose 
between them. Any reason that is less than complete will be, from the impartial perspective, 
worthless. So far as we want to be impartial, nothing less than a complete reason will do. 
It  is  this  demand for impartiality which pushes us  towards a  policy of  Extreme Evidentialism.
Inquiry  without  impartiality  is  inquiry  which  settles  for  unfounded  assumptions,  favouring
hypotheses because they are convenient, pleasing or popular; it is not inquiry worth the name68.
6. Epistemological Miracles
Everybody knows by now of the fact that there is a difference between my believing that P and its
being true that P, at least for almost every P. Perhaps even more familiar is the fact that the broad
68 I am sure that Conservatives will object out-right that we ought to be impartial. They will say that it is, at least 
sometimes, acceptable to be biased in favour of what you already believe (See Lycan (2012)).  As I see it, that is 
intuitively not the case. In Lycan's terms, I “balk at Conservatism”. I have also discussed Conservatism at length. 
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details of our world-view are things we swallow up as a result of our upbringing, early education
and cultural  surroundings,  and one  doesn't  have  to  venture  too  far  outside  of  one's  immediate
neighbourhood to find people with all sorts of different opinions. If you go far enough afield, you
will struggle to find that you have anything of any significance at all in common. I think ancient
sceptic's made appeal to such facts because they thought that once you saw them, it would just be
natural to feel dissatisfied with one's own beliefs.
 I recognize that I'm not an oracle. I don't have any magical insight into the truth, and it would be
something like an epistemological miracle if I just happened to live at the right time out of every
possible time in history both in the future and the past, in the right place in the entire universe, to
have been educated by the right folks out of everyone on earth; to have been endowed with the right
perceptual and cognitive hardware, and as a result to have inherited the right system of beliefs, out
of every logically possible set that I could have had. It is hard to feel at all confident in one's beliefs
in the face of that. Once one feels  the disappointment that this sort of reflection engenders, it is
hard to think of yourself as reasonable in believing something without some explanation of why this
rather  than  anything  else.  Now  I'm  not  suggesting  that  these  reflections  about  our  radical
contingency69 entail EE. Of course they don't, but they do pull you towards adopting a policy like
EE. 
When it comes down to it, you either answer the question, “why believe that P?” or you don't. If
you don't and you believe P whilst in full realization of the radical contingency of that belief, you
are banking on an epistemological miracle in that respect. You are banking on just being lucky
enough that all of the circumstances line up in the myriad ways that I just described. It is far too
much like question begging just to insist that I should never bank on an epistemological miracle and
that therefore EE must be correct. But I suggest that it is at least intuitively right that I should not
hope for an epistemological miracle, and that this intuition needs to be accommodated (or at least
explained away) by a satisfying policy of belief. 
Moreover, no currently popular theory can accommodate it. Externalist theories (and their relatives)
will hold that it is reasonable to hope for such a miracle if the belief you are banking on was caused
in the right way, or has some other nomological property that entirely evades your grasp (better
hope the belief does have that property!). Conservative theories will say that it is reasonable to hope
for a miracle if the belief seems to you to be true (better hope that how things seem to you is a
69 I use the phrase “contingent” here not in contrast with “necessary” but in the sense of “subject to chance”.
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reliable guide to truth!)70. Contextualist theories will say that its reasonable to bank on a miracle if
you are in the right context for it (better hope your context is the right one!). 
It won't help any of these theories to introduce what is sometimes called a “defeater” condition. A
defeater  is  something  which,  under  certain  conditions,  would  prevent  your  belief  from  being
acceptable when it otherwise would be. Many contemporary versions of these theories do impose a
defeater condition, but the realization that you are relying on an epistemological miracle is not
typically allowed to count as a defeater. 
Externalists won't allow that the “mere” fact that your belief, that there is a God, is the product of
all of the radically contingent factors mentioned above can defeat your justification for believing
that there is a God. On the standard account, S's justification for believing that P at t is defeated if
and only if there’s some reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S at t which, if it had
been used by S in addition to the process actually used,would have resulted in S’s not believing p at
t (Goldman, 1979; Lyons, 2009). That plainly won't accommodate the intuition.
Another  account  of  defeat  –  one  more  friendly to  Conservatives  –  is  one  which  distinguishes
rebutting and undercutting defeaters. A rebutting defeater is “evidence that what appears to be the
case is in fact false”, while an undercutting defeater is “evidence that one's appearance (whether it
is true or false) is unreliable or otherwise defective as a source of information”. (Huemer, 2018). Of
course, the fact that your belief is the product of a radically contingent history isn't evidence that the
belief is false. For all that is shown, the belief is true. 
Whether, once you realize that your belief is a product of a radically contingent history, that  gives
you  evidence  that  the  belief  is  unreliable  or  otherwise  defective,  depends  on  what  counts  as
“otherwise  defective”,  but  it  is  quite  clear  that  Conservatives  don't  mean to  construe  it  in  the
required way. For if they did, any person who realized the radical contingency of their beliefs would
immediately have their justification for believing anything at all defeated pending some positive
reasons  to  think  that  the  belief  is  true,  and the  chief  motivation  for  Conservatism is  that  it  is
supposed to side-step these kinds of sceptical worries. 
70 Lycan's (2013) Conservatism holds that a belief is only fully acceptable if it seems to you to be true and significantly
coheres with your system of beliefs, but the detail makes no difference, because it will still be acceptable to bank on 
your radically contingent system of beliefs being true as opposed to another.
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Extreme Evidentialism accommodates the intuition, because to bank on an epistemological miracle
would involve accepting a belief without a complete reason for it. Again, I stress that the point here
is  not at  all  one about the ordinary meanings of epistemic words. I  don't  mean to say that the
sceptic's EE offers an intuitive analysis of the word “justified” or any other word because of these
reflections. I mean to say that the desire to avoid epistemological miracles is what pulls the sceptic
towards adopting the policy, “you should believe what you have complete reason to believe and
nothing else”. It is what tempts him to treat as acceptable only beliefs which meet that condition. 
7. Huemer's Absurd Speech Argument
Huemer (2006) argues against other views on the grounds that they council a person to sometimes
endorse an absurd speech. He argues, for example, against:
Reliabilism. S is justified in believing that p, if S formed the belief that p by a reliable
method, S has no beliefs that either support ~p or support the proposition that S formed the
belief that p by an unreliable method, and S has no available reliable belief-forming method
that, if used, would have led S to believe that ~p (Huemer, 2006, 2).
He argues against the view by appeal to a variation on Bonjour's well-known thought-experiment:
The Clairvoyant Brain. Susan has two interesting ways of forming beliefs: apparent sensory
perception,  and  clairvoyance.  Susan,  unfortunately,  is  a  brain  in  a  vat,  and  her  sense
perception is entirely unreliable, although she has no reason to suspect this, and it seems to
her that her sense perception is just as reliable as her clairvoyance. It also seems to her that
her perceptual beliefs are adequately justified, just as much as her clairvoyant beliefs. Nor
has she any reason to doubt any of this. Oddly enough, Susan actually has psychic powers,
and her clairvoyance is highly reliable. One day, Susan seems to see a dog in front of her and
has no special reason to doubt the dog’s reality. She also has a clairvoyant experience of a
purple unicorn grazing in a field somewhere, with no special reason to doubt the unicorn’s
reality. In fact, there is no relevant dog of the sort she seems to perceive, but there is a real
unicorn that she is accurately detecting clairvoyantly (Huemer, 2006, 4). 
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He points out that “If Reliabilism is a correct theory, then Susan would be justified in believing that
the purple unicorn exists, but unjustified in believing that the dog exists” (Huemer, 2006, 4). If
Reliabilism is right, then, Susan is reasonable in giving what Huemer calls an “absurd speech” to
those around her:
Absurd Speech. I seem to be aware of a dog, just as I seem to be aware of a unicorn. These
two experiences seem equally reliable to me, and in general, seem alike in all epistemically
relevant respects. However, I believe that there is a unicorn, and I do not believe that there is
a dog. I have no reason to think that the unicorn experience is any more likely to be accurate
than the  dog experience;  I  just  accept  the  content  of  the  one  and not  the  other,  for  no
apparent reason (Huemer, 2006, 5). 
 
But, Huemer says, the Absurd Speech is not a reasonable thing for Susan to say, nor is it even a
reasonable state of mind for her to be in (Huemer, 2006, 5).  Absurd Speech would (if true) be a
report of an epistemically rational state of mind; “even to think to oneself what the Absurd Speech
says would be a mark of irrationality” (Huemer,  2006, 5). He concludes about Reliabilism and
similar views that:
Externalist theories of justification countenance peculiar cases in which subjects rationally
believe (disbelieve, withhold) some proposition yet are seemingly in no position to account
for why they should believe (disbelieve, withhold) as they do. This is what internalists object
to. A rational person, it seems, ought to be in a position, if he should come to reflect on his
doxastic attitudes (that is, his attitudes of belief, disbelief, or suspended judgement toward
various propositions), to approve those attitudes as justified—or at least he should not be in
a position such that on reflection, he would or should disapprove of those attitudes. Such
cases as that of the Clairvoyant Brain bring out externalism’s violation of this constraint. In
the Clairvoyant Brain Case, it seems that Susan (the brain) is in no position to reflectively
endorse both her credulity towards her clairvoyant experiences and her skepticism towards
her sensory experiences; from her own point of view, the combination of attitudes must
appear  arbitrary and inexplicable.  It  therefore  seems irrational  of  her  to  persist  in  those
attitudes; yet that is what the externalist counsels (Huemer, 2006, 10). 
About this Huemer is quite right, and his argument against a Reliabilist ethics of belief is utterly
decisive. However,  he draws the further moral that  “there cannot be a pair of  cases in which
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everything seems to a subject to be the same in all epistemically relevant respects, and yet the
subject ought, rationally, to take different doxastic attitudes in the two cases—for instance, in one
case to affirm a proposition and in the other to withhold” (Huemer, 2006, 6), and, even further, that
something like Phenomenal Conservatism is the most “plausible and natural” explanation of this: 
Something like Phenomenal Conservatism seems to underlie our intuitive reactions to the
scenarios discussed above and to the various Absurd Speeches that those scenarios would
lead to on externalist theories of justification. For example, in the Clairvoyant Brain Case,
Susan’s  combination  of  attitudes  towards  her  dog  experience  and  towards  her  unicorn
experience seems irrational, because the dog seems to her just as real as the unicorn, the two
experiences seem equally likely to be veridical, and she has no apparent reason for doubting
either. All of this would render her combination of attitudes irrational only if these seemings
were relevant to what Susan was justified in believing in roughly the way that Phenomenal
Conservatism indicates—that is, if the dog’s seeming equally real as the unicorn conferred at
least some sort of justification (in the absence of defeaters) for thinking that it was equally
real, if the two experiences’ appearing equally likely to be veridical was some sort of prima
facie  justification  for  thinking  that  they  were  equally  likely  to  be  veridical,  and  so  on
(Huemer, 2006, 12). 
These further points beyond the criticism of Reliabilism make heavy use of Huemer's notion of
“seemings” construed as sui generis mental states. But, if, as I have argued, there are no such things
as seemings, the argument cannot even get started. Phenomenal Conservatism cannot be the most
plausible  explanation  of  the  fact  that  absurd  speech  is  absurd  if  there  are  no  such  things  as
seemings71. 
Still,  Huemer's  argument does suggest a  motivation for Extreme Evidentialism.  What  is  absurd
about absurd speech is, and Huemer agrees with this, that Susan takes different attitudes to two
propositions  inexplicably. If she asks her self, “why do I believe that there is a unicorn while not
believing that there is a dog?”, she will draw a complete blank. That is what makes Susan's state of
mind a silly one. But, if that is what makes absurd speech absurd, then wouldn't it be equally absurd
for Susan to give this speech?;
71 To point this out is really to do something quite obvious. Of course if there are no seemings then the argument for a 
view which presupposes them will not be convincing. But I point it out for the sake of completeness. 
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Absurd Speech 2. I believe that there is a unicorn on Mars. I don't really know why I believe
it. I can't think of any reason to. I just do. I don't believe that there is a unicorn on Jupiter. I
don't really know why I don't believe it. I just don't. 
Just  like the first  Absurd Speech,  the  two propositions  are,  from Susan's  perspective,  of  equal
credibility, but she favours one and not the other, for nothing. It seems clear that Susan's attitude
here is completely unreasonable, and she ought not to take it. If she takes it, she has no coherent
account of what she is even doing72.
Now, you will be committed to some such absurd state of mind whenever you make an assumption
with no answer to the question, “why believe that?”, because you will always be in the position of
assuming something inexplicably while not assuming other things which are, from your perspective,
just as good. Consider Susan again, who this time believes that her deepest desires are a guide to the
truth:
Absurd Speech 3. I believe that how I deeply desire things to be is how things probably are,
at least unless there is some reason to suppose other wise. I don't know why I believe this. I
just believe it. I don't believe that what I see with my eyes is how things probably are. I don't
really know why I don't believe it. I just don't. 
Absurd Speech 3 is  surely no less absurd than Absurd Speech 2.  In it  Susan assumes that her
deepest desires are at least a fairly reliable indication of the truth, and she rejects the same view
about her senses, for nothing. Her differing attitudes here are completely inexplicable from her
point of view, and she has no coherent account of what she is even doing. She just opts, willy-nilly,
to trust her deepest desires and ignore her senses. Moreover, she would not be any less absurd were
she instead to trust her senses, completely inexplicably, and ignore her desires, for nothing. If Susan
proceeds  in  accordance  with  Absurd  Speech  3,  she  does  exactly  the  sort  of  thing  which  the
Reliabilist  implausibly  councils  that  she  should  do;  she  takes  different  attitudes  towards  two
propositions but cannot explain, even to herself, why she is doing so. 
One is in that absurd state of mind whenever one makes an assumption for no reason – whether that
assumption is that sense perception is trustworthy, or that how things seem to be is trust worthy, or
72 If there were such things as seemings, there would be an easy way out of my argument. Perhaps it seems to Susan 
that there is a unicorn on Mars, but doesn't seem to her that there is a unicorn on the moon. 
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that our inclinations to believe are trustworthy, or whatever it is.  If we agree that such a state of
mind is irrational and that we ought to avoid being in it, we agree to follow Extreme Evidentialism. 
8. Forgotten Evidence
I  turn  now  to  a  discussion  of  objections  to  EE.  Most  of  the  objections  stress  that  EE  is  an
implausibly strict policy, and that adopting it would lead us to treat as unacceptable beliefs which
obviously are acceptable. 
EE stresses the role  of what  the person has  in  his  mind when he is  deciding what  to  believe.
Goldman (1999) objects to theories which take this approach on the grounds that they produce
implausible consequences in cases of forgotten evidence:
Last year Sally read about the health benefits of broccoli in a New York Times science-
section story. She then justifiably formed a belief in broccoli's beneficial effects. She still
retains  this  belief  but  no  longer  recalls  her  original  evidential  source  (and  has  never
encountered either corroborating or undermining sources). Nonetheless, her broccoli belief
is still justified (Goldman, 1999, 281).
Suppose, then, that pace the sceptic, Sally has a complete reason for believing that broccoli has
beneficial effects. But then she forgets all or part of that reason. EE will imply that Sally is no
longer entitled. That is implausible, says Goldman, because Sally doesn't lose justification that she
had just by forgetting.
Whether EE has this result  depends on how we fill  in the details of the case.  If Sally is fairly
normal, she will have all sorts of background beliefs; that most people think broccoli is beneficial;
that health experts say that it is, and so on. She will also remember that when she originally became
convinced that broccoli is beneficial, she had then a complete reason for believing it. If these beliefs
are acceptable, she will be entitled to once again affirm that broccoli is beneficial on the basis of her
background beliefs.
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If  Sally  is  a  real  wierdo,  and  doesn't  have  any  relevant  background  beliefs,  nor  any  relevant
occurring memories, EE will imply that Sally is not entitled to her beliefs73. But if Sally is that
weird, it is at least unclear whether she is entitled to believe that broccoli is beneficial. To insist
otherwise is to beg the question against EE. 
9. Over-Intellectualizing 
Extreme Evidentialism, paired with either (1) or (2) sets the standards for belief very high. The
demand is so strong that, even supposing, pace the sceptic, that it is at least logically possible to
have a complete reason for a belief, and even supposing that some clever philosophers have those
reasons, it  is quite clear that most people would be not be entitled to their  beliefs. But, so the
objection goes, that is a monstrously implausible over-intellectualizing of the standards for right
belief.  It  is  plain that  people other than very clever (and weird?) philosophers have acceptable
beliefs. So we must reject EE. 
Here are Rescorla and Silins:
 “young children, and possibly also non-linguistic animals, are justified in believing many
propositions, even though they cannot mount sustained arguments” (Rescorla, 2009, 50). 
Consider a young child... who gets a good look at the Sesame Street character Elmo in a
book, and who forms the belief that that is red without further ado. In forming the belief, the
child certainly does not consciously draw on beliefs about the reliability of her experience...
she does not even have the concepts required to form beliefs about the reliability of her
experience.... however the child and the adult are plausibly both justified in forming and in
holding the belief (Silins, 2014, 10)74.
The case of animals is fairly easy to handle. Most animals are not cognitively sophisticated enough
to be appropriate subjects of normative appraisal75. When a bird swoops down and steals your chips
at the seaside, hardly anyone would suppose that what the bird did was morally wrong, or that the
73 Feldman (2000, 70) responds in a similar way. I have moulded his response to fit my theory of justification, which is
different to his in some respects, though also borrows from it. 
74 It isn't just against EE that this objection is made. It is made, again and again by different authors in a volume 
discussing Bonjour and Lehrer's versions of Coherentism (1989). Silins (2014) makes this same objection against 
Fumerton's Acquaintance theory of justification. 
75 I offer no account of when a creature is cognitively sophisticated enough, but I take it that there is some such 
distinction to be made, and defer to psychologists and cognitive scientists to fill in the details. 
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bird ought not to have stolen the chips, or that the bird was blameworthy for having stolen them, or
anything of the sort. Yet, by the same token, no one would suppose that what the bird did was
morally acceptable either. Birds are just not proper subjects of moral evaluation. In the same way,
they are not proper subjects of epistemic evaluation either. It is inappropriate to hold birds and
various other animals to the standards of reasonable belief that we expect humans to adhere to. 
Young children are a more difficult case, but something similar holds, I suggest. Young children
certainly do get away with lots of things that it would be completely unacceptable for humans to do.
It is unacceptable, for example, for me to keep my mother awake all night crying because I am
feeling irritable. If I were to do that, everyone would think that what I did was unfair and that I
should not have done it. But, I suggest, we do not want to make that same evaluation of small
infants. We do not react to a child crying late at night with negative evaluation and criticism. We do
not say things like “I can't believe our 6 month old has the audacity to keep me awake all night! He
is a selfish and careless person, and he should not be doing this”. The child  does not know any
better, and for this reason is not seriously held to the standards of acceptable behaviour that an adult
would be held to. 
In just the same way, young children are not appropriately held to the standards of acceptable belief
that cognitively sophisticated adults are held to. Some children believe that they have friends that
they don't actually have (imaginary friends). If I were to hold such a belief, most people would
criticize me for being unreasonable – perhaps even downright stupid – and suggest that I should not
believe it. But if a child is very young, I suggest that it is inappropriate to criticize the child in the
same way - to wit – to say that the child is unreasonable or stupid. The child is simply not old
enough that we can properly demand that they critically reflect on their beliefs in the way demanded
of sophisticated adults76. 
10. Self-Refutation?
EE looks to be self-refuting. The EE policy advices me to form beliefs only when I have a complete
reason for doing so, but I don't have a complete reason to believe EE – all I've got are some 
reflections about what's plausible and what isn't, and who knows whether what's plausible to me has
any bearing on what the true ethics of belief is. Thus, EE will recommend that I don't believe EE. 
The difficulty is of the same form as that faced by the verifiability criterion of meaning – that the 
76 Silins (2014) calls this the “spider man principle”  according to which “greater conceptual power brings along 
greater epistemic responsibility”. That seems to me exactly right. 
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criterion itself is not verifiable and so is itself meaningless. The proponent of EE should reply in the
same way that Carnap defends the verifiability criterion. He distinguishes two kinds of question:
A question of the first kind is a theoretical one; it asks, what is the actual state of affairs; and 
the answer is either true or false. The second question is a practical one; it asks, how shall 
we proceed; and the answer is not an assertion but a proposal or a decision (Carnap, 1936, 
3). 
The verifiability criterion of meaning, Carnap says, answers a question of the second kind. It isn't a 
principle aimed at being true to the facts about meaning, if there are any such facts. It isn't even a 
principle aimed at being true to the facts about the word “meaning” in ordinary English. Carnap 
proposes that we replace the ordinary concept of meaning with the concept of “logical” meaning – a
concept which conforms to the principle of verifiability (Surrovell, 2013). In other words, the 
proposal is that we should treat as meaningful only sentences which meet the verifiability criterion. 
We should proceed from here by disregarding ideas that don't meet the verifiability criterion77.
The proponent of EE should make this same move. EE is not put forward in an attempt to capture 
the true epistemic duties. It isn't even put forward as a principle aimed at being true to the facts 
about the words “acceptable”, “entitled”, “justified”, and the like. Rather, it is a proposed rule. It is 
not a principle which one believes to be true, but a rule one decides to follow. If we take EE that 
way, it isn't self-refuting. EE does not say that you should follow a policy only if you have a 
complete reason for believing it to be the true policy. It says that you should believe something to 
be true only if you have a complete reason for believing it.
Williams likens epistemic norms to the rules of a game:
is talk of correctness, in the sense of truth, out of place with respect to norms? For aren't 
norms like the rules of a game, mere arbitrary conventions?  (Williams, 2004, 156). 
If we follow Williams in this suggestion, the charge of self-refutation has no force at all. When I 
play a game of basketball, I don't believe the rule “you should not carry the ball without dribbling 
it” to be the truth. I decide to follow the rule for the purpose of playing a good game. 
77 Hempel (1950) held that the verifiability criterion was an explication of the ordinary concept of meaning. For a 
sorting through these issues, see Surovell (2013). 
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Of course, in following the rule I might tacitly believe that it is a good rule to follow while 
playing78. So too in following EE. If I believe anything about EE, I might believe merely that it is 
the most plausible policy to adopt out of those I have considered, and I can have a complete reason 
to believe that – a typical philosophical discussion of the implications of different policies, their 
internal consistency and the motivations for them will suffice for that. 
11. Useless?
I have just admitted that the question of what our epistemic duties are is a question to be answered
with a decision about how we want to proceed – about which policies we want. That admission
might cause some trouble for EE and the sceptic, because, if a policy for belief entails that we
should not believe anything, then it is, you might think, a useless policy. Why should we proceed
with it then? For that reason, EE should be rejected. Thus, Williams, in criticizing what he thinks is
the sceptic's policy, writes:
however, I suggest that we look at the issue pragmatically. In saying this, I mean that we
take  into  consideration  the  interests  that  are  subserved  by  practices  of  epistemic
assessment...  standards  of  justification...  can  be  evaluated  in  the  light  of  our  epistemic
interests: avoiding errors, coming to believe significant truths, improving our theories, and
so  on.  Viewed  in  this  pragmatic  perspective,  the  Prior  Grounding  conception  does
particularly badly. No proposed normative structure for our epistemic  practices is useful if it
precludes  making  any  distinction  between  justified  and  unjustified  beliefs.  Unless  this
distinction can be made, there are no such  practices. The Prior Grounding Requirement,
which makes scepticism unavoidable,  is  self-defeating in just  this  way.  The Default  and
Challenge  conception,  which  heads  off  scepticism,  is  normatively  preferable  (Williams,
2004, 156). 
It  is  far  from  clear  that  a  policy  that  entails  Scepticism  “doesn't  serve  our  interests”  in  any
significant sense. Williams lists three interests of “ours”. 
(1) avoiding errors
(2)  coming to believe significant truths
(3)  improving our theories
78 I say “might”. I might not. I might find the rules completely ridiculous and in need of reform, but just be going 
along with it for now. 
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As for (1), if by “avoiding” it is meant “not believing”, then a policy that entails Scepticism does
help  us  avoid  errors,  because  it  councils  us  not  to  believe  anything,  and  one  cannot  believe
erroneously without believing at all. Such a policy helps us with (1) to the maximal degree! 
As for (3), we can improve all of our theories without believing them. Scientists are free to continue
work on theories about the origin of the universe and about the evolutionary history of human
beings  and  Historians  are  free  to  continue  work  on  theories  about  the  culture  of  ancient
civilizations.  Even  philosophers  are  free  to  work  on  theories  about  morality,  metaphysics,
philosophy of religion, philosophy of language and so on. One can develop and improve theories
without  believing  them to  be  true.  So  an  policy  of  belief  with  sceptical  consequences  doesn't
frustrate the goal of improving our theories. 
That just  leaves (2). Obviously a policy which entails that we should not believe anything will
frustrate the goal of believing significant truths, and frustrate it to the maximal degree. Is that a
strong motivation to replace EE with something else? It depends. It depends, first, on whether there
is anything better to replace it with. Second, on whether we should make (2) one of our goals, and
third, on whether there are any other benefits of EE that balance the scales. 
With respect to the first issue, it  is at least unclear that there is anything better. I have heavily
criticized  several  of  the  most  prominent  options,  and  there  are  plenty  more  criticisms  around
besides79. 
With respect to the second issue, many philosophers hold that one of “our” goals is mere true belief.
Now, once you make your goal  the mere “getting it right”, a policy that entails Scepticism will
seem quite unattractive. Yet, I suggest that there is nothing particularly valuable in merely “getting
it right” if it comes with no understanding at all that the belief is true. An illustration from Sextus
Empricus is instructive:
Let us imagine that some people are looking for gold in a dark room full of treasures....
[N]one of them will be persuaded that he has hit upon gold even if he has in fact hit upon it.
In the same way, the crowd of philosophers has come into the world, as into a vast house, in
search of truth. But it is reasonable that the man who grasps the truth should doubt whether
79 Williams (2004, 156-157) admits this point, but he thinks his Contextualism provides the needed alternative, but see 
my discussion of that. 
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he has been successful80.
There is nothing particularly valuable about grabbing a piece of gold in the dark, not at least, for the
person who grabs it. The person who grabs it will never see that he has gold, and so for all the
difference it makes to him, it might as well be a clump of dirt. By that same token, i f I believe that
evolutionary theory is true and happen to be right, there is no particular value in this for me if I
could not even explain to myself why I suppose it to be true. I will be “flying blind” in an obvious
way if I have no answer in my mind at all to the question “why believe that evolutionary theory is
true?”. I could get myself in that state by sitting in my room without doing any research and taking
a guess, and I do not see why anyone would make it a goal of theirs to be in this state for any belief
at all, even if the belief is, as a matter of fact entirely outside of your grasp, true. 
Let me be clear about how strong my suggestion is here. The person who grabs gold in the dark is
no better off in the slightest for, as a matter of fact having a piece of gold, than he would be if he
merely had a clump of mud. It does nothing for him at all. For any purpose that matters to him
whilst in that dark room, a piece of gold is just as good as a piece of mud. The same is true, I
suggest, of a true belief which I hold without any reason for holding it. Even if the belief is, as a
matter of fact, true, it makes absolutely no difference to me for any purpose whatsoever. So long as
the belief is useful for various purposes, it might as well be false. I deny, in short, that there is
anything intrinsically valuable in merely being right. The fact that I can never be right,in this mere
sense -given EE- should not be taken as a strong motivation for the rejection of EE.  
Now to the third issue. A policy that entails Scepticism is of some practical benefit. In collapsing
the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable beliefs it  removes any theoretical basis for
thinking that some ways of thinking about the world are silly and some superior. In so doing it
fights off the inclination to think that the dominant ideas of your time, culture or group of associates
is the best set, and that alternative ways of approaching the world are for quacks. There is just no
room for that distinction in a policy that entails Scepticism. No idea is more credible than its rivals.
Such a  policy therefore  encourages  humility,  open-mindedness  and  free-inquiry,  as  opposed to
rashness, refusal to consider different perspectives, and dogmatism81.
80From Sextus,  Against the Mathematicians, V I I  2 5 9 .
81 Ancient sceptics would have contended that the benefit of their Scepticism is peace of mind and that this benefit 
outweighed any alleged benefits of merely believing truth by accident. I suppose that the reflections just given are 
my replacement for that argument. 
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There is, for these reasons, no good argument for the claim that a policy entailing Scepticism does
not serve our interests. 
12. Conclusion
Though the arguments for Extreme Evidentialism are not absolutely decisive, I claim that they are
somewhat  persuasive.  What's  more,  I  have  here  defended  Extreme  Evidentialism  against  the
strongest  objections  known  to  me.  No  doubt  most  philosophers  will  still  reject  EE,  but  bare
rejection is not argument. Extreme Evidentialism remains an attractive policy, and we dogmatists
find ourselves unable to wriggle free of the sceptic's net. 
Concluding Remarks
1. A Summary
The Pyrrhonian sceptical strategy aims at convincing others first that they have no reason for their 
beliefs, and second that they should give up their beliefs. I have defended this kind of Scepticism in 
several ways. I recount briefly some of those here.
First, I have pointed out numerous times that the philosophers I have considered have not done
anything at all to give any of us any reason to believe anything. Such philosophers have either
conceded that it isn't possible to think of such reasons, or been committed to it by their views. It
seems to me that this is the most fundamental issue in this connection. Even if we can get used to
some weaker standards for belief like Conservatism or Williams' Contextualism, if the sceptic is
right about our lack of reasons, then all of our beliefs are, in the last analysis, mere guess work;
blind faith no more rationally explicable than any system of beliefs there has ever been or ever
could be.  BonJour writes:
 For the denial  that such reasons exist  amounts already to a very severe and intuitively
implausible version of skepticism, no matter what may be said further about the concepts of
justification (and of knowledge). If I have no reasons for thinking that my beliefs are true,
then  I  am  “flying  blind”  in  an  obvious  way,  and  the  seriousness  of  this  result  is  not
diminished in any clear way by adding that in some other, perhaps externalist sense my
beliefs are (or rather may be – see below) still justified (BonJour, 2003, 175). 
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It is this idea that drives the sceptic's pessimistic assessment of ordinary human knowledge and his 
total suspension of judgement. It is, therefore, the heart of Scepticism, and it remains unchallenged 
by everything I have here examined.
Some of the critics of Scepticism  have said that the sceptic's definition of “knowledge” is not the 
ordinary one and that this completely undermines his argument. In reply, I distinguish between 
Semantic Scepticism and Substantive Scepticism. The former is weak to the critic's objection, but 
the latter is not. In defining “knowledge” the way that he does, the substantive sceptic is not at all 
trying to refute ordinary knowledge attributions. What he means to say (or convince us of), rather, is
that ordinary human knowledge is doubtful, fragile and just not that impressive – perhaps even so 
doubtful that we are reproachable for accepting it. 
Other critics have responded to Scepticism not by thinking about epistemic words or by giving good
reasons for our beliefs, but by contending that the sceptic's ethics of belief should be rejected. Here,
I'd like to say something more detailed about what I take myself to have shown. We may distinguish
different grades of response to the sceptic. The first, call it a “Lousy Defence”, is to meet the sceptic
with an incredulous stare, ignore his arguments, call him absurd for even suggesting that we should
not hold our beliefs, and then move on. 
One grade higher is a “Minimal Defence”, which involves locating the assumptions of a sceptical
strategy,  and  then  creating  and  accepting  an  alternative  to  those  assumptions.  One  could,  for
example, create a form of Conservatism as opposed to the sceptic's Extreme Evidentialism, and
then, for no reason at all, just dismiss the latter and accept the former. In other words, one just
creates a non-sceptical way of thinking, and then gives the incredulous stare again. 
One grade further from there is a “Moderate Defence”. A Moderate Defence involves creating an
alternative to the sceptic's assumptions, and then giving some independent reasons to prefer your
alternative. One might, for example, claim that your Contextualist view fits better with “ordinary
practice” and should be accepted for that reason. 
150
Higher  still  is  a “Strong Defence”,  which involves doing all  of  the above and providing some
independent criticisms of the sceptic's assumptions. One might argue, as Williams did, that Extreme
Evidentialism is a policy which would frustrate our goals. 
If what I have argued here is correct, then we have yet to find any independent reasons for rejecting
Extreme Evidentialism, and so we do not have a Strong Defence against the sceptic. Moreover, as
far  as  Contextualism  and  Conservatism  go,  neither  is  a  Moderate  Defence,  because  the  best
arguments for them are no good. 
They aren't even persuasive as Minimal Defences, because both are fraught with their own serious
problems. It is here, in my estimation, that the best argument for the Extreme Evidentialist policy
lies.  Although it  is,  obviously,  a  very strict  and demanding policy,  the  alternatives  that  I  have
considered are all absurdly permissive or else suffer from other theoretical problems. Is there some
middle road between absurdly relaxed epistemic policy and incredibly demanding policy? Until we
locate  the  middle  road,  we  dogmatists  have  nothing  more  than  the  Lousy Defence  –  looking
stubbornly into the sceptic's eyes and refusing to suspend judgement no matter what he says. I take
it that no philosopher is happy with that. 
2. Critical Reflections
The  kind  of  Scepticism I  have  focussed  on  here  is  radical.  It  is  Scepticism about  absolutely
everything. There are more restrained versions of Scepticism which focus on particular domains.
Religious Scepticism is the view that we do not know, ought not to believe, or have no reason to
believe religious claims, chief amongst those claims being that God exists. Several philosophers
have tried to criticize Religious Scepticism in the same ways that more radical Scepticism has been
criticized. Plantinga (2000) argues that Religious Scepticism presupposes a mistaken definition of
“knowledge”, and Swinburne (2004) defends a version Conservatism applied to religious belief.
The latter view is modified and developed in some detail by me (Burns, 2017). It is not hard to
imagine a critic of Religious Scepticism arguing in the way that Michael Williams does either; that
“God exists” is default acceptable in the contexts that religious believers often find themselves. If
my arguments here are right, however, none of these criticisms of Religious Scepticism will be of
any force at all, for the same reasons that they are of no force against more radical Scepticism82. 
82 It should be noted that both Plantinga and Swinburne have much more to say in defending religious belief against 
Scepticism than just these things, but they do rely on these arguments at crucial points in their work. 
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There are various ways in which my discussion here might be improved. I have not discussed every 
anti-sceptical move which philosophers have made. I have stuck to moves which you can find in 
contemporary epistemology and even there I have restrained myself to a subsection of those. I do 
not claim that Scepticism is true or that there is no plausible way to resist Sextus' sceptical strategy. 
I only claim that responses which I, at one time or another, found absolutely decisive are completely
unsatisfying. 
Further, I have not discussed a number of other aspects of the sceptical philosophy. I did not discuss
whether it is possible for the sceptic to consistently or even fruitfully live out his Scepticism. I did 
not discuss the ancient Pyrrhonian idea that suspension of judgement leads to a kind of peace of 
mind. I did not discuss why the sceptic cares so much about convincing others of his sceptical 
theses and I only very briefly touched on the other Pyrrhonian idea that sceptic's are honest truth-
seekers. My omission of these issues is because, for most of the time that I have been thinking about
Scepticism, these issues seemed to me only of secondary importance to those discussed here. I may 
well have changed my mind by now!
I mentioned a moment ago that there are various other arguments in the sceptical tradition than the 
one I have discussed. I chose the Sextan strategy on the grounds that it seemed to me the most 
powerful, but that is not to say that there are no other strong tools in the sceptic's box. No doubt I 
will have cause to examine those arguments in the future, and so too to re-examine the present 
arguments. 
Appendix A. The Conceptual Variation Hypothesis
for Knowledge 
1. A Little Reminder
Some  critics  of  Scepticism  have  accused  the  sceptic  of  using  a  non-ordinary  definition  of
knowledge  in  his  arguments.  The  consequence  is  allegedly  that  the  sceptic  fails  to  contradict
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anything that we believe and that the sceptic's conclusion does not matter. I argued earlier that
neither of these consequences really does follow, even if we admit that the sceptic's definition is
non-ordinary. To this end, I drew a distinction between Semantic and Substantive Scepticism. The
Semantic sceptic denies ordinary knowledge attributions while the Substantive sceptic thinks that
ordinary human knowledge is quite flimsy and unimpressive, even if sentences like “S knows that
P” are often true. 
This appendix is  something of a digression. I have already shown that the sceptic can develop
Substantive  Scepticism in  a  way to  defend it  against  his  linguistic  critics,  but  I  would  like  to
convince other philosophers that Semantic Scepticism, or the business of understanding Scepticism
as the denial of knowledge attributions, is pointless and muddled (good luck to me!). To that end, I
wish  to  make  plausible  the  thought  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  the  ordinary  meaning  of
“knowledge”,  where this means a single meaning shared by all  or at  least  the vast  majority of
people. The corollaries of this are that Scepticism cannot be criticized for using a non-ordinary
definition, because the sceptic's definition is just one among many different definitions.  Semantic
Scepticism entails that your beliefs about what you know are false only if you share the sceptic's
definition of knowledge and there is no saying in general that we do or do not share that definition.
One of two conclusions may be drawn from this; either that Scepticism is a parochial subject which
you need only bother  with if  you accept  one of  the  many definitions  of  “knowledge” floating
around, since only then will it entail that your knowledge attributions are false; or that it is not
philosophically fruitful to understand the issue of Scepticism as one about whether our knowledge
attributions are literally true. At the end of the appendix, I shall suggest that this latter conclusion is
correct, but this is a long way away. First, I shall argue for my claim that there is no such thing as
the ordinary meaning of “knowledge”. I present two arguments, neither of them conclusive on their
own but, I claim, taken together they provide a convincing case. 
Section 2 clarifies what I shall argue. Section 3 gives the first argument. Section 4 gives the second
argument. Section 5 considers the significance of my arguments for the evaluation of Scepticism. 
2. The Conceptual Variation Hypothesis
Almost  20  years  ago,  Harold  Brown  (1999)  criticized  conceptual  analysis  in  philosophy  for
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assuming that all members of the wider community share the same concepts. His claim was:
CV. Members  of  a  conceptual  community  often  associate  different,  although  similar,
concepts with a given term (Brown, 1999, 40).
I will not argue for CV here, but I shall argue for a version of it which is limited to the concept of
knowledge: 
CVK. There are substantial amounts of variation in the concept of knowledge among people
from the same culture.
When I say that there are “substantial amounts of variation” I just mean that different people have
different concepts of knowledge. I am not saying that each individual has a different concept to
every other individual, but I am saying that it is false that everybody or even any large majority of
people  have  the  same  concept  of  knowledge.  When  I  say  that  a  person  “has  a  concept  of
knowledge”, I mean that they use the word “knowledge” as a label for a certain idea. 
Before providing the argument  for  CVK, it  is  necessary to  ward off  an objection which many
readers may already have. That is, if there is so much variation in the concept of knowledge even
between members of the same culture, how can these people ever communicate with one another? If
they were always  using the  word “knowledge” in  a  different  way to one  another,  it  would be
exceedingly difficult for them to understand each other and misunderstandings would be far more
common-place  than  they  seem  to  be.  In  fact,  the  objection  goes,  people  rarely  seem  to
misunderstand each other when making attributions of knowledge, and appear to proceed as though
they understand each other perfectly well. If CVK is true, there ought to be some explanation of this
phenomenon83. 
The first thing to note is, again, that I am not claiming that each individual has a different concept to
every other individual, so that we should expect constant miscommunication every time the word
“knowledge” is used. I am saying only that there is a large amount of variation. Still, the objector is
right  in  thinking that  we should expect  miscommunication  to  occur  quite  often,  given that  the
variation  is  fairly  large.  The  explanation  for  why people  seem to  communicate  so  well  when
discussing knowledge despite conceptual variation is that although the intension of these concepts is
83 Sorin Baiasu once made this argument in conversation with me. See also Brown (1999).
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different, their extension – or at least what people believe to be their extension – is largely the same.
Take  two  people  A and  B.  A defines  knowledge  as  reliably  produced  true  belief.  B  defines
knowledge as rightly held true belief. In most everyday circumstances, when a person forms a belief
rightly – by considering criticisms, looking for evidence, considering alternatives and so on – they
also do so via a reliable process. It is only in a small number of rarely occurring cases that the
extensions  of  the two concepts  diverge.  That  this  is  so is  reinforced by the fact  that  the  most
influential counter-example to the reliability analyses of knowledge was BonJour's (1980, 62) case
of reliable yet irresponsible clairvoyance – a case quite far removed from ordinary situations. It is
the fact that the extensions of the two concepts largely overlap which produces the illusion that A
and B understand one another perfectly in their discussions involving the concept of knowledge. In
fact, since A and B have different concepts of knowledge, if neither of them has clarified what they
mean, the two misunderstand each other, but the misunderstanding does no harm because of the
overlapping extensions. This, then, is the explanation for the appearance of perfect communication. 
The picture I  wish to  defend is  therefore this.  People quite  often mean different  things  to  one
another by “knowledge”, owing to the fact that there are many variations among people's concepts
of  knowledge,  even  within  the  same  culture.  Despite  this,  very  rarely  is  there  any  clear
miscommunication in discussions about knowledge, because the extensions of the concepts of most
people overlap84. 
It is not enough to respond to objections to CVK, I must also marshal some arguments in its favour.
To this I now turn. 
3. The Argument from Philosophical Disagreement 
The first argument involves four claims. First, there is a large amount of disagreement in philosophy
about the meaning of “knowledge”. Second, there is no theory neutral way of deciding who is right.
third, the best explanation of these facts is that philosophers are trying to analyse different concepts.
Having established that philosophers have different concepts of “knowledge” to one another, I argue
that since there is no reason to suppose that the philosophical community is idiosyncratic in this
respect, it is reasonable to expect that the wider community is the same – that there is no ordinary
84 I assumed here that A and B have fairly well defined concepts of knowledge, and I suspect that this is not the case 
for many people. I suspect that many people have an idea of what sorts of things to use the word “knowledge” for, 
but don't have anything like an implicit definition. I leave this aside for now. 
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concept of knowledge. 
Anyone familiar with the literature on the analysis of knowledge will not need telling that there is a
large amount of disagreement about it, but I list here seven different analyses all of which have been
defended in the literature. It should be noted throughout that these are purported analyses of what
“knowledge” means, not only necessary and sufficient conditions: 
JTB. S knows that P if and only if (a) S believes that P, (b) S is justified in believing that P,
(c) P is true (Plato, 1973 Ayer, 1936).
NFE. S knows that P if and only if (a) S believes that P (b) S is justified in believing that P,
(c)  P is  true,  (d)  S's  justification  contains  no false  evidence  (Clark,  1963;  Mcgrew and
Mcgrew, 2006). 
ND. S knows that P if and only if (a) S believes that P, (b) S is justified in believing that P,
(c) P is true, and (d) There are no defeaters for S's justification (Lehrer and Paxson, 1969).
CT.  S knows that p if and only if the fact that p is causally connected in an “appropriate”
way with S’s believing p (Goldman, 1967).
RT. S knows that P if and only if (a) It is true that P, (b) S believes that P, and (c) S's belief
that P results from a reliable belief forming process (Goldman, 1995)85. 
TT. S knows that P if and only if (a) It is true that P, (b) S believes that P, (c)  if in the nearest
possible worlds in which P is not true, S no longer believes that P (Nozick, 1981).
ST. S knows that P if and only if (a) S believes that P, (b) P is true, and (c) In all nearby
worlds in which S believes that P, P is true (Sosa, 1999). 
These are just some of the definitions which have been offered. There is also a great divide between
those who require that a person must be aware of reasons for thinking that their belief is true and
those who deny that requirement  (BonJour, 1980; Fumerton, 2006; Mcgrew, 2006; Bergman, 2011;
Greco, 2011). Moreover, philosophers not only offer differing definitions of knowledge, but they
85 Goldman's final analysis is far more complicated. 
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even disagree explicitly about the extensions of the concept. BonJour (1980) denies that a reliable
clairvoyant  that  has  no  reason to  believe  he  is  a  clairvoyant  can  know anything  by using  his
clairvoyant  powers.  Greco (2006),  however,  maintains  that  the clairvoyant  can gain knowledge
through his special power. Goldman (1976, 772-773) denies knowledge to a man looking at a barn
in a field, who believes that he is looking at a barn in a field because there are many barn facades
around.  McGrew (2006, 18) claims that the man has knowledge. Plantinga (1993, 35) denies that in
general  a  belief  can  be  known  to  be  true  if  it  is  true  “by  accident”.  Mcgrew  (2006,  15-16)
distinguishes the kind of accident involved in the original Getteir cases from other kinds of accident
and holds that only the former are a barrier to knowing.  I take this to establish my claim that there
is substantial disagreement in philosophy about the meaning of “knowledge”. 
My second claim is that there is no theory neutral way of deciding who is right. According to the
conceptual analyst, the target is the implicit rule we all follow in classifying things as “knowledge”.
The rule is, by their own admission, implicit and not the sort of thing we can 'read off' just by
reflecting  on  the  matter.  It  is  also  quite  a  different  sort  of  thing  to,  for  example,  a  biological
specimen, which we can put on a Petri dish and look at as long as we like. We have no such access
in the case of the implicit meaning of “knowledge”. The standard means of solving this problem is
through the use of thought-experiments. Our intuitions about thought-experiment cases can show us
how we would classify cases  and through the  meticulous  study of  these  cases,  we are able  to
hypothesize,  test  and  gradually  refine  our  analysis  (Jackson,  1998).  The  problem  with  this
methodology in the case of knowledge is that, whilst there are a great many very clear cases of
knowledge about which almost everyone agrees, every viable analysis in the literature, including
those listed above, is consistent with all of the uncontroversial cases. The only way to distinguish
between  the  different  analyses  is  by  designing  more  complex  thought-experiments,  and
philosophers usually disagree about the correct response to more complex thought-experiments, as
they do with the clairvoyant case, the barn facade case and others. Thus, the picture is that most
analyses can handle all of the clear cases but each extrapolates from those cases in different ways
(Swinburne, 2001) and there is seemingly no uncontroversial way to decide which extrapolation is
correct.
I doubt that much of this will be controversial, but what will be controversial is my claim that the
best explanation of these facts is that philosophers have different concepts of knowledge and so are
trying to analyse different concepts. The only way I am aware of to argue that some hypothesis is
the  best  explanation  of  data  is  by comparing  that  hypothesis  to  others.  One  explanation  more
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favourable  to  the  traditional  conceptual  analyst  is  that  philosophers  disagree  about  the  correct
analysis because it is an exceedingly difficult matter. On this hypothesis, philosophers all have the
same concept of knowledge, but because it is so hard to produce a correct analysis, they end up
disagreeing  a  lot.  The  reason  it  is  so  difficult,  it  will  be  argued,  is  because  the  meaning  of
“knowledge” being sought is something we understand only implicitly. We unconsciously follow a
rule  which tells  us when to classify something as knowledge and when not to,  but we are not
explicitly aware of what this rule is. To uncover the rule is to provide the correct analysis and this
can be exceedingly difficult (Fumerton, 1983, 489). Call this the Difficulty hypothesis.
The  Difficulty  hypothesis,  unlike  CVK,  does  not  explain  why  philosophers  disagree  over  the
extension of the concept. If what we are doing is trying to make an implicit rule which we usually
follow explicit then one would not expect disagreements over whether a given case is a case of
knowledge, because our implicit understanding of the rule should yield the same classifications, on
the  assumption  that  we  share  the  same  rule.  CVK,  by  contrast,  has  a  ready  explanation.
Philosophers  disagree  about  which  cases  are  cases  of  knowledge  because  they  have  different
concepts. A defender of the Difficulty hypothesis could save it by maintaining that sometimes we
misapply our implicit rule, saying of a case that it fits the rule when it does not really. Due to the
extent to which philosophers disagree over cases, however, such misapplication would have to be
fairly widespread (it is not just one or two cases!), and in any case an explanation is required as to
why  we  misapply  the  rule  in  any  given  case.  Philosophers  have  sometimes  invented  such
explanations in the process of “explaining away” the intuitions of their opponents, but these further
explanations introduce substantial complication into the Difficulty hypothesis. CVK provides the
far simpler explanation. 
Another issue with the Difficulty hypothesis is this. Supposing that it is difficult to make explicit a
rule which we implicitly follow, one wonders just how difficult it can reasonably be thought to be. It
might  be  difficult  enough  that  the  analyses  we  initially  proposed  were  refuted  fairly
straightforwardly by some counter-examples we had not thought of, as in Getteir's examples. But
can it be so difficult as this: that not only did we get it wrong to begin with, but hypotheses about
the correct analysis diverge further and further away from one another as they develop, with some
analyses accommodating some intuitions while shunning others, and vice versa for other analyses in
such a way as to produce seemingly intractable disagreement86? 
86 See Shope (1983) for a documentation of this. 
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Lastly, the most decisive consideration in favour of CVK over the difficulty hypothesis it seems to
me is  this.  Philosophers  have clearly articulated what  they mean by “knowledge” in  all  of  the
different ways I have listed above. Whether or not, for example, Reliabilism is the correct analysis
of the concept shared by most people, what seems clear is that Goldman proposes it as the analysis
of  his  own concept,  and that  those  who reject  Reliabilism deny that  it  is  their  concept87.  The
philosophers who have proposed these analyses at the very least believe that those analyses are the
correct accounts of their own concept.  What better evidence is there that two people have different
concepts  than each person's  having stated what  they take their  concept  to  be,  and those stated
concepts being different? I propose that the simplest explanation of the fact that philosophers have
stated  different  concepts;  the  fact  of  substantial  disagreements  about  the  correct  meaning  of
“knowledge”; and the fact that there is no neutral method of resolving the disagreements is not that
finding the correct analysis of the uni-vocal ordinary meaning is very difficult, but that philosophers
have different concepts of knowledge88. 
Now, having gotten that far, I see no reason to regard the philosophical community as idiosyncratic
in this respect. In producing their analyses of knowledge, philosophers have reflected on counter-
examples and other proposed definitions, and refined their analyses in the ways which struck them
as intuitively correct. So far as I can see, there is no property of this method or the philosophical
community  itself  which  makes  the  philosophical  community  likely  to  have  many  different
conceptions  of  knowledge  whilst  the  wider  community  agrees  uni-vocally.  In  light  of  this,  I
tentatively conclude that the wider community is much like the philosophical one – that CVK is
true. 
4. The Argument from Surveys
The  argument  from philosophical  disagreement  is  by no  means  conclusive.  It  depends  on  my
controversial  claim about  the best  explanation of  various  facts  about  the discipline  and on the
assumption that the philosophical community is not relevantly different to the wider community. It
is  possible to bolster that argument with a second and more direct argument – one which uses
survey data to argue that CVK is true. There has been plenty of empirical work done in recent times
assessing the extent of variation in the concept of knowledge between cultures. Some of this work
87 Goldman (2007) actually says that first and foremost, his analysis is an analysis of what his own meaning. 
88 A similar argument is found in Alston (2005) about “justification”. In a way, this paper is an extension of Alston's 
point about “justification”, which I find plausible, to the concept of knowledge. 
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has suggested very great differences (Weinberg, 2001), but more recent work has emphasized a
degree of agreement (Nagel, 2013; Kim & Yuan, 2015; Seyedsayamdost, 2015; Turri, 2017). What
has not been recognized, however, is that the data in these very same studies shows substantial
variation in the concepts of knowledge of participants from the same culture. The studies provide
evidence for CVK. I will simply present each study and note the places where conceptual variation
is indicated. 
 In  a  much discussed study,  Weinberg (2001) found significant  differences  in  the  intuitions  of
Westerners compared to East Asians when they were presented with this variant of a Gettier Case:
The Buick Case
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.  Bob therefore thinks that Jill
drives an American car.  He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen,
and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of
American car.   Does Bob really know that Jill  drives an American car,  or does he only
believe it?
The vast majority of Westerners had the intuition that Bob does not know, whilst the majority of
East Asians said just the opposite – that Bob does know. The contrast was even more pronounced
when comparing  the  intuitions  of  Westerners  to  Indian,  Pakistani  and Bangladeshi  participants
(Weignberg, 2001). The results are shown below:
The Buick Case Really Knows Only Believes
Westerners 26.00% 74.00%
East Asians 53.00% 47.00%
Southern Asians 61.00% 39.00%
Figure 1: Buick Case Intuitions
Notice here that 26% of Westerners attributed knowledge whilst 74% chose “only believes”. The
majority  of  participants  went  with  “only believes”  but  26% is  not  a  small  minority  of  people
seemingly exhibiting responses indicative of a different concept of knowledge to the other 74%. 
Another case of crucial importance in the debate about the analysis of knowledge was a case put
forward by Lehrer:
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TrueTemp Case
One day Charles was knocked out by a falling rock; as a result his brain was “rewired” so
that  he is  always  right  whenever  he estimates  the  temperature where he is.   Charles  is
unaware that his brain has been altered in this way.  A few weeks later, this brain rewiring
leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his room.  Apart from his estimation, he has no
other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees.  In fact, it is 71 degrees. 
The vast majority of Philosophers thought that the TrueTemp Case was intuitively not a case of
knowledge. Even Goldman and Alston, figureheads of RT, took the TrueTemp Case to present a
very serious problem for their analyses. Weinberg (2001) found that most Westerners share that
same intuition, but a significantly greater percentage of East Asians share it:
TrueTemp Case Really Knows Only Believes
Westerners 32.00% 68.00%
East Asians 12.00% 88.00%
Figure 2.: TrueTempt Case Intuitions
The  statistically  significant  difference  disappears,  however,  if  the  TrueTemp  Case  is  changed
slightly. If, instead of a rock causing changes to Charles' perceptual system, the entire of Charles'
community undergoes those changes, the percentage of East Asians reporting that Charles 'only
believes' falls significantly:
Community TrueTemp Case Really Knows Only Believes
Westerners 20.00% 80.00%
East Asians 32.00% 68.00%
Figure 3: Community TrueTemp Case Intuitions
These  findings  suggest  that  East  Asians'  knowledge  attributions  are  sensitive  to  considerations
about the wider community in a way which Westerners' attributions are not (Beebe, 2012,5). Again,
the key point for my purposes is not the cross cultural difference but the within-culture difference.
In the first trial 32% of participants chose “really knows” as against 68%, and in the second trial the
split  was  20%-80%.  The people  attributing  knowledge are  in  the  minority,  but  they are  not  a
negligible minority. 
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In perhaps the largest scale study so far, Stich et al (2016) surveyed 245 participants from the US,
India, Japan and Brazil finding that the substantial majority of participants denied knowledge in the
Gettier cases presented whilst affirming knowledge in standard “non-Gettiered” cases of justified
true belief. These results lead the authors to hypothesize a “underlying innate and universal core
folk  epistemology”  (Stich  et  al,  2016,  8)  such that  people  of  all  cultures  possess  a  concept  of
knowledge which requires more than justified true belief. That may or may not be, but Stich et al's
(2016) results  also reveal  differences within the US when participants are  presented with these
Getteir cases:
Gettier/Hospital Case 
Paul Jones was worried because it was 10 pm and his wife Mary was not home from work
yet. Usually she is home by 6 pm. He tried her cell phone but just kept getting her voicemail.
Starting to worry that something might have happened to her, he decided to call some local
hospitals to ask whether any patient by the name of “Mary Jones” had been admitted that
evening.  At  the  University  Hospital,  the  person  who  answered  his  call  confirmed  that
someone  by  that  name  had  been  admitted  with  major  but  not  life-threatening  injuries
following a car crash. Paul grabbed his coat and rushed out to drive to University hospital.
As it turned out, the patient at University Hospital was not Paul’s wife, but another woman
with the same name. In fact, Paul’s wife had a heart attack as she was leaving work, and was
at that moment receiving treatment in Metropolitan Hospital, a few miles away. 
Gettier/Trip Case
 Luke works in an office in New York with two other people, Victor and Monica. All winter
Victor has been describing his plans to go to Las Vegas on his vacation, even showing Luke
the website of the hotel where he has reservations. When Victor is away on vacation, Luke
receives a very nice email from Victor together with photos of Victor posing in front of Las
Vegas landmarks. When he gets back to work, Victor talks a lot to Luke about how much fun
he had vacationing in Las Vegas. However, Victor didn’t really go on the trip; he has just
been pretending. His tickets and reservations were cancelled because his credit card was
maxed out, and he secretly stayed home in New York, very skillfully faking the photos he
sent Luke. Meanwhile, Monica just spent a weekend vacationing in Las Vegas, but kept this
a secret from all her co-workers.
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Stich et al (2016) asked participants two questions about these cases. They first asked participants
whether the protagonist of the case has knowledge. They then asked which of these two was the
more  accurate  description:  (i)  “[Protagonist]  knows  that  [relevant  proposition],”  and  (ii)
“[Protagonist] feels like [s]he knows that [relevant proposition] but [s]he doesn’t actually know
[this].”. In the hospital case, 30% of participants attributed knowledge and 15% chose (I) in answer
to the second question. In the trip case, 40% of participants attributed knowledge and 25% chose
option (I).  These results  once more indicate that even within the same culture,  there exist non-
negligible variations in people's concepts of knowledge. 
Cullen (2010) criticized Weinberg's cross-cultural findings on the grounds that participants had to
choose between 'really knows' and 'only believes'. 'Really knows', Cullen argues, might suggest to
the participants a very strong concept of knowledge and they might understand the question 'does
Charles  really know?' as a question about whether Charles can be absolutely certain. Participants
might  understand the  concept  of  'really  knowing'  differently to  the  concept  'knowing'.   To see
whether  this  was  so,  Cullen  replicated  Weinberg's  study  using  both  the  Buick  Case  and  the
TrueTemp Case. Cullen's study had two stages. He first presented the cases and gave Weinberg's
two non-dichotomous options,  “Really knows” and “Only Believes”.  He then retested the same
cases using the dichotomous options - “knows” and “does not know”. 
Concerning  the  Buick  Case,  Cullen  found  that  almost  exactly  like  Weiberg's  study,  71%  of
participants opted for “Only Believes” when given the non-dichotomous options. When given the
dichotomous options,  however,  subjects  were substantially more likely to attribute knowledge -
42% chose “knows”when given dichotomous options, whilst only 29% chose “really knows” given
non-dichotomous options (Cullen, 2010). 
The difference was even more pronounced concerning the TrueTemp Case. Cullen found that only
28% of  participants  responded  “really  knows”  given  non-dichotomous  options,  whilst  57% of
participants chose “knows” given dichotomous options. Participants were twice as likely to attribute
knowledge given dichotomous options as opposed to non-dichotomous ones (Cullen, 2010)89. 
Yet, the within culture difference is even more pronounced in Cullen's study. As mentioned, 42% of
89 Cullen's paper contains a penetrating critique of the methods of experimental philosophy. It is actually very difficult 
to gain insight into lay concepts using survey methodology. One reason for this is that  participants do not typically 
grasp why they are being asked questions about the bizarre cases they are being asked about, and this can have a 
distorting influence on the answers that they give. 
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Western participants in Cullen's study reported that the subject of a Gettier Case had knowledge.
Philosophers have taken it for-granted since Gettier's (1963) paper that subject's in Gettier Cases
intuitively do not know, and this was the chief refutation of the traditional justified,  true belief
analysis of knowledge. Yet, 42% of the participants in Cullen's study do not share that intuition.
Similarly, the majority of philosophers took the subject in the TrueTemp Case intuitively not to have
knowledge90, and yet in Cullen's study 57% of participants affirm that the subject of the case does
know. Cullen's findings thus suggest great differences between the intuitions of Philosophers and
those of a large number of non-philosophers. Moreover, 42% is just barely a minority and 57% just
barely a majority, suggesting once more that there are variations in the concepts of knowledge of
non-philosophers, even concerning cases which philosophers took to be uncontroversial. 
In  fact,  even  the  studies  which  demonstrate  substantial  cross-cultural  consistency  in  intuitions
indicate that a sizeable minority of Westerners dissent from the intuition that Gettier Cases are not
cases of knowledge. In Nagel's (2013) study, 31% of participants from the 'white'  ethnic group
attributed knowledge in Gettier  cases with 69% not doing so91.  Starsman and Friedman (2012)
distinguish between cases in which a subject forms a belief on the basis of authentic evidence and
cases  in  which   the  belief  is  formed on the  basis  of  apparent  evidence.  Authentic  evidence  is
evidence  which  is  'informative  about  the  world'  (Starsman  and  Friedman,  2012,  7),  whereas
apparent evidence merely appears to be. They give this example:
Piggy Bank Case
Corey puts a coin dated 1936 into his piggy bank and therefore believes that his piggy bank
contains a 1936 quarter. Although the coin is later removed by his room mate his belief
remains true because the piggy bank contains a different, previously unnoticed 1936 quarter.
In the authentic evidence version of the case, Corey puts a genuine 1936 quarter into his piggy
bank. In the apparent evidence version, Corey puts a coin in the piggy bank which looks like a 1936
coin but is actually a 1938 coin. Starsman and Friedman (2012) claim that both types of case are
such that most philosophers would say that they are not cases of knowledge. At the very least, cases
of apparent evidence are much like the Sheep in the Field and Clock Cases discussed earlier. In any
90 As I have said, this intuition was even shared by Goldman the most well-known proponent of Reliabilism.
91 Of course, a person who is not in the ethnic group Nagel labels 'white' may still be from the west and particularly 
from the US. It is also possible that someone from the 'white' group is not from the west. The percentage of 
knowledge attribution from other ethnic groups ranges from 27% for 'black' to 64% for 'other' (Nagel, 2013) – and 
these are all decently sized percentages, although the number of participants in  each group is not very large. 
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case, participants attributed knowledge 67% of the time in the authentic evidence case and 30% of
the time in apparent evidence cases (Starsman and Friedman, 2012, 7). Given this work, it seems
difficult  to  deny  that  a  substantial  body  of  the  wider  population  do  not  share  the  intuitions
Philosophers have about cases which have proved pivotal in the debate92. Moreover, we see yet
again that the most common response of participants is far from a gaping majority indicating once
more conceptual variations in the general population.
Wright (2010) appears to have found similar results while using the TrueTemp Case to investigate
whether  the  order  in  which  thought-experiments  are  presented  has  an  effect  on  the  intuitions
participants have (see the next section). When TrueTemp is preceded by a clear case of knowledge,
40% of participants attributed knowledge. When TrueTemp is preceded by a clear case of non-
knowledge,  55% of  participants  attributed  knowledge.  Lastly,  when  TrueTemp  is  preceded  by
another controversial case (the Fake Barn Case), 26% of participants attributed knowledge. The
relevant points here are, first, that much like in Cullen's study, a substantial body of participants
attributed knowledge in the TrueTemp Case, contra the majority of philosophers – and Internalist
Philosophers  in  particular.  These  results  do  seem to  suggest  that  a  substantial  portion  of  the
population have an externalist conception of knowledge, although more detailed work is needed to
support  this  hypothesis.  Second,  the percentage of  knowledge attribution in  each case leaves a
sizeable number of participants not attributing. When TrueTemp is preceded by a clear case of non-
knowledge, knowledge attribution rates are almost half and half! 
In Cullen's study, 43% of participants denied that the TrueTemp Case was a case of knowledge.
When  asked  why  they  denied  it,  the  majority  of  those  participants  gave  clearly  Internalist
explanations:
(1) Charles only “believes” because he’s got no reason to think he’d be spot on, it’s just a
guess as far as he’s concerned. Perhaps if he’d been noticing on occasion after occasion that
he’s guessing the right temperature, then he would get to the stage where [we] could say “he
knows”. 
(2) Charles’ belief is influenced by a sub-conscious activity in his brain. For his belief to
become knowledge, he would have to become aware that he has some kind of crazy human
92 This is overlooked by most researchers in this area, perhaps because most of the studies in which the data can be 
found have focussed on other hypotheses. 
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thermometer power, and thus know that his brain can tell the temperature. Now it is just a
strange, instinctive belief. 
Cullen writes that ,”almost all subjects explicitly cited the internalist intuition that in order to count
as knowing that p, one must be aware of one’s reasons for believing p, in support of their responses”
(Cullen, 2010, 16). 67% of participants, attributed knowledge, suggesting that they did not share the
Internalist requirements on knowledge. A number of Philosophers have held that ordinary language
contains both of these senses of 'knowledge' (Swinburne, 2001).
This concludes my presentation of the within culture data. It should be clear from what has been
said  that  in  every  study  mentioned,  whenever  there  has  been  a  majority  response  made  by
participants, there has always been a non-negligible number of participants who dissent. In some
cases, the minority almost reaches 50%.  How should we explain this fact? In a different context,
Nagel (2012, 22) notes that the fact that many lay people dissent from the philosophically standard
intuitions may be the result of them misunderstanding the cases. She notes that Gettier cases may be
'taxing to follow' and that participants do not have the motivation that professional philosophers
have to read the case closely. This might result in them only picking up the gist of the story and
thereby responding in a way that they might not have if they had read more thoroughly. We might
adapt this same explanation for why intuitions are sometimes divided. It is not that people have
different concepts of knowledge. They have the same concepts, but they misunderstand the cases, or
they fail to correctly apply their own implicit concept93. 
 It is always possible when using surveys that participants misunderstand what they are being asked
to comment on, but the Buick case is not really that taxing. I think that S owns an American Car
because I've seen her Buick. That Buick has since been replaced by S with another American Car.
Participants could misunderstand the case, as Nagel notes, if they don't really care and are just skim
reading. Yet, the dissenting population in some of these studies is quite large, ranging from 25% -
67% depending  on the  case  and the  study and one  would  not  expect  so  many participants  to
misunderstand  or  misread  the  thought-experiments.  Moreover,  Nagel's  own  study  contains  a
comprehension question, which should help weed out participants who are not paying attention, yet
she still finds many people attributing knowledge in Gettier Cases (35% in one survey. Nagel (2013,
6)) and still finds the within culture variation that I have been trying to bring out94. 
93 This seems to be a variant of the Difficulty hypothesis discussed earlier. 
94With respect to the finding that many people attribute knowledge in the TrueTemp Case, Nagel 
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Although it may be possible to provide explanations for each particular study as to why there is
apparent conceptual variation without conceding that it is actual, it seems to me that, again, the
simplest and most explanatory hypothesis is that apparent conceptual variation is actual conceptual
variation, and that CVK is true. 
The important question remaining is, how great is the conceptual variation within, for example, the
English speaking Western culture? There has not been enough detailed work to tell. The majority of
empirical studies conducted have focussed on variants of the classic Getteir cases and the TrueTemp
case. The fact that there is considerable variation in responses to these cases indicates variations in
both whether justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge and whether a person needs to be
aware of a reason for their belief in order to know it to be true. There are, however, many other
thought-experiments which remain unexamined and these might reveal greater or lesser variation. I
suspect that, if variation arises even about Gettier cases, which philosophers took to be absolutely
decisive,  variations  will  only  be  more  prominent  in  response  to  more  controversial  thought-
experiments. 
5. Scepticism and The Conceptual Variation Hypothesis
Let us return now to Scepticism and ordinary talk about knowledge. Many philosophers have tried
to criticize sceptical arguments by claiming that they make use of a definition of knowledge which
is non-ordinary. The sceptic allegedly defines knowledge in a non-standard way and then concludes
that we cannot know anything (Greco, 2011, 124-127; Goldman, 1995, 33-57, ; Hill, 1999). 
In support of CVK I have  given two arguments – that from philosophical disagreement and that
from surveys.  I do not think that either argument by itself makes a strong case for CVK, but I
submit that both arguments taken together indicate that CVK is true. Of course, it would be better to
have more detailed survey work on conceptual variation which involves larger sample sizes and
more thought-experiments, but the evidence we do have points in the direction of CVK. 
(2012) argues that the case, as presented, is under-described in comparison to Lehrer's original and 
that this leaves the case open to interpretation in various ways. It isn't clear how presenting the fully
described case would influence the results, since the fully described case is such that even 
Reliabilist Philosophers could admit that it is not a case of knowledge since it is not then an instance
of a reliably produced true belief. 
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If CVK is true the above criticism  of Scepticism makes no sense. It cannot be a criticism of the
sceptic's argument that he uses the word “knowledge” in a non-ordinary way because if CVK is true
there is no ordinary way – there are many different ways, which are more or less common. The
sceptic's  definition  is  therefore  just  one  among  the  many  different  definitions.  But  this  point
apparently cuts both ways. It is true that the sceptic cannot be criticized for using a non-ordinary
definition, but it is equally true that the sceptic, in defining “knowledge” his way, may easily argue
for a conclusion which is not at odds with any one of our beliefs about what we know. Since there is
no ordinary definition, he cannot claim that his is it, and we cannot claim that it isn't. He cannot
therefore confidently assert that all our knowledge attributions are false and we cannot confidently
assert that he is unable to show this. He may show it for some people, and not for others. 
I suggest that it would be an unsatisfying deflation of Scepticism to let the issue rest there. The
great sceptical writings of philosophy must surely get at more than the bland point that if you share
one of the many definitions of “knowledge” bandied about in society, some of your beliefs are false;
and if not, not. The Conceptual Variation Hypothesis suggests, therefore, that neither the sceptic nor
his opponents should understand the issue as one of whether ordinary knowledge claims are literally
true95.  My suggestion  is  that  we instead  try to  see  what  the  sceptic  means  by his  words,  not
worrying about  whether  he  is  using  words  in  an  “ordinary”  way,  and then  try to  evaluate  his
argument for soundness and significance. 
Appendix B. Some Comments on Methodology
Here I have assessed various accounts of when we should and should not hold beliefs. In my terms,
I have assessed various epistemic policies. This brings us to an important issue. How does one
properly decide which policies are correct? The method philosophers typically use in discussions of
the question is  the one invented by Plato – test  theories  by evaluating the plausibility of their
implications (their plausibility according to us!). Here is one of Plato's uses of the method in a
discussion of justice: 
Well said, Cephalus, I replied: but as concerning justice, what is it?--to speak the truth and to
95 This is the most common interpretation of the issue (Cohen, 2011; Bergman, 2011; Greco, 2011; Goldman, 1995; 
Fogelin, 1994; Prichard, 2011)
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pay your debts--no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose a
friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is
not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or
that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak
the truth to one who is in his condition. 
You are quite right, he replied. 
But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of 
justice. 
Quite correct, Socrates (Plato, 2010, 595).
The method is explained most lucidly by Goodman in his discussion of how we are to decide on the
correct rules of inference:
How do we justify a deduction? Plainly by showing that it conforms to the general rules of
deductive inference.... Analogously, the basic task in justifying an inductive inference is to
show  that  it  conforms  to  the  general  rules  of  induction.  
Yet, of course, the rules themselves must eventually be justified. The validity of a deduction
depends  not  upon  conformity  to  any  purely  arbitrary  rules  we  may contrive,  but  upon
conformity to valid rules.... But how is the validity of rules to be determined? ... Principles
of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive practice.
Their  validity depends upon accordance with the particular  deductive inferences that  we
actually make and sanction. If a rule yields inacceptable inferences, we drop it as invalid.
Justification of general rules thus derives from judgments rejecting or accepting particular
deductive  inferences.  
This looks flagrantly circular.  I have said that deductive inferences are justified by their
conformity to valid general rules, and that general rules are justified by their conformity to
valid  inferences.  But  this  circle  is  a  virtuous one.  The point  is  that  rules  and particular
inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other.  A rule is
amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it
violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of
making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement
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achieved lies the only justification needed for either (Goodman, 1955, 66-67).
In  Plato's  discussion,  he  applies  the  method  to  discussions  about  justice,  and  in  Goodman's
discussion he is talking about rules of inference. The same method is used in epistemology as a
means  of  discussing  standards  of  reasonable  belief.  A standard  is  rejected  if  it  has  too  many
implausible implications that we are not prepared to swallow. We might,  on the other hand, be
happy to live  with  one or  two implausible  implications  if  a  given standard is  overwhelmingly
appealing in other respects. We might say with Goodman, that the process is one of making mutual
adjustments  between  standards  for  reasonable  belief  and  judgements  about  what  is  and  it  not
reasonable, and when we reach a balance between the two we arrive at a successful theory. 
The method is not just that. One's views about the correct epistemic standards must cohere not just
with  one's  judgements  about  what  is  and  isn't  reasonable,  but  also  with  all of  one's  other
commitments, where these commitments might be moral, metaphysical, logical, scientific, etc. As
DePaul puts it:
the method of reflective equilibrium directs the philosopher to... (I) reflect upon her beliefs
and the logical and evidential interconnections among her beliefs, (ii) to try to construct
“theories” that are intuitively appealing on their own and that account for various categories
of beliefs, for example, judgements about right and wrong, epistemic judgements [etc], and
(iii) to resolve such conflicts as are uncovered in the course of these reflections and efforts at
theory construction on the basis of what comes to seem most likely to be correct as a result
of still further reflection (DePaul, 1998, 298-299).
That is pretty much the method that I use here. 
Objection. Obviously, the whole method is guided solely by the philosopher's beliefs, commitments
and judgements. That might lead some people to think that that is a rather silly method for thinking
about anything. Indeed, it is easy to imagine someone outside of philosophy – perhaps someone
used to methods which are allegedly more “objective” in other areas – who finds the method of
reflective equilibrium completely ridiculous. DePaul (1998) imagines just such a reaction to his
characterization of the method. 
Reply.  What  is  the  alternative  to  Reflective  Equilibrium characterized  by  (I),  (ii)  and  (iii)  by
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DePaul? Each person already has, like it or not, philosophical beliefs; beliefs about how we should
act and how we should believe; about what humans can achieve in scientific investigation; about
whether there is a God and what they are like, and so on. Those people also have a raft of more
plain beliefs that they take fore-granted in everyday life. Reflective Equilibrium is the attempt to
bring all  of those beliefs  into a  neat and coherent  system or way of thinking about the world.
Moreover, it isn't like you are trapped in a cage of your own beliefs. The philosopher is free to (and
probably should) incorporate the insights of other philosophers, or the data of science, or any other
such things, but all of that is just more Reflective Equilibrium; it is incorporating things that the
philosopher judges to be important and relevant. When the method succeeds, the result is a system
of beliefs that is more credible than the one you started with, in virtue of its increased coherence.
So, using the method is far better than doing nothing at all and staying at the pre-reflective level. 
Objection. A persistent objector will remain unsatisfied by that. It is all good to make the method of
Reflective Equilibrium sound more rigorous by talking about how it can incorporate “the data of
science”  and  “the  insights  of  other  philosophers”.  Those  parts  aren't  the  ridiculous  parts.  The
ridiculous parts are the parts which are most salient in this work, namely, rejecting a policy of belief
because the author's  opinion is  that  it  has absurdly implausible  implications.  That  is  ridiculous
because it is not “objective” enough, so the thought might go. 
Stich  (2001)  calls  this  kind  of  reliance  on  the  philosopher's  judgement  “Intuition  Driven
Romanticism” and claims that it groundlessly (and naively) assumes that our mere opinions are
somehow a reliable guide to the truth. It assumes that “knowledge of the correct epistemic norms is
implanted within us in some way, and with the proper process of self-exploration we can discover
them” (Stich, 2001, 627)96.  Against the view he objects: “what reason is there to think that the
output of [this strategy] has real normative force?” (Stich, 2001, 628). That is,  why think that my
judgements about, for example, what are and are not plausible epistemic norms, have any baring at
all on whether the norm in question is correct? “Why, in short, should we take any of this stuff
seriously?” (Stich, 2001, 628)97. 
His question is made salient by the fact that there are logically possible people who will have very
different judgements to  mine about the acceptability of the implications  of a given theory,  and
different reactions to thought-experiments aimed at highlighting those implications. If those people
96 He cites Plato as an early defender of this way of thinking, and not without some justice. 
97 DePaul (1998) struggles hard to turn back this criticism, but seems to admit by the end of the paper that he has no 
answer to it. 
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used  my method  of  relying  on  their  judgements  about  thought-experiments  to  assess  a  set  of
epistemic standards, they would arrive at very different conclusions to mine. Given that fact, why,
Stich says, should I think that my judgements are particularly important? This problem is only made
more acute by the empirical evidence he cites in the very same paper, which shows that there really
are many actual people who have all sorts of different epistemic standards and form and revise their
beliefs by very different norms (Stich, 2001, 629-639)98. The conclusion Stich draws is:
In light of this... Intuition Driven Romaticism seems a rather bizarre way to determine the
correct  epistemic  norms.  For  it  is  difficult  to  see  why a  process  that  relies  heavily  on
epistemic intuitions that are local to one's own cultural and socioeconomic group would lead
to genuinely normative conclusions. Pending a detailed response to this problem, we think
that  the best  reaction to  the High-SES, Western philosophy professor who tries to  draw
normative conclusions from the facts about “our” intuitions is to ask: What do you mean
“we”? (Stich, 2001, 642)
Reply. If  I  thought  that  there were objective truths,  “out  there” which determine my epistemic
duties, I suppose it would be silly to expect that I could discover such truths by relying on my own
plausibility judgements. But I don't think that. It is up to us to decide what our epistemic duties are,
or, how I would prefer to put it, which epistemic policies we want to adopt. It is up to each person
to decide. There are, obviously, better and worse ways to decide, even if there is no absolutely true
way to decide. Any sensible anti-realist will admit that much (Lycan, 2019). 
Thus the philosopher considers various policies and weighs them against his other commitments
and the criticisms/insights of his dialectical partners. He tries to arrive at a more coherent view than
he started with, and so to work-out which epistemic policies he will accept. Of course, he needn't,
and perhaps even shouldn't, do just that. There is no a priori reason why he can't do other things. He
can offer constructive help to others, by helping them to see the implications of their own policies
or views more generally, and he can explore alternative ways of thinking to his own – I did this here
with  the  Pyrrhonian  sceptic  –  and  see  what  can  be  said  for  them.  In  this  way,  although  the
philosopher can't answer your philosophical questions for you, he can lay out all of the various
answers, restlessly exploring all of them as far as he can (Shand, 2017). It might be nice to have
something “more rigorous” or “objective”, but you can't always get what you want. 
98 See Stich (2001) for a fascinating overview of the relevant data. See also my own Appendix A, in this work. 
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Back to the data. Stich's data shows that people often do react differently to thought-experiments in
this  area and so that  people really may prefer  different  epistemic  policies.  That  by itself  is  no
objection to my methods. Anyone with different opinions to mine is perfectly welcome to join the
conversation about which epistemic policies we should decide on, and that person may or may not
be  convinced  by  an  argument  which  relies  on  my  judgements  about  the  plausibility  of  the
implications  of  various  proposals.  There  are,  fortunately other  kinds  of  argument  which  might
convince them. I might try to show that the epistemic standard he accepts is in conflict with other
things that he believes. For instance, I might show that his ethics of belief entails that he ought not
to believe that there is a God, and that he believes that there is a God. It is then open to him to
revise one of the two. Obviously he might abandon his belief that there is a God and retain his ethic
of belief and so remain unconvinced. Indeed, he may or may not be convinced by any argument I
can offer him,  plausibility judgements  or no,  but that  is  not an objection to  my using such an
argument. It is a mere summary of the limits of Philosophy99.
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